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Vietnamese rulers since the tenth century endeavored to create a kingdom 
domain that has become the basis for modern Vietnam’s territorial claims. This 
expansion in the shadow of the northern giant, China, was in terms of politics, 
economics, culture and demographics. The political and economic centre of 
Vietnam had shifted with the kingdom’s consolidation, the expansion of territories 
and the dynasties’ fortunes. This dissertation covers a number of intriguing 
questions that arise from events related to Vietnam's history from1802 to1874. In 
this time span, issues of trade and Sino-Vietnamese relations compounded 
important elements in Vietnam’s national development. 
 Nguyễn Vietnam expanded commercial contacts with China in 1802 along the 
familiar lines of traditional Sino-Vietnamese relations, namely tributary relations. 
Some of the prominent official activities between Vietnam and China included 
tributary trade, extraditing and repatriating criminals and rescuing wrecked 
Chinese ships. The Nguyễn dynasty was seemingly comfortable in retaining the 
traditional mould of the Sino Vietnamese relationship. In addition, authorised 
Sino-Vietnamese commerce also proceeded quickly. Plying junks and itinerant 
merchants knitted a huge commercial network in northern Vietnam.  
Aside from this legal commercial network, the invisible network of illegal 
trade also existed. The commercial activities performed by illegal merchants such 
as pirates, bandits, fraud merchants and officials not only influenced the economic 
but also the security policies in Nguyễn Vietnam. Therefore, Vietnam issued royal 
edicts forbidding items of all kinds and consolidated national defence in an 
attempt to solve some problems that originated from a burgeoning Asian economy. 
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These trade and security issues signaled how Nguyễn Vietnam endeavored to 
adjust traditional Sino-Vietnamese relations while at the same time seeking 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1. Questions 
This paper covers a number of intriguing questions that arise from events in Vietnamese 
history during the period 1802 to 1874, during which trade and Sino-Vietnamese 
relations compounded important elements in national development. Before we go any 
further, a brief account of the principal events is necessary to understand the context in 
which my questions are posed. The questions then follow this account. 
During their reigns, Vietnam’s rulers oversaw the extraordinary expansion of Nam 
tiến, which lasted more than two centuries, creating a kingdom domain that has become 
the basis for modern Vietnam’s territorial claims. This expansion was political, 
economic, cultural and demographic. The political and economic centres of Vietnam 
shifted southward, and the expansion of territory shifted with the rise and decline of 
dynasties. 
The prelude to Sino-Vietnamese relations began when the Qin Emperor (BC 247) 
established Nan Hai (南海), Gui Lin (桂林) and Xiang (象郡) as administrative units in 
Southern China. Triệu Đà(赵佗) did not achieve his aim to make Nam Việt nto an 
independent kingdom ruled by the Han dynasty. Before the seventh century, China had 
undergone various different separatist regimes by force of arms. Such regimes in 
southern China fostered Vietnamese (Jiao Zhi 交址) independence from China. In the 
tenth century, northern Vietnam completed independence from China, when the Song 
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occupied half of the country and were busy fighting with the northern Liao. However, it 
was not easy for the Vietnamese to survive in the shadow of the northern giant. 
Subsequently, they began to dance to China’s tune in terms of war and tribute relations. 
Ðại Việt did not stop developing even though it suffered under the Ming in the 
fourteenth century. After its independence from China, Vietnam moved through the 
dynasties of Đinh (968–980), Lê (980–1009), Lý (1010–1225), Trần (1225–1400), Hồ 
(1400–1407) and later Trần dynasty (1407–1413), and Lê (1428–1527). After the Ming 
occupation, the Lê dynasty united Ðại Việt until the fifteenth century. Soon afterward, 
Ðại Việt was divided into two parts, between the Trịnh family and the Nguyễn families, 
after the Mạc had usurped the throne. The Trịnh controlled Đàng Ngoài, while the 
Nguyễn family occupied Đàng Trong. It is well known that the southward expansion 
begun by Nguyễn Hoang lasted nearly two centuries, and was the basis for the birth of 
Nguyễn Vietnam in 1802. Then, in the 1780s, the Tây Sơn (西山) Nguyễn brothers 
defeated the Trịnh Lord, and in 1786 entered Thăng Long (升龙), the capital of the Le 
dynasty at the time. However, Tây Sơn supremacy under Quang-Trung (光中) did not 
last long. By the end of the eighteenth century, Nguyễn Phúc Ánh had finally defeated 
Quang-Trung and reunited Vietnam with the help of French mercenaries. 
Nguyễn Phúc Ánh reunited Vietnam and set the capital at Huế in the centre of the 
kingdom in 1802, so as to control both southern and northern Vietnam. The expansion 
of Nguyễn Vietnam did not halt, but continued after the Nguyễn Dynasty was founded. 
The imperial successors of the Nguyễn family in the nineteenth century henceforth ruled 
 3 
the whole of Vietnam, based on the stable foundation provided by their predecessors. 
Commerce was crucial while the Nguyễn Lord managed the south, and they presented a 
bastion for Vietnam and offered ‘a new way of being Vietnamese’.1
                                                 
1 Li Tana, Nguỹên Cochinchina: Southern Vietnam in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
(Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1998), p. 99. 
 The successful 
localisation mechanisms developed by the Nguyễn family in the south undoubtedly 
influenced the mode of ruling the kingdom for succeeding leaders of the new dynasty in 
both southern and northern Vietnam. With the rise and decline of the dynasty, numerous 
social vicissitudes occurred on the northern frontier, both on land and at sea, as the 
political and economic centres of Vietnam shifted southward even though the northern 
frontier as a historically the fundamental part did not seem to be a huge territorial 
alteration geographically. China, as both Vietnam’s major partner and threat, also 
played a historically significant role in the process of Nguyễn’s state-formation, through 
the Sino-Vietnamese commercial relationship. The question that the Nguyễn faced in 
making the transition from being just Chúa Nguyễn (Lord Nguyễn) ruling over Đang 
Trung to being Nguyễn ruling over all of Đại Nam was how to maintain a balance 
between the traditional northern frontier and the new political and economic centres in 
the south in their differing administrative management strategies and policies and how 
to tackle the multi-dimensional relationships with China and other neighbours such as 
Laos and Cambodia in overland Southeast Asia. 
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    The foundation of this new dynasty in the nineteenth century has triggered 
some of the major questions involved in this study. What was the commercial policy, 
especially in terms of trade, set for Chinese merchants in northern Vietnam during the 
new dynasty? To what degree did tributary, private, and even illicit trade with the 
Chinese influence Sino-Vietnamese relations? How did Sino-Vietnamese trade shape 
the northern frontier, and in turn, how did these changes in frontier policy in northern 
Vietnam originating from commercial contact between the Chinese and Vietnamese 
lead to the consolidation of centralised power and help to intensify frontier defence? 
What was the connection between trade and security? 
   These questions will be answered in the following chapters in this dissertation. 
Chapter 1 introduces the historical background of border trade between China and 
northern Vietnam, reviews academic literature on this issue, raises my research 
questions, introduces the theoretical framework, and presents my hypothesis. Chapter 2 
discusses the new trends in Sino-Vietnamese traditional tributary relations during this 
period. The internal mechanism that generated these new hallmarks is revealed from the 
point of view of the Huế court rather than of the Beijing court. It also elaborates on how 
the new trends in Sino-Vietnamese relations that emerged during the nineteenth century 
helped to shape the ideas that Nguyễn Vietnam used to settle its affairs with its other 
neighbours. Furthermore, the role that Vietnam played in the change of China’s 
tributary system and the relations between Sino-Vietnamese tribute trade and common 
trade contacts is examined here. Chapter 3 outlines the cross-border and marine trade 
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with the Chinese at the non-government level in northern Vietnam during this period. 
Some correlated issues are revealed in this chapter, such as the main component and 
flow of trade, the structure of the goods, trade methods, the relations with tribute trade, 
the relations with common Sino-Vietnamese commercial contacts, and other related 
issues. 
In the fourth and fifth chapters, smuggling and forbidden items policy are discussed. 
The role of smuggling in northern Vietnam with the Chinese is also described. 
Additionally, the contraband2
                                                 
2 Here, in ancient Vietnam, ‘contraband’ as a term to describe smuggling goods in English does not cover 
the phenomenon completely in Vietnam in the nineteenth century. On this point, please refer to the 
‘terms’ part in this chapter. 
 connected with smuggling is analysed in these two 
chapters, including how smuggling and contraband had an effect on Sino-Vietnamese 
relations in the global context, and what the connections were between authorised and 
illicit trade. Also examined in this chapter is the confrontation and strife between 
reinforcing central power while managing local power forces on frontiers and dealing 
with its neighbours at the same time. This conflict frequently sparked off a chain of 
reactions on frontline security, starting with the curbing of smuggling and the royal 
monopolising of specific cargos so as to maintain and benefit the vested interests of the 
central government. The sixth chapter delves into the security and defence of the 
Nguyễn court. These security and defence problems that influenced the 
Sino-Vietnamese political and diplomatic relations originated, in a sense, from trade 
activities and commercial interaction between the Chinese and Vietnamese in overland 
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and maritime frontiers in northern Vietnam. The final chapter concludes with discussion 
of the possible part that maritime and overland trade with the Chinese in northern 
Vietnam may have played in the development of Sino-Vietnamese relations and 
Vietnamese history. 
 
2. Labels  
Definitions of smugglers such as pirates and bandits are different in the different 
historical contexts and periods. Concurrently, definitions are also related to complicated 
aspects such as authorities, local people and ideology and technology development. The 
factors that resulted in smuggling were connected with frontier produce, transgression, 
the evolution of frontier, colony’s interests and the like. Expanding state control and 
local resistance always occurred along a wide section of the frontier.3
The terms ‘bandits’ and ‘pirates’ must be clarified. Pirates and bandits were not defined 
in northern Vietnam in the nineteenth century in the modern sense. The terms defining 
pirates and bandits in this period of study covered those groups that were seen in the 
 The most 
important point is that the acknowledgement on the frontiers between local people and 
the central government demarcation was distinct. In this study, pirates and bandits were 
put into a specific historical context. 
 
  2.1 Pirates and Bandits 
                                                 
3 Eric Tagliacozzo, Secret trades, porous borders: smuggling and states along a Southeast Asian frontier, 
1865–1915 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005). 
 7 
archives of Nguyễn Vietnam as unlawful groups. The Vietnamese authorities defined 
some groups as bandits or pirates. However, the terms describing ‘bandits and pirates’ 
in the Vietnamese archives such as Tặc (贼) or Phỉ (匪), Thanh Phỉ (清匪) or Nghịch 
Phỉ (逆匪), Sơn Tặc (山贼) or Sơn Phỉ (山匪), Hội Phỉ (会匪), could be the same 
interchangeable terms, but were used in different ways by the Qing and Nguyễn. 
Specifically, Vietnamese pirates who plundered within Chinese waters were not 
considered pirates, but were depicted as ‘Annamese’ by Qing China. In contrast, the 
Nguyễn authorities described them as pirates. Additionally, not all the Chinese who 
launched attacks on and looted along Vietnamese riparian frontiers were effectively 
regarded as Chinese pirates. 
The meaning of the term ‘pirate’ changed during the different periods in the 
nineteenth century. Who these ‘pirates’ were, lurking just off Vietnamese shores and on 
its oceanic world, is a question well worth considering. These so-called ‘pirates’ were 
often traders, fishermen, or even cross-border coastland people from either China or 
Vietnam. Their status was ambiguous from the perspective of the Huế authorities. 
Offshore people would be branded ‘pirates’ or ‘smugglers’ once they had been caught 
engaging in deals or commercial exchanges without paying tax. Consequently, many 
coastal people such as fishermen or merchants ultimately became professional pirates or 
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smugglers. Many plying Chinese merchant ships were involved in smuggling and 
sporadic plundering.4
On the whole, the Chinese described in this study are the Thanh Nhân or Qing Ren (清
人, people from Qing China) whose names were recorded in the archives of the Nguyễn 
Vietnam. The ‘People from Qing China’ were known as Thanh Nhân in the archives of 
the Huế court. Nevertheless, Thanh Nhân includes Thanh Giap (清贼, Chinese bandits 
or pirates), Thanh Thương (清商, Chinese merchants), Thanh Ngư Hộ (清渔户, Chinese 
fishermen) in the Vietnamese archives. All of these groups are described as ‘Chinese’ in 
   
    For bandits, those Chinese who joined forces with Vietnamese bandits were not 
named as Chinese bandits in the archives of Nguyễn Vietnam. They were just described 
as Chinese people who were in Vietnam, despite the fact that they had joined 
Vietnamese bandit gangs. They were punished as villains once they had been captured 
by the Vietnamese court. According to Vietnamese records, these Chinese were defined 
as bandits operating in Vietnam. However, we confine ourselves within this study to 
scrutinising those Chinese bandits who were described by Qing China to have fled to 
Vietnam and joined local bandit groups. The clarification of the concept of bandits and 
pirates will be further elaborated on in the fourth chapter. 
 
  2.2. Chinese 
                                                 
4 Trương Đăng Quế张登桂. Đại Nam Thực Lục大南实录 [Primary compilation of the Veritable 
Records of Imperial Vietnam] (Tokyo, 1963), Chính Biên II, Vol. 201, pp. 19–20. Hereafter referred to as 
ĐNTL.  
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this study for the convenience of discussion. The various categories under the term 
‘Chinese’ are explained in context. 
The ‘Chinese’ people should be categorised into two main groups. The first is the 
Chinese in Qing China who had commercial dealings in Vietnam, namely the Thanh 
Thương. Therefore, they itinerated or plied among China, Vietnam and even other 
places. The archives of the Nguyễn Vietnam described this group as a kind of Thanh 
Nhân.   
The other group of Chinese was those who were operating in Nguyễn Vietnam, 
including Chinese fishermen, Chinese merchants, and other sojourned Chinese who 
were living in Vietnam temporarily or permanently. These Chinese were under the 
authority of Huế Vietnam. Distinguishing themselves from the Chinese in China, they 
registered in the government roll in Vietnam, and paid poll tax and corvee, since the 
Nguyễn court accepted them as Vietnam’s subjects. Moreover, most of them, including 
merchants and fishermen, the Nguyễn also catalogued them roughly. The Chinese in 
Nguyễn Vietnam were catalogued into roughly three parts. One is named Thực Hộ (实
户). They have accommodations and stable occupations. The second is called Khách Hộ 
(客户), who were temporary residents and were exempted from taxes on some 
occasions. The last one is Biệt Nạp Hộ (别纳户), who lived in one place and worked in 
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another place. These Chinese paid taxes based on the government rules of Nguyễn 
Vietnam.5
Finally, Minh Hương must be clarified here before our study starts even though 
Minh Hương is not paid more attention in this study. Minh Hương (明乡) was called 
Minh Hương (明香) in early times of Chinese migration. Previously, Minh Hương was a 
kind of organisation built by Chinese migrants in Vietnam. The earlier Chinese migrants 
did not like to submit to reign of Qing and fled to Vietnam when the Ming dynasty 
ended. The Chinese migrants established the Minh Hương community in Hội An around 
1650 in order to keep the Ming loyalty alive and multiply.
 
6
Afterward, the Chinese migrants increasingly went to Vietnam. In 1671, Mo Jiu (莫
玖) led the Chinese to settle southern Vietnam. Besides, in 1697, Yang Yandi (杨彦迪) 
and Chen Shangchuan (陈上川) led a great number of Chinese to southern Vietnam. 
Soon afterward, the Vietnamese government established Thanh Hà (清河) and Minh 
Hương (明香) communities for the Chinese in southern Vietnam.
 
7
                                                 
5 [越]朱海 Chu Hải；李娜译, Li Na Translated. 十九世纪越南阮朝的华人政策, shi jiu shi ji yue nan 
ruan chao de hua ren zheng ce. [The policy on the Chinese in Nguyễn Dynasty of Vietnam in the 
nineteenth century]. 东南亚纵横, Around Southeast Asia. 广西. Guangxi, 3, 2003, pp. 55–56. 
6 Chen Chingho,Qing chu zheng cheng gong can bu zhi yi zhi nan qi.清初郑成功之移植南圻，下. In Xin 
ya xue bao, 新亚学报. Vol 8, 2, p. 483, footnote 46. 
7 ĐNTL, Tiền Biên, Vol. 5, p. 22; Vol. 7, p. 14. 
 The places where 
Minh Hương resided were called Minh Hương Xã (明香社). From 1802 onward, Gia 
Long set Minh Hương Xã in the whole Vietnam so that to manage the Chinese migrants. 
In 1811, the places where Bắc Khách (北客, northern guests) were also called Minh 
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Hương (明乡).8 In 1862, Bắc Khách was changed into Minh Hương (明乡).9
In the Nguyễn dynasty, the Chinese in Vietnam were divided into two parts. One 
was the old Chinese migrants, that is Minh Hương, the other was the new migrants, who 
were called Thanh Nhân (清人, the Chinese from Qing dynasty). Meanwhile, the 
Chinese migrants from Qing China were also called Bắc Khách or Bắc Nhân (北人, 
people from the north).
 
Afterward, all Minh Hương (明香) in Vietnam were changed into Minh Hương (明乡).  
10
Lạng Sơn
 Theoretically speaking, Minh Hương is not the main subject 
matter to be examined in this study. However, it was aforementioned that among the 
Minh Hương, there was one special group. The Nguyễn authorities described them as 
Bắc Khách. Bắc Khách were also the Chinese for making living in  (谅山) of 
Vietnam. This group of Chinese also registered in the roll of Nguyễn Vietnam. 
Therefore, Bắc Khách is one of the groups examined in this study.  
How did the first generation Chinese in Vietnam transform into Minh Hương? What 
was the transformation process? As to this point, the Nguyễn also had regulations. The 
sons and grandsons of the first generation Chinese were restricted to following Qing 
customs. Their heirs were obliged to join the local Minh Hương communities once they 
were 18 years old. Their offspring would be organised into a new Minh Hương 
                                                 
8 Phan Thúc Trực潘叔直. Quốc Sử Di Biên国史遗编 [A transmitted compilation of the dynasty’s 
history]. Xiang gang zhong wen da xue wen hua yan jiu suo香港中文大学新亚硏究所 (Hong Kong 
New Asia Institute, 1965), p. 72. 
9 Ibid, p. 163. 
10 Wu Fengbin 吴凤斌 ed. Dong nan ya hua qiao tong shi 东南亚华侨通史.  Fu jan ren min chu ban 
she 福建人民出版社 (1994), pp. 189–191. 
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community once the number of the second and third generation exceeded five, if a Minh 
Hương community had not already been established in their villages. If the number was 
less than five, they would be integrated into a new Minh Hương community along with 
another local Chinese family. Undoubtedly, it was compulsory for them to register and 
pay tax or else serve the corvee.11
    Chinese fishermen played a significant part among the Chinese in Vietnam. 
They survived in floating communities in cross-border regions or in offshore areas in 
northern Vietnam. They lived on their boats and spent their time in fishing, only 
occasionally coming ashore for necessities, such as fresh water and repairing wrecked 
boats. Particularly in many islands in 
 
Hải Dương and Quảng Yên, these Chinese 
fishermen were seen not only as groups that threatened the national security of Nguyễn, 
but they were used also mostly as the police of the Huế court for frontier defence. 
    Besides Chinese fishermen, the Chinese merchants in Vietnam also were a 
crucial part of Vietnamese society. These Chinese merchants were distinguished from 
the Chinese merchants in Qing China. Unlike those Chinese merchants who just paid 
customs taxes, these Chinese merchants in Vietnam were registered on the roll of the 
Nguyễn court and also had to pay poll tax, even though they could pay less than other 
Chinese Vietnamese. The Chinese merchants in Lạng Sơn were a good example. 
Chinese merchants in Lạng Sơn paid tax three strings of cash if they had come into 
Vietnam in March and returned to China by June or July. Additionally, they paid a tax 
                                                 
11 Khâm Định Đại Nam Hội Điển Sự Lệ钦定大南汇典事例 [Official compendium of institutions and 
usage of Imperial Vietnam], A54, Vol. 44, p. 65. Hereafter referred to as KĐĐNHĐSL 
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of five strings of cash if they came in March and returned by August or by the end of 
the year. Whenever they returned, official registration was compulsory. 
 
2.3 Terms 
In this study, some terms in English are likely not proper words to describe some 
historical phenomena in ancient Vietnam. Here, two terms approached in my thesis need 
to be explained specifically and clearly.  
 
Contraband  
Based on the dictionary, contraband is the illegal or prohibited traffic or anything 
prohibited to be imported or exported.12 In addition, ‘contraband’ also refers to goods 
forbidden by law to be imported and exported; smuggled merchandise.13
                                                 
12 A P Cowie and J Windsor Lewis, Oxford advanced learner’s dictionary of current English (London, 
Oxford University Press, 1974). See ‘contraband’, p. 187. C.T. Onions, ed. The shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973). See ‘contraband’, p. 413.  
13 David B. Guralnik, Webster's New World dictionary of the American language (Cleveland World Pub: 
1976). See ‘contraband’, p. 320. 
 In the 
nineteenth century, ‘contraband’ as a specific term did not appear in official archives of 
the Nguyễn. There was no single Vietnamese term in Nguyễn government to describe 
merchandise that was strictly prohibited from import or export. The Huế court just 
issued many bans to prohibit some goods from import or export. Furthermore, these 
‘prohibited goods’ were not invariable but changed according to the historical context at 
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that time. On some occasions, they were prohibited from being imported. Sometimes, 
they were forbidden for export. Therefore, ‘contraband’ did not fit properly in ancient 
Vietnam society. In this study, ‘forbidden items’, ‘prohibited goods’, ‘smuggling 
merchandise’ and the like are used in specific historical contexts and will be clarified in 
specific chapters. 
 
Merchants involved in unauthorised deals  
In this study, ‘merchants involved in unauthorised deals’ is used to describe one kind of 
merchants who engaged in smuggling by fraud or cheating. Those cheating commercial 
activities either occurred through the waiving of import or export duties or the making 
of profits by cooperation with high-ranking officials in Huế court. To some degree, 
these ‘unauthorised commercial activities’ should be considered a type of ‘smuggling’ 
category based on the dictionary.14
                                                 
14 ‘Smuggle’ means to convert goods clandestinely into or out of a country or district in order to avoid 
payment of legal duties. Onions, ed. The shorter Oxford English Dictionary. See 'smuggle', p. 2031; 
Cowie and Lewis, Oxford advanced learner’s dictionary of current English. See 'smuggle', p. 830. 
 However, ‘merchants involved in unauthorised 
deals’ as one term did not cover all patterns but was only one pattern of smuggling in 
this study. Smugglers as private merchants could not be distinguished from other 
smuggling entities such as bandits and pirates if ‘merchants involved in unauthorised 
deals by cheating or fraud’ as a specific term was replaced by ‘smuggling merchants’ or 
‘smugglers’. It was well known that the status between authorised merchants and 
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smugglers were easily convertible. So was the status among merchants, pirates and 
bandits, even fishermen and smugglers.  
There are ambiguous lines between smugglers and authorised merchants. Authorised 
merchants could engage into smuggling temporarily and permanently. Smuggling 
merchants could be pirates and bandits or fishermen temporarily and permanently. Even 
for the Nguyễn Court, it was difficult to distinguish smugglers from sanctioned 
merchants. Therefore, the more regular words that Vietnam used to depict ‘merchants 
involved in unauthorised deals’ or likely to be ‘smugglers’ were not unlawful merchants 
but 奸商 (cunning merchants) and 狡商 (tricky merchants). The definitions in this 
study have to be put into specific historical contexts. Consequently, ‘merchants 
involved in unauthorised deals by fraud or cheating’ as one specific term were 
generalised from the narrations and recordings of Nguyễn government archives.  
 
3. Time and place 
3.1. Northern Vietnam 
For the purposes of this study, trade with the Chinese will be explored in northern 
Vietnam. The geographical areas of northern Vietnam referred to in this dissertation 
were the Vietnamese administrative divisions during the Nguyễn dynasty, which is to 
say, the 13 provinces in northern Vietnam. As recorded in the Đại Việt Cổ Kim Duyên 
Cách Địa Chí Khảo15
                                                 
15Đại Việt Cổ Kim Duyên Cách Địa Chí Khảo大越古今沿革地志考[A study of historical geography in 
imperial Vietnam]. Viện Hán Nôm. A.77 
, the 13 administrative units in northern Vietnam were Ninh Bình 
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(宁平), Hà Nội (河内), Nam Định (南定) , Hưng Yên (兴安), Hải Dương (海阳), 
Quảng Yên (广安), Sơn Tây (山西), Hưng Hóa (兴化), Tuyên Quang (宣光), Bắc Ninh 
(北宁), Thái Nguyên (太原), Lạng Sơn (谅山), Cao Bằng (高平). Commercial contacts 
and communications occurring in these northern thirteen provinces are of primary 
interest, particularly in marine and land frontiers. Notwithstanding, other places or 
domestic regions such as middle or southern Vietnam and even some areas in Southeast 
Asia will be involved in this study in pursuit of a comprehensive and precise narrative 
on commercial contacts and other relevant matters between the Chinese and Vietnamese. 
Unlawful trade is a good example. Illegal merchants in southern Vietnam or other parts 
of Southeast Asia are argued in this study as affording a complete and dynamic picture 
on clandestine commercial exchanges in Vietnam as a whole in this period. However, 
the part related to southern Vietnam and Southeast Asian was not so much in this study. 
 
3.2. Timeframe 
This dissertation covers the period from 1802 to 1874. It was in 1802 that Nguyễn Phúc 
Ánh established the last monarchical dynasty, the Nguyễn, in Vietnam. No former 
dynasty could be comparable to the Nguyễn Dynasty in Vietnamese history, whether in 
political, economical, administrative and cultural dimensions. 1802, in a sense, 
represented an outset, a new age in Vietnamese history. Nguyễn Vietnam ushered in 
another new age in 1874 when it signed the Philastre Treaty, which recognised French 
sovereignty over all of Cochin China since the 1862 treaty had ceded part of Cochin 
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China. The 1874 treaty called for a French official to be stationed in Huế as a kind of 
diplomatic representative. This was the beginning of direct French interference in 
Vietnam’s political affairs. The treaty also gave France authority over Vietnam’s 
foreign relations. Therefore it was a turning point in these two important ways. In the 
later part of the century, Huế Vietnam gradually evolved into a kind of society different 
from the earlier period of the Nguyễn Dynasty, due to multiple interacting elements 
including French influence penetrating into northern Vietnam. Consequently, the period 
in this study is confined to the years 1802 to 1874. 
 
4. Literature Review 
There is more and better research on China’s southwest borders and frontiers than the 
study on Vietnam’s northern frontier. The frontier-formation processes in China’s 
history have attracted greater attention from academics. The frontier-formation 
processes of China, which were characterised by commercial, political, and cultural 
interconnections in the borderlands with its neighbours, are doomed to entangle with the 
relations between China and its neighbours. Furthermore, China was one of the greatest 
empires in Asia in ancient times, and it influenced its neighbours through commerce, 
especially in caravan trade, politics (the tribute system), and war etc. The historiography 
of China’s frontier-formation processes can be classified into two categories. The first 
type of documentation is on the relationship between China and its neighbours in 
historical perspectives. Besides, this kind of documentation mainly focuses on how 
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China throughout its history portrayed its relations with its neighbours beyond its 
southern frontiers, particularly from a political point of view. The second type of 
documentation concerns dynamic development, particularly commercial development, 
in the border regions between southwest China and its neighbours. Many scholars have 
carried out excellent research on political and social resistance in multiple frontier 
societies under imperial frontier policy. The Sino-Southeast Asian relationship is 
explored against the complex backdrop of the imperial southwest frontier that 
distinguished itself through its varied topography, multi-ethnic groups, and disparate 
and transnational trade partners, among other unique features.16
As for the first point, the idea which one country was used to portray its relations 
with other countries must influence the decisions of statecraft on the affairs of frontiers 
between China and its neighbours. Accordingly, the ideas that China used to settle its 
affairs with other countries, and the relations between China and its neighbours in 
history should certainly be reviewed at the outset of this study. In addition, many 
Western scholars have also delved into the relations between China and other 
non-Chinese regions from a historical perspective. These monographs go some way in 
shedding light on Sino-Vietnamese relations during the nineteenth century. John King 
Fairbank has provided further analyses of the ideas that China used to describe people 
beyond its political and cultural borders.
    
17
                                                 
16 David, G. Atwill, Trading Places: Resistance. Ethnicity, and Governance in Nineteenth century Yunnan. 
Robert J. Antony and Jane Kate Leonard, ed. Dragons, Tigers, and Dogs, Qing Crisis Management and 
the Boundaries of State Power in Late Imperial China (New York, Cornell University, 2002). 
 The characteristics of the way in which 
17 John R. Faust and Judith F. Kornberg, China in world politics (Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
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China used to treat other neighbours in history, have undoubtedly become the 
predominant method that China has employed to settle its affairs with Vietnam since 
Vietnam became an independent country. The monographs and articles on Chinese 
borders or frontiers, and even those on Sino-Southeast Asia relations offer helpful 
insights into Sino-Vietnamese relations during this period. Besides, Geoff Wade 
analyses some topoi in southern border historiography during the Ming in China, and 
the cultural, historical, and social meaning behind the analyses on these topoi. ‘This 
elite Chinese 'world-view' provided the framework for recording the hierarchy of the 
universe and China’s relationship with the non-Chinese. It also provided the framework 
within which subsequent generations of Chinese people have understood the history of 
their nation’s relations with non-Chinese people.’18
                                                                                                                                               
1995). John King Fairbank, ed. The Chinese world order, traditional China's foreign relations 
(Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1968). Li Yunquan 李云泉, chao gong zhi du shi lun 朝贡制度
史论 [Studies on the history of paying tribute system], xin hua chu ban she 新华出版社, 2004. 
18 Geoff Wade, “Some topoi in Southern border historiography during the Ming (and their modern 
relevance)” in Sabine Dabringhaus and Roderich Ptak, ed. China and her neighbors: borders, visions of 
the other, foreign policy 10th to 19th century (Wiesbaden ,Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz,1997), p .137. 
Edward H. Schafer, The vermilion bird; T'ang images of the South (Berkeley, University of California 
Press, 1967). Morris Rossabi, ed. China among equals: the Middle Kingdom and its neighbors, 10th–14th 
centuries (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1983). 
 To some degree, coupled with the 
tribute system under the Rites of Zhou, establishing harmonious relations between all 
domains within the empire became a sign of proper government. Accordingly, political 
order and its administrative institutions were closely interconnected with regional 
accord and the empire’s frontiers. The active participation of neighbouring kingdoms in 
the tribute system to demonstrate their legitimacy was indispensable, as were other 
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ritual responsibilities. Consequently, Vietnam had to promote Sino-Vietnamese 
commercial, diplomatic, and political relations in its scale of contributions on the tribute 
system. 
Vietnam was one tributary of Qing China, and most Chinese scholars readily view 
the relationship between China and other neighbours as one aspect of China’s world 
order, since the tributary system was the main ideology by which China defined its 
affairs with other neighbours. Over the past 50 years, scholars who read Chinese 
sources have produced an impressive body of work on historical Sino-Southeast Asian 
or Sino-Vietnamese relations.19
                                                 
19 See Zhang Mingfu 张明富, Altai he yun gui bian sheng de jing ji kai fa 鄂尔泰于云贵边省的经济开
发 [Altai and the economy in frontier provinces, Yunnan and Guizhou provinces] Dong Bei shi da xue 
bao, 东北师大学报. Vol 3, 1994; Yang Yuda 杨煜达， qing chao qian qi de dui mian zheng ce he xi nan 
bian jiang 清朝前期（ 1662–1765 ）的对缅政策和西南边疆 [The policy on Burma and the southwest 
frontier of China prior to Qing dynasty]. Zhong guo li shi di li lun cong 中国历史地理论丛. 3, 2004. 
Tang Kaijian and Tian Yu汤开建，田渝, qing dai zhong xian gong ci wang lai yi ji qi ying xiang 清代中
暹贡赐往来及其影响 [The Sino –Siamese tribute relations and its influence]. Guang xi min zu xue yuan 
xue bao, 广西民族学院学报. Vol. 26 No. 2, 2004; Yu Dingbang and Yu Changsen余定邦、喻常森, jin 
dao zhong guo yu dong nan ya guan xi shi .近代中国与东南亚关系史 [The relationship between China 
and Southeast Asian countries in modern age]. Zhong shan da xue chu ban she 中山大学出版社. 1999. 
Yun nan she hui ke xue yuan dong nan ya yan jiu suo.云南省社会科学院东南亚研究所编, Yun nan yu 
dong nan ya guan xi lun cong. 云南与东南亚关系论丛. [Discussion on the relationship between China 
and Southeast Asian countries]. Yun nan ren min chu ban she 云南人民出版社, 1989. Han Zhenhua 韩
振华, Zhong guo yu dong nan ya guan xi shi yan jiu 中国与东南亚关系史研究 [Studies on The 
Relationship Between China and Southeast Asian Countries. Guang xi ren min chu ban she] 广西人民出
版社, 1992. Liu Shuichao刘水焯, Zhong guo dong nan ya yan jiu de hui gu yu qian zhan 中国东南亚研
究的回顾与前瞻 [Yesterday and Tomorrow of Studies on The Relationship Between China and 
Southeast Asian Countries].Guang dong ren min chu ban she 广东人民出版社. 1994.  
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These works elaborate in great detail many aspects and functions of the tributary 
system. From these works, Sino-Vietnamese relations developed alongside China’s 
worldview. Concurrently, Vietnam also adopted Sino-Vietnamese tributary relations in 
the relations with its Southeast Asian neighbours. Dai Kelai termed this ‘sub-tributary’ 
relations. Moreover, some scholars looked into the change in Sino-Vietnamese relations 
by analysing Vietnam’s requests to change details on ritual precedents and the like 
while paying tribute. From these excellent works, different aspects of the 
Sino-Vietnamese relationship have unfolded before us. However, these works have not 
succeeded in discovering the deeper motives behind Sino-Vietnamese tributary relations 
in the early nineteenth century, especially for Vietnam.   
The latest monograph by Sun Hongnian focuses on a great deal of information on 
the Sino-Vietnamese relationship in Sino-Vietnamese tributary relations during the 
whole of the Qing dynasty period in China. Many specific aspects of the 
Sino-Vietnamese relationship have been argued in this monograph such as tribute 
relations, illegal business in the borderlands, commercial activities, the activities of the 
overseas Chinese in Vietnam, and so on.20
                                                 
20 Sun Hongnian 孙宏年, qing dai zhong yue zong fan guanxi yanjiu 清代中越宗藩关系研究 [The 
study on the tributary relations between Qing China and Vietnam during the Qing dynasty]. hei long jiang 
jiao yu chu ban she 黑龙江教育出版社. 2006. 
 However, just like most other works by 
China-trained scholars, Sun presents us with a complete picture in history with less 
analysis of these historical details. His work also sees the Sino-Vietnamese relationship 
from the point of view of Qing China—not from Huế to Beijing, but in reverse. The 
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Sino-Vietnamese relationship that involved in commercial, political, cultural and other 
aspects was not a one-way process, on the contrary, both sides influenced each other. 
Besides Sun Hongnian, other China-trained scholars who documented Sino-Southeast 
Asian relations are also inclined to explore it from the China angle.  
A few Western and Western-trained scholars have published a great number of 
works on Sino-Southeast Asian or Vietnamese relations. The first and most important 
work is Vietnam and the Chinese model, by Alexander Barton Woodside.21
 Besides this classic work, other scholars have also made significant contributions, 
such as Truong Buu Lam, Liam C. Kelly and other scholars. Truong Buu Lam seeks to 
outline the Sino-Vietnamese tribute relationship from 1788 to 1790 in his article. This 
article furnishes us with some fundamental ideas on the consistent policy and attitude 
that Qing China used to settle its diplomatic affairs with Vietnam. 
 This 
comparative historical study of China and Vietnam in the nineteenth century is 
unprecedented. It affords us the complete picture on many aspects from bureaucratic 
systemisation to imperial examinations. This exhaustive descriptive and analytical work, 
which focuses on a political and cultural comparison of Qing China and Nguyễn 
Vietnam, as well as detailing the bureaucratic authority and international relations of the 
Huế court with the outside world in the nineteenth century, has provided us with a broad 
conceptual framework from which to start our inquiry. 
22
                                                 
21 Alexander Barton Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese model: a comparative study of Vietnamese and 
Chinese government in the first half of the nineteenth century (Cambridge, Mass: Council on East Asian 
Studies, Harvard University; distributed by Harvard University Press, 1971). 
 Unfortunately, this 
22 Truong Buu Lam, “Intervention Versus tribute in Sino-Vietnamese Relations, 1788–179” in John King 
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article reflects more Vietnam’s passive response under the tributary system than the 
Vietnamese role that it played in consolidating and improving its tributary relationship 
with Qing China during this period. Did Vietnam change its attitude or policy during the 
traditional Sino-Vietnamese relations after Nguyễn Huế unified Vietnam? What was the 
change? What was the impetus behind this change? These questions obviously cannot 
be addressed in just one article. With respect to the evolution of Sino-Vietnamese 
traditional tributary relations and the Vietnamese monarchy at the turn of the nineteenth 
century, the endeavours of Liam C. Kelly, and Brantly Womack have enlightened us 
with this present. 23 Other studies on the Sino-Siamese tributary system have also been 
most helpful to us in understanding how this system operated, including Tribute and 
profit: Sino-Siamese trade, 1652–1853 by Sarasin Viraphol24, Cambridge, Mass: 
Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University: distributed by Harvard University 
Press, 1977, and 'Sino Siamese tributary relations 1282–1835' by Suesang Promboon.25
The last type of documentation on the China’s southern frontier formation process is 
focused on commercial dynamic development. Latest works by scholars have made 
  
                                                                                                                                               
Fairbank, ed. The Chinese world order; traditional China's foreign relations (Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 1968). 
23 Brantly Womack, China and Vietnam: the politics of asymmetry (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006). Liam C. Kelly, Beyond the bronze pillars: Envoy poetry and the Sino-Vietnamese 
relationships (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press and Association for Asian Studies, 2005). Luong 
Nhi Ky, 'The Chinese in Vietnam: a study of Vietnamese-Chinese relations with special attention to the 
period 1862–1961', PhD dissertation, University of Michigan, 1962. 
24 Sarasin Viraphol, Tribute and profit: Sino-Siamese trade, 1652–1853 (Cambridge, Mass: Council on 
East Asian Studies, Harvard University; distributed by Harvard University Press, 1977). 
25 Suesang Promboon, 'Sino Siamese tributary relations 1282–1835', PhD dissertation, University of 
Michigan,1971. 
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great contributions to multi-ethnic frontier studies of Sino-Southeast Asia, which have 
attempted to break away from a China-centric viewpoint. They have observed that the 
borderlands between China and other Southeast Asian regions were dynamic areas, 
which were characterised as being actively two-sided in terms of conquering and 
displacing, which occurred on both sides of the borders between infringing people and 
the local inhabitants. The border areas in the Sino-Southeast Asia were affected rather 
more by local indigenes than by any political influence of the Qing Empire. C. Patterson 
Giersch introduces a new framework designed to overcome Sino-centric preconceptions 
so as to explore the Qing China’s frontier from rarely glimpsed perspectives.26
An increasing number of scholars who have carried out research on the Southwest 
frontier of China have made great contributions on commercial penetration by the 
caravan trade, ethnic interactions, cultural mutual-assimilation and other such spheres 
outside political influence. Chiranan Prasertkul has made a serious effort to build a 
bridge across academic frontiers to investigate the socio-economic ties between Yunnan 
and its neighbours in the nineteenth century. Furthermore, this is also a kind of attempt 
to seek the roots of this complex frontier society. This work provides us with a new 
insight into the Sino-Vietnamese frontier and even into Sino-Vietnamese relations, 
which commercial communications among the border areas influenced behavioural 
patterns of its inhabitants and united into different special circles in the borderlands.
 
27
                                                 
26 C. Patterson Giersch, Asian borderlands, the transformation of Qing China's Yunnan frontier 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006). 
 
27 Chiranan Prasertkul, Yunnan Trade in the Nineteenth Century: Southwest China’s Cross-boundaries 
Functional System (Bangkok: Institute of Asian Studies, Chualalongkorn University, 1990); Andrew DW 
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Besides this study, Sun Laichen’s dissertation offers us a clear view of the overland 
interactions along the southwest frontier of China and mainland Southeast Asia.28
                                                                                                                                               
Forbes and David Henley, The Haw: traders of the Golden Triangle (Bangkok: Teak House, 1997). Piper 
Rae Gaubatz, Beyond the Great Wall: urban form and transformation on the Chinese frontiers (Stanford, 
Calif: Stanford University Press, 1996). Pamela Kyle Crossley, Helen Siu, and Donald Sutton, ed. Empire 
at the margins: culture, ethnicity, and frontier in early modern China (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2005); Yang Bin, Between Winds and Clouds : the making of Yunnan (Second Century 
BCE-Twentieth Century BCE. (Manuscript) 
28 Sun Laichen, 'Ming-Southeast Asian Overland Interactions 1368–1644', PhD dissertation, University 
of Michigan, 2000. 
 His 
dissertation has turned our attention from maritime to overland stimuli, and he analyses 
the dynamic processes by which the centre of gravity shifted from northern Southeast 
Asia, which had enjoyed an advantageous position, mainly through the trading of 
military technology, overland trade, and internal migration with Ming China, to the 
ascendancy of southern mainland Southeast Asia after the arrival of the Europeans.  
His dissertation has equipped us with a clear picture of how the interactions and 
interconnections between the military, trade, and migration in the borderlands could 
result in northern mainland Southeast Asia’s being an advantageous position, and even 
how the political map of Southeast Asia before the arrival of the Europeans in the early 
sixteenth century was changing. It was all aforementioned research on Sino-Southeast 
Asian transnational contacts that has contributed to our comprehension of the 
commercial, diplomatic, and national security of Vietnam in the maritime and overland 
history of its frontiers.  
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The maritime history, especially maritime trade, between China and other regions in 
Southeast Asia deserves some mention here, in relation to the history of the formation 
of the frontier between southern China and northern Vietnam. Countless monographs on 
trade in the South China Sea or on the maritime trade between China and other regions 
in Southeast Asia have given us a glimpse of the historical context in which 
Sino-Vietnamese commercial relations existed. Nevertheless, Vietnamese maritime 
trade and other relevant enterprises could not be fully and precisely explained in the 
considerable studies and articles that delve into Chinese maritime commercial history.29
                                                 
29 For this thesis, see Li Jinming 李金明, Qiang dai qian q ixia men yu dong nan ya de mao yi 清代前
期厦门与东南亚的贸易 Trade between Xiamen and Southeast Asia in the early time of Qing. Xia men 
da xue xue bao 厦门大学学报（哲学社会科学版）.vol. 2, 1996. Li Jinming 李金明, Qing kang xi mo 
nian jin zhi nan yang mao yi dui nan yang hua qian de ying xiang 清康熙末年禁止南洋贸易对南洋华
侨的影响 [Prohibition  Maritime Trade]. Nan yang wenti yanjiu 南洋问题研究. Vol. 4,1995. Chen 
Xiyu 陈希育, Zhong guo fan chuan yu hai wai mao yi 中国帆船与海外贸易 [Chinese Clipper and 
Maritime Trade]. xia men da xue chu ban she厦门大学出版社. 1991. Shen Guangyao 沈光耀, Zhong 
guo gu dai dui wai mao yi shi 中国古代对外贸易史 [Maritime Trade history of Ancient Chinese]. 
Guang dong ren min chu ban she 广东人民出版社. 1985. Nie Dening 聂德宁, Ming qing hai wai mao 
yi shi yu hai wai hua shang mao yi wang luo yan jiu de xin tan suo 明清海外贸易史与海外华商贸易网
络研究的新探索(荷兰)包乐史著〈巴达维亚华人与中荷贸易〉评介 [Studies on Commercial and Trade 
Network of Overseas Chinese and Maritime Trade history in Ming and Qing]. Zhong guo she hui jing ji 
shi yan jiu 中国社会经济史研究. Vol. 3, 2003. 
 
Various elements, including transnational migration, alien trade, the multi-ethnic milieu, 
and the variable influence of the central governments on both sides of the 
Sino-Vietnamese marine and overland frontiers, along with maritime or inland 
cross-border commercial and other activities, created the tension between an expanding 
Vietnamese power force and other potential force groups. What sort of role these 
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maritime and overland activities in northern Vietnam played in the frontier evolving 
process is a topic worthy of study. Thus, our purpose here is to uncover the role that the 
Sino-Vietnamese cross-border trade activities that sparked off a chain of reactions in 
political, diplomatic, and security fields played in Vietnam and even the 
Sino-Vietnamese relations during the nineteenth century.  
Setting the capital city right in the middle of Vietnam inevitably made Huế a pivot 
of the two equally crucial southern and northern frontiers. Some historiographies on the 
formation of southern Vietnam’s frontier that sprang from commerce are essential in 
thinking through Nguyễn dynastical history. Prior to the Nguyễn Dynasty, Vietnam had 
experienced a new mode of survival through commerce in the south.30
                                                 
30 Li Tana, Nguyên Cochinchina, 1998. 
 The unique 
history of Vietnam has attracted great attention from scholars, and in particular, that of 
southern Vietnam. Water frontier: commerce and the Chinese in the Lower Mekong 
region, 1750–1880, edited by Nola Cooke and Li Tana, is a collection of many articles 
on commercial development in southern Vietnam. This collection extends our limited 
understanding of southern Vietnam, and has shaped the concept of the ‘water frontier’ 
to denote the areas stretching from southern Vietnam and the regions further southward 
to eastern Cambodia and southwest Thailand, and has enlarged the field of vision on a 
socio-economic framework specifically for southern Vietnam. This collection also 
illustrates that this area was a separate trading zone, woven together by the regular 
plying of a great number of small and large trading junks, which made up the new 
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regional flourishing trade networks behind these overlapping plying, as well as the 
socio-economic complexities that are characteristic of mixed ethnicities and uncertain 
settlement. 
It was Chakkri Siam and Nguyễn Vietnam that came out as two new powers in 
mainland Southeast Asia from this complex socio-economic position, and their 
strengths were the flourishing31 regional trade, and various articles on trade in southern 
Vietnam are valuable in portraying the history of Nguyễn Vietnam.32
                                                 
31 Nola Cooke and Li Tana, ed. Water frontier: commerce and the Chinese in the Lower Mekong Region, 
1750–1880 (Singapore: Singapore University Press; Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004). 
32 Li Tana, “Rice from Saigon: the Singapore Chinese and the Saigon Trade of the nineteenth century” in 
Wang Gungwu and Ng Chin-keong, ed. Maritime China in transition 1750–1850 (Wiesbaden: 
Harrassowitz, 2004). Nola Cooke, “The Myth of the Restoration: Dang Trong Influences in the Spiritual 
Life of the Early Nguyễn Dynasty 1802–1847” in Anthony Reid, ed. The last stand of Asian autonomies: 
responses to modernity in the diverse states of Southeast Asia and Korea, 1750–1900 (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1997). 
 The commercial 
activities, particularly regional trade, did not halt but instead continued after Huế 
centralised its bureaucratic authority from 1802. For regional commercial expansion in 
southern Vietnam, it was necessary to foster local power, which possibly impeded the 
consolidation of Huế’s central power. Nguyễn Vietnam consistently maintained a 
watchful eye with regard to this point, as a power rising from the same flourishing place 
and with the same pattern to be a power to ultimately reunify Vietnam’s northern and 
southern territories. Choi Byung Wook elaborates the fine balance between central 
policy and local power rising from the booming trade in southern Vietnam during the 
Minh Mạng period, which was the high point era of Huế’s centralised power over the 
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whole kingdom.33
The power of the central government of Nguyễn dynasty as the exclusive and 
effective rulers of Vietnam was increasingly strengthened during centralising of 
authority hand in hand with resistance by regional powers. The study of the local 
response to the centralising control of the capital, and the extension of this central 
power on the southern frontier during the socio-economic vicissitude, inspires us to 
ponder on some aspects of the relations between the central power and local forces in 
the northern frontier in Vietnam at this time. Few scholars have provided us with a 
complete picture of commerce and trade and the situation in which the central power 
and local forces in northern Vietnam and the changing Sino-Vietnamese political, 
 Choi offers us a fresh way of viewing the processes by which the 
Huế court increasingly transformed the inhabitants of its socially heterogeneous, 
southern frontier region into more faithful and submissive subjects of the capital by 
concentrating on bureaucratic reforms and cultural policies. Southern Vietnam, as a 
particular and crucial region politically and commercially, offered the Huế regime a 
unique vitality, which had an effect on the administration of northern Vietnam in the 
Nguyễn’s administrative management of the whole kingdom. Therefore, the research on 
southern Vietnam provides us with a broad picture and multiple elements with which to 
understand Nguyễn Vietnam as a whole after 1802. 
                                                 
33 Choi Byung Wook, Southern Vietnam under the reign of Minh Mạng (1820–1841): Central Policies 
and Local Response (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program Publication, 2004). 
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diplomatic relations under the complex socio-economic evolved in northern Vietnam 
during this period.  
Fortunately, Li Tana makes endeavours on this theme.34
Socio-economic, ethnic, and other non-political demarcations provide a new road 
into the history that is quite different from traditional nation formation or political 
history. Li Tana demonstrates that the Jiaozhi Ocean (the littoral areas from the Tonkin 
Gulf to areas further south) that lay alongside central Vietnam had been the hub of 
travel and trade between the east and the west for thousands of years, while the Tonkin 
Gulf was the extension of the trading zone in the Jiaozhi Ocean. Such trade on this road 
included slaves, horses, and salt, and others. Muslim trade also became the most 
 Her two articles on 
northern Vietnam furnish us with more ideas on the trade networks connected with 
southern China from mountain to sea in a historical perspective. In her article on 
Nagasaki, she shows how frequent itinerant trade was between southern China and 
northern Vietnam during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. A similar process 
exists behind different historical phenomena, of which one was a number of regional 
overlapping trade networks between southern Vietnam and eastern Cambodia and 
Thailand, and the other was the flourishing trade zone between northern Vietnam and 
southern China.  
                                                 
34 Li Tana, A view from the sea: perspectives on the northern and central Vietnamese coast. Journal of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 37(1), pp. 83–102, February 2006; Li Tana, 'national' and 'overseas' markets in 
the early 19th century Vietnam: a view from the mountains and the sea. For the workshop “Dynamic Rim 
lands and open Heartlands: Maritime Asia as a Site of Interactions”. Nagasaki, 27–28 Oct 2006. 
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important component on this trade route. It was the trade that closely connected Hainan 
with Cham and ‘the trade was surely an essential part of many people’s lives in this 
region.’35
                                                 
35 Li Tana, A view from the sea, p. 93. 
 In her articles, the national stories behind the regional dynamics on the states 
that were founded later provide us with a new way of viewing other aspects of northern 
Vietnam in our study. However, her articles do not cover many aspects in great detail. 
The studies in these articles are not completely systematic, and focus only on a single 
aspect, that of interconnections in trade. 
Finally, some fundamental aspects of Sino-Vietnamese trade have to be examined if 
our study on the Sino-Vietnamese relations in the historical context, coupled with the 
evolution of Sino-Vietnamese trade relations in northern Vietnam, is to go into greater 
depth. Authorised trade was crucial in the socio-economic circle of Nguyễn Vietnam’s 
northern frontier. Besides sanctioned trade, non-authorised trade, which filtered into the 
regions alongside legal trade, connected the ‘water world’ with the ‘overland world’. 
Furthermore, and together with legal trade, unlawful trade contacts built up the dynamic, 
complex and ever-changing nature of the northern frontier of Nguyễn during the 
nineteenth century. Unauthorised deals as a kind of glamorous force and on some 
occasions even as a potential threat to the economic interests of Nguyễn’s rulers, 
revealed its extreme flexibility in every aspect of politics, economics, security, and 
Sino-Vietnamese relations and so on. The available theoretical literature on illicit trade 
is indispensable for our study.   
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A small amount of historiography concentrates on some curial schemes correlated 
with smuggling such as contraband, the patterns of smugglers. The historiography on 
this theme can be categorised into two parts. One is on Chinese smuggling, especially 
on pirates in South China Sea. The other is on smuggling in Southeast Asia.On Chinese 
smuggling and piracy in South China Sea, Murray’s book takes the first step in 
endeavouring to uncover the unique nature of the maritime realm of the South China 
Sea.36
Some monographs on Chinese piracy are necessary for an understanding of the 
Vietnamese piracy during this period such as the work of Robert J. Antony, Hunt Janin 
 The practice of piracy throughout the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries is elaborated. The highlight of this work is the analysis of Vietnamese piracy 
in the early nineteenth century. Murray illustrates some crucial aspects of Vietnamese 
pirates who were active in South China Sea and in the Vietnamese waters. These 
aspects include the relations between Vietnamese pirates and the social organisation, the 
influence which the maritime trade had on these pirates, the relationship between pirates 
and Vietnamese authorities and the like, all of which shed light on the study of illicit 
trade in northern Vietnam after 1810, since piracy composed the main part of smuggling 
in the nineteenth century. However, the whole picture of piracy in Vietnam and other 
groups involving in smuggling, such as bandits and private merchants, during the 
nineteenth century are not revealed in this work. 
                                                 




Besides monographs on the Chinese piracy in the late eighteenth to early nineteenth 
centuries, several books on smuggling in Southeast Asia are worth more attention. One 
is Sulu Zone and Iranun and Balangingi by James Francis Warren.
 Antony claims that pirates and seafarers helped to shape the 
maritime economy, society and culture, and that piracy had penetrated into South 
China’s maritime society by the powerful conquest of such places as many coastal 
villages, port towns, and shipping or fishing enterprises. The boom in Chinese piracy 
during the first decade of the nineteenth century was a reflection of the endeavours 
Chinese seafarers made against poverty, prejudice, and injustice. Also, other functions 
of piracy, such as in politics, have not been explored.    
38 The other is 
Secret trades, porous borders: smuggling and states along a Southeast Asian frontier, 
1865–1915 by Eric Tagliacozzo.39
                                                 
37 Robert J. Antony, Like froth floating on the sea: the world of pirates and seafarers in late imperial 
south China (Berkeley, Calif: Institute of East Asian Studies, 2003). Zheng guang nan 郑广南, Zhong 
guo hai dao shi 中国海盗史 The History of Piracy in China. hua dong li gong da xue chu ban she 华东
理工大学出版社, 1998. Hunt Janin, The India-China opium trade in the nineteenth century (Jefferson, 
NC: McFarland & Company, 1999). See Chapter 7, Pirates of the South China Sea, pp. 131–149. 
38 James Francis Warren, The Sulu Zone 1768–1898: the dynamics of external trade, slavery, and 
ethnicity in the transformation of a Southeast Asian Maritime State (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 
1985). James Francis Warren, Iranun and Balangingi: globalization, maritime raiding and the birth of 
ethnicity (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2002). 
39 Eric Tagliacozzo, Secret trades, porous borders: smuggling and states along a Southeast Asian frontier, 
1865–1915 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005). 
 Warren used the framework of the 
‘centre-periphery’ concept to interpret social interaction between ethnic groups within 
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the region’s trade zone, which was full of lawful and illicit trade. Tagliacozzo’s book is 
remarkable in its research on the contraband and smuggling during the formation of the 
frontier. This work analyses the nature, practice, and extent of various ‘secret trades’ 
along the various frontiers of Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the role that smuggling 
played in the process of frontier formation is also revealed in this work. In addition, 
smuggling was also dynamically prevalent among different ethnic groups, geographical 
regions, and among different social classes. The burgeoning of contraband depended on 
the needs of the rulers in various states, which were to enforce authority, seize economic 
interests, and maintain security. Contraband could also ‘mean the difference between 
maintaining or losing power to one’s rivals’.40
The specific study of frontiers connected with southern China and other Southeast 
Asian neighbours is a useful reference on the processes of social vicissitude in northern 
Vietnam and southern China, as they unfolded. However, as far as these aforementioned 
and excellent works are concerned, three points should be noted before we begin our 
study. First, they did fail to treat the Sino-Southeast Asian relationship, which was 
 The traits of contraband and smuggling 
were similar, both in seafarers and in overland operators, to the archipelago regions of 
Southeast Asia. Nguyễn Vietnam also confronted similar problems during the 
nineteenth century. The evaluation of the role that contraband and smuggling played in 
the socio-economic flux and the consolidation of the northern traditional frontiers by the 
Huế court is the main purpose of our study. 
                                                 
40 Tagliacozzo, Secret trades, p. 5.  
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dynamic and interconnecting, as a whole. Second, by and large, most of them, 
particularly works by China-trained scholars, offer more descriptive detail rather than 
analytical views of the history. Third, with regard to source materials, these works 
largely used Chinese sources, whereas a great number of Vietnamese sources in many 
works are ignored, although some scholars attempted to use Vietnamese materials, such 
as Sun Hongnian. Because of this bias, the perspectives on the Sino-Southeast Asian 
and even the Sino-Vietnamese relationship are inevitably Sino-centric. Finally, the 
intricacies of Sino-Vietnamese relations on Vietnam’s land and sea frontiers, 
interwoven with political, social, commercial, and ethnic elements, during the 
nineteenth century, as the last and only monarchy, is seldom explicitly delineated. 
Furthermore, the works that delve into the Sino-Vietnamese relationship during the 
nineteenth century in terms of commercial and trade perspectives still leave much more 
to be revealed.  
 
5. Objectives of the Present Study 
The chief purpose of this study is to reveal the intricacies of the commercial relationship 
between the Chinese and Vietnamese in northern Vietnam that influenced the Nguyễn 
Dynasty’s diplomatic tendencies, policy-making procedure, national security defence, 
and related matters, from 1802 to 1874. This main goal is comprised of many 
sub-themes. The first of these is on the relations between the tribute trade and other 
commercial activities pertaining to tribute at a governmental level in the 
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Sino-Vietnamese tributary context of history. The second sub-theme relates to 
authorised trade activities, such as itinerant merchants in overland border trade, and 
plying merchants in the maritime frontiers of northern Vietnam. The last sub-theme 
concentrates on illicit trade. The last one based on the aforementioned sub-themes 
focuses on national security, which originated from the tension and the seizure of 
privileges and power between the central government, which expanded its power to the 
frontier, and the existing potential power forces at these frontiers. This work is an 
attempt to understand the history of this zone as a whole, as well as Sino-Vietnamese 
relations during this period. To achieve this, we have employed documentation on 
northern Vietnam’s overland and maritime history, revolving around the interrelated 
themes of internal and external trade with the Chinese, such as tribute trade, 
cross-border trade, and smuggling. This trade is characterised by four elements: the 
authorised merchants, the officials at the Huế court, pirates and bandits, and the 
evolution of the northern frontier in which these parties were intricately bound up with 
one another. 
In the last few decades, as far as works on Sino-Vietnamese relations or schemes 
related to it are concerned, most scholars have tended to focus on Sino-Vietnamese 
relations from a historical perspective, namely between two authorities, two countries, 
and two states, since China was a hugely influential power in Asian history. An 
increasing number of historians have made significant contributions to our 
understanding of this borderless history, such as commercial, migration history and 
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similar areas concerning the cross-border regions between China and other countries in 
Southeast Asia, and excluding political history. However, should the borderlands 
between southern China and northern Vietnam be regarded as part of the southward 
extension of the southwest frontier of China? We think not. In one respect, frontier 
policy in China had consistently evolved since the Qing dynasty. Different dynasties 
had different frontier policies, which had brought about economical or political changes 
to its frontier regions. 
Furthermore, both the relations between local forces, especially different ethnic 
groups in frontier regions and the central government of China had an effect on local 
politics, economics and the social order. In other respects, the rise and decline of local 
less powerful and subject polities such as Laos and Burma, as well as Vietnam, meant 
frontiers were able to transform economically, ethnically, and politically. Therefore, the 
frontiers between southwest China and northern overland Southeast Asia were not the 
result of a southward extension of the southwest frontier of China. This region had its 
own unique characteristics. Furthermore, what Vietnam left in its historical narratives is 
merely the passive response to the potential threat from China as a coercive power in 
the suzerainty-tributary system. Without a doubt, Vietnam was an active player in 
China’s world order during the nineteenth century. This dissertation endeavours to 
break away from Sino-centric ideas in researching the relationship between China and 
its neighbours. This dissertation chooses to approach this period from the Huế point of 
view rather than the Beijing angle, which has been overrepresented.  
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Besides, the Nguyễn Dynasty merits a larger place in Vietnamese history. The 
characteristics that make Vietnam similar to the rest of Southeast Asian countries has 
been increasingly recognised by more and more scholars, in both political and cultural 
fields. Excellent scholars with training in classical Chinese, such as Alexander 
Woodside, O.W. Wolters, and John K. Whitmore and others, are inclined to 
differentiate Vietnam from China’s civilisation. ‘Wolters, Whitmore, and Esta Ungar 
well represent the school that attributes a Southeast Asian identity to political and 
cultural patterns observed in Vietnamese’.41 However, one scholar (Liam Kelly) still 
insists on claiming that Vietnam was still one part of the northern giant’s Chinese 
culture, with regard to the Sino-Vietnamese tributary relationship.42 Liam Kelly 
analyses the poems written by the most erudite of Vietnamese literati, who were 
selected to travel to the Beijing court, and to represent the Vietnamese rulers in the 
ritualised formalities of acknowledging suzerain-vassal relations. He also held that 
Vietnamese and Chinese ‘partook in common cultures’.43
                                                 
41 Nhung Tuyet Tran and Anthony Reid, ed. Vietnam borderless Histories (The University of Wisconsin 
Press, 2006), p. 11.  
42 See Liam C. Kelly, Beyond the bronze pillars: Envoy poetry and the Sino-Vietnamese relationship 
(Honolulu, University of Hawiian Press, 2005). 
43 Kelly, Beyond the bronze pillars, p. 36. 
  However, concerning the 
Nguyễn Dynasty, we can neither neglect its ‘Chinese’ merits nor ignore its ‘Southeast 
Asian’ influence. This dissertation takes both Nguyễn’s ‘Chinese’ and ‘Southeast 
Asian’ influences into account.    
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Finally, the interconnections between northern Vietnam and southern China have 
continued till the present time. Thus, many one-sided analyses have not reflected the 
complete picture of history in northern Vietnam and southern China. The flows of 
socio-economic or political and cultural interactions from northern Vietnam to southern 
China are explored in reverse in this study. Furthermore, this study demonstrates the 
political and socio-economic mechanisms in a commercial context of the history of 
northern Vietnam, rather than depicting socio-economic changes from a conceptual 
political viewpoint.  
This study aims to make a contribution to the understanding of the history of 
Nguyễn Vietnam, and to re-evaluate the role that Nguyễn Vietnam played before 
Vietnam became a French colony. Moreover, it should afford a fresh understanding of 
the role Vietnam played in the relationship between the Chinese and Vietnamese, such 
as the contributions the Nguyễn made to China’s world order and Sino-Vietnamese 
tributary relations, the endeavours the Huế made to Sino-Vietnamese diplomatic 
relations by Sino-Vietnamese commercial contacts and Sino-Southeast Asia relations by 
the commercial, political and diplomatic evolution of Sino-Vietnamese relations. 
Additionally, the effect Vietnam had on the trade networks of the South China Sea and 
Southeast Asia revealed in this dissertation might strengthen our grasp of the maritime 
and overland communication history between China and Southeast Asia. Concurrently, 
it might also offer valuable insights into security policy and national defence, and 
Nguyễn Vietnam’s relations with other Southeast Asian countries. 
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6. A Note on Sources 
6.1. Primary Archives 
In this study, some chief sources, Chinese documents and Vietnamese archives, should 
be involved. 
Several documents are very important for this study, such as A Comprehensive 
History of the Qing Dynasty (清代通史), The History of the Qing Dynasty (清史), The 
Draft History of the Qing Dynasty (清史稿), Primary Compilation of the Veritable 
Records of the Imperial China in the Qing Dynasty (清实录), Gazetteer of Imperial 
China (大清一统志), the Official Compendium of Institutions and Usages of Imperial 
China (钦定大清会典), Gazetteers of Guangxi, Yunnan, Guangdong, and Hainan 
Provinces (广西，云南，广东，海南省志), the Vermillion Books of the Qing Dynasty, 
and the Memoranda of the various offices and foreign correspondences. Furthermore, 
the Agreement and Order Books are an important source of information on 
administrative matters, containing agreements, rules, regulations, and orders and so on. 
The Court Records hold invaluable information on legal and administrative matters that 
give us some insights on economic and social life. Besides these above, customs records 
and some correspondences of certain generals in Guangxi, Guangdong, Yunnan 
Provinces are indispensable. All of these documents are now regarded as fundamental 
and relevant sources with which to approach a study of Chinese history. However, all of 
these documents are not sufficient for this study. For these types of sources I will be 
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turning chiefly to the National Library of China and libraries in Guangxi, Guangdong, 
and Yunnan Provinces, among others. 
For Vietnamese documents, for the most part, official records are still of the utmost 
importance, such as Đại Nam Thực Lục, (大南实录, Primary Compilation of the 
Veritable Records of the Imperial in the Nguyễn Dynasty), Gazetteer of Imperial 
Vietnam, Khâm Định Đại Nam Hội Điển Sự Lệ (钦定大南汇典事例, Official 
Compendium of Institutions and Usage in Imperial Vietnam), Bắc Kỳ Các Tỉnh Địa 
Chí(Gazetteers of North Vietnam Provinces), and Nguyễn Triều Châu Bản (阮朝硃本, 
the Vermillion Books of the Nguyễn Dynasty), memoranda of the various offices and 
foreign correspondence. Since illegal trade is usually connected with bandits and pirates 
along the borders between southern China and northern Vietnam, some vital official 
archives on policies and activities to combat bandits and pirates should not be ignored, 
for instance, Khâm Định Tiễu Bình Bắc Kỳ Nghịch Phỉ Chính Biên, (钦定剿平北圻逆
匪正编, Records of Subduing Bandits in Northern Vietnam), and so on.   
 
6.2. Fieldwork 
Collecting materials is an important part of fieldwork. I visited some archives and 
libraries in China and Vietnam including Yunnan University Library, Yunnan Library, 
Guangxi Library, Academy of Social Science in Yunnan Province, Academy of Social 
Science in Guangxi Province, the First National Historical Archives of China, the 
National Library of China, Beijing University Library, Viện Hán Nôm, the National 
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Library of Vietnam, and the National Archives of Vietnam. Besides these, I went to 
some important ports and cities such as Đà Nẵng, Huế, Hồ Chí Minh 
City, Pingxiang, Gejiu and Kunming.  
This extensive travelling throughout northern Vietnam and southern China, 
especially along the Red River to the river mouth of the Red River toward the sea 
provided me with important insights into my research, allowing me to appreciate a 
geographical landscape traversed by rivers, such as the Sông Ho (Black River), the 
Sông Hồng, (Red River) and the South China Sea. It was necessary to visit ports built 
on the wealth created by authorised deals along the Red River, to investigate old copper 
mines in the border of that period between Yunnan Province of the Qing Dynasty and 
Lai Châu in the Nguyễn Dynasty, to get a feel of what the environment must have been 
like for smugglers. In the meantime, I was also a participant observer. By seeing 
first-hand the present smuggling conditions, circumstances, and so forth, I was able to 
appreciate a sense of continuity from the past. The extensive travelling and the 







Chapter 2: Paying tribute and Sino-Vietnamese relations 
1. Introduction 
Vietnam constructed its own social civilisation and local orders once it separated from 
China. However, the influence and stress from the northern giant of China still existed 
in Vietnam. Therefore, the history of Vietnam is connected with that of China. 
Sino-Vietnamese tributary relations played a significant role in traditional 
Sino-Vietnamese relations, both politically and diplomatically. Nonetheless, the 
ostensible affiliation under Sino-Vietnamese tributary relations had various subtle 
features, which were often at variance with domestic political, economic, and 
diplomatic changes and the like on both sides at different historical periods. By the 
nineteenth century, the tributary system as a kind of normalisation with which China 
handled its affairs with neighbours had improved. China’s tributary system evolved 
flexibly and grounded in this flexibility, Sino-Vietnamese tributary relations also 
improved. Aside from the acknowledgement and investiture between suzerain and 
vassal, some new merits in the obligations under the tributary system appeared. 
What were the new merits of the tributary system between Qing and Nguyễn? How 
did Nguyễn Vietnam go about managing and expanding the trade opportunities under 
the Sino-Vietnamese tributary relationship? What kind of contributions did the Nguyễn 
make to China’s world order and the Sino-Vietnamese tributary system? What was the 
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connection between tribute trade and common Sino-Vietnamese commercial contacts? 
These questions are answered in this chapter.   
 
2. The Chinese world order and the maritime trade ban during the Qing Dynasty  
Tributary relations were the main framework and ideas with which China, as the Middle 
Kingdom in Asia, settled its international affairs with its neighbours. This normative 
pattern was the unique way in which China’s rulers over the centuries owned, practised, 
and developed in this system. The relationship between every authority in China and 
their people in surrounding areas—which were non-Chinese in general—were coloured 
by ‘the concept of Sino-centrism,’ and were based on Confucian ideas, such as ‘under 
the wide heaven, all is the king's land’ and ‘within the sea-boundaries of the land, all are 
the king's servants’ (pu tian zhi xia, mo fei wang tu; shuai tu zhi bin, mo fei wang chen, 
普天之下，莫非王土；率土之滨，莫非王臣). 1 The tributary relations with its 
neighbours also represented an ‘assumption of Chinese superiority’ in all aspects such 
as politics, economy, and culture. This ‘Chinese world order’, as described by John K. 
Fairbank, not only included the normative politics pattern, but also contained the 
principal trade pattern between China and other non-Chinese groups. 2
                                                 
1 Zhou Zhenfu translated, 周振甫译注，Shi jing xuan yi, 诗经选译 [the selection of the book of songs]. 
Zhong hua shu ju. 中华书局, p. 224. 
2 John King Fairbank, 'The preliminary Framework' in John King Fairbank, ed. The Chinese world order: 
traditional China's foreign relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 2–4. 
 These tributary 
relations entirely supplanted other patterns, such as military conquest and administrative 
assimilation of its neighbours, and became the prevailing pattern of Chinese 
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international relations by the nineteenth century, before the treaty system used by 
Western powers advanced toward China and even Asia. 
The function of the tribute system evolved over time in China. Generally, tribute 
relations included two parallel aspects. One was commerce, and the other was 
diplomacy. In diplomacy, different dynasties had different purposes. In the Song era 
(960—1127, 1127–1279), it was used mainly for defence, whereas in the Yuan 
(1206–1367), the tribute system served expansion purposes. However, in the Qing, the 
tribute system shifted towards advocating stability in foreign affairs.3 The tributary 
relations with its neighbours became increasingly one of stagnant inactivity, instead of 
bringing about rapid social change in other ways, such as military conquest by the Qing 
Dynasty. ‘For China it was a lever and economical device for dealing with a bordering 
country which the Chinese rulers did not consider practical to control directly and yet 
wanted to keep revolving within the orbit of China’s influence.’4
                                                 
3 John King Fairbank, Trade and diplomacy on the China coast: the opening of the treaty ports, 
1842–1854 (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 31. 
4 Mark Mancall, 'The Ch’ing Tributary System: An Interpretive Essay' in John King Fairbank, ed. The 
Chinese world order: traditional China's foreign relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), 
p. 63. 
 The main purpose 
was to keep potential dangers or threats outside the Chinese frontier, and maintain peace 
and order within border regions. Until the nineteenth century, inner Asia was 
consistently the concern of imperial foreign policy. Therefore, based on the tendency of 
diplomatic stability and the focus on inner Asia, war affairs seldom occurred in the 
southwest frontiers. It only once invaded Vietnam in a punitive operation when the Lê 
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dynasty was overthrown by the Tây Sơn in 1789, an action that was seen as violating 
the ritual or moral value of the imperial tribute system. This characteristic of the Qing 
court of preferring to confine itself to revolving within the orbit of China’s influence in 
its tributaries under the tributary relation system, rather than directly interfering in the 
internal affairs of Vietnam or having as little involvement as possible in order to 
maintain the tranquillity of its sea and overland frontiers did not change even when the 
new Nguyễn dynasty was found in Vietnam. 
The commercial function of the tribute system was not the most important aspect in 
the earlier period of China’s history. The diplomatic function of the tribute system was 
far more important thanits commercial function during the early period of China’s 
history. The tribute system was the political tool used to handle Sino-Vietnamese 
relations. From the Ming and Qing dynasties onward, tribute trade, to a large extent, 
was a strategy that the Vietnamese would use at times when maritime trade was 
restricted. However, it was the maritime ban that was an important factor in banding 
foreign trade and the tribute system together. As for China’s maritime trade, the Song 
and Yuan periods in Chinese history were significant. In the Song dynasty, revenue 
coming from maritime trade, especially with Southeast Asian regions, became the 
economic basis for confronting the northern Liao. Spurred by political motives, 
maritime trade enjoyed prosperity.5
                                                 
5 Huang Chunyan 黄纯艳, Song dai hai wai maoyi 宋代海外贸易 [the maritime trade in Song dynasty]. 
She hui ke xue wen xian chu ban she社会科学文献出版社， 2003, p. 79. 
 China’s maritime trade reached a new peak under 
the encouragement of the central government of the Yuan dynasty. Later on, when the 
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Ming dynasty was established, Wo pirates (倭寇) became a critical issue that compelled 
Chu Yuanzhang (朱元璋) to consolidate the empire’s coastal security. To exterminate 
Wo pirates entirely, the Ming issued a ban, hai jin (海禁), that forbade all people from 
travelling abroad by sea. This ban became the ultimate striving force that united the 
tribute system and trade as one.6
Therefore, tribute trade, maritime trade and diplomatic relations with other regions 
were united by the hai jin policy. The expanded diplomatic relations with more 
Southeast Asian regions was realised by Zheng He (郑和), who succeeded in integrating 
maritime trade into the tribute trade system.
 
7 Besides, Zheng He voyaged to Southeast 
Asia, and integrated maritime trade by bringing a number of small sultanates under the 
tribute system and enrolling them as Ming vassals.8
Hai jin, which united maritime trade and the tributary system, was later adopted by 
the Qing dynasty. Tribute trade became an important part of the tribute system. On 
tributary trade, Mark Mancall believes that tributary trade in Qing China should be 
categorised into three parts, namely ‘gift trade’, ‘market trade’ and ‘administrated trade’. 
‘Three main types of trade occurred in two-sided commerce, each based on a different 
integrative principle’. ‘Gift trade’ appeared in the outer areas, commencing with places 
 
                                                 
6 Zheng Yongchang郑永常, Lai zi hai yang de tiao zhan, ming dai hai wai mao yi zheng ce yan bian yan 
jiu 来自海洋的挑战—明代海贸政策演变研究 [The study on the maritime trade policy in Ming 
dynasty]. Tai bei, Dao xiang chu ban she台北，稻香出版社 2004, pp. 16–20. 
7 JK Fairbank and SY Teng, 'On the Ch’ing Tributary System', Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, Vol. 6, 
No. 2 (June 1941), p. 204. 
8 Fairbank, Trade and diplomacy on the China coast, pp. 36–35. 
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such as Beijing or on the frontier. ‘Market trade’, which occurred in Canton, was a 
supply and demand mechanism, and correlated with European economies; while 
‘administrated trade’ took place between permanent trading bodies, such as 
governments and government-licensed companies. Trade was conducted in a legal 
manner either by authorised government or approved companies.9 By the Qing period, 
tribute and trade were intricately but not necessarily directly interrelated. Trade could 
happen either with the immediate presentation of tribute to the emperor, or without the 
presentation in Peking. Trade could also occur at the border markets without the 
presentation under the tribute system.10 To some degree, the increase in the number of 
tribute missions was stimulated by commercial motives. 11 Commercial contact in 
tribute relations was multidimensional and was incorporated into various elements and 
demands.12 Furthermore, the cross-payment of tribute among the tributaries themselves 
helped to transform trade patterns. Satellite tribute zones and the Chinese-dominated 
core gradually took shape in Asia’s commercial network of contacts.13
    The intermittent maritime ban during the Qing period interplayed with tribute 
trade with other countries. The imposition or rescinding of Chinese maritime bans could 
also change the pattern of maritime trade and tributary relations between China and its 
neighbours in Southeast Asia. In 1684, the Emperor Kang Xi rescinded the maritime 
   
                                                 
9 Mancall, 'The Ch’ing Tributary System' in Chinese world order, pp. 79–80. 
10 Ibid., pp. 75–76. 
11 Fairbank and Teng, 'On the Ch’ing Tributary System', p. 199. 
12 Takeshi Hamashita, 'The tribute trade system and modern Asia' in Memoirs of Research Department of 
the Toyo Bunko, No. 46, 1988, p. 13. 
13 Ibid., pp. 14–15. 
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ban, and Chinese junk trade revitalised. ‘(The Chinese vessels) whatever bigger or 
smaller, went to ocean in an endless stream.’14 However, in 1717, Qing reimposed the 
maritime ban, under which Chinese merchant ships were not allowed to trade in 
Southeast Asia. However, this restriction excluded Vietnam. Junks from Macao and 
Chinese vessels that travelled to Vietnam for trade were endorsed by the Qing court.15 
The Veritable Records of Qing (Qing shi lu 清实录) do not demonstrate the specific 
reasons that Vietnam and Macao were not included in the maritime trade ban. 
Meanwhile, other countries in Southeast Asia were not mentioned here. However, these 
could be hypothesised from a report by the War Board in 1716. On one hand, the Qing 
believed that Dutch Batavia was the fiercest enemy in Nanyang and that Dutch 
Batavia’s advanced military weapons were a threat. Therefore, these weapons had to be 
impounded before they were permitted to harbour in seaports. On the other hand, 
foreigners in Macao obeyed Chinese regulations in China, and did not make any 
trouble.16
                                                 
14 Shi Lang, 施琅, 'lun kai hai jin shu 论开海禁疏 [The argument on rescission of maritime ban]', He 
Changling 贺长龄, ed. jing shi wen bian chao, 经世文编抄 [The collection of statecraft writing of Qing 
period], 1848, Vol. 33. 
15 Sheng zu shi lu 圣祖实录. Vol. 277, p. 28 in Yun nan sheng li shi yan jiu suo 云南历史研究所. ‘Qing 
shi lu’yue nan mian dian tai guo lao wo shi liao zhai chao, 《清实录》越南缅甸泰国老挝史料摘抄 [The 
collection of materials related to Vietnam, Laos, Thailand and Burma in the veritable records of Qing 
dynasty]. Yun nan ren min chu ban she云南人民出版社, 1985. Hereafter qing shi lu shi liao zhai chao, p. 
15.  
16 Qing shi lu 清实录 [The veritable records of Qing dynasty]. Bei jing, zhong hua shu ju北京: 中华书
局, 1987. Sheng zu shi lu 圣祖实录 Vol. 277, p. 14. 
 Therefore, from this report, it can be seen that Vietnam, which was far away 
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from Batavia and Macao, did not present any great threat for the Qing. Therefore, 
Vietnam benefited from this policy.   
By the close of the eighteenth and opening of the early nineteenth century, the Qing 
court had to rescind the restriction on trade in Southeast Asia in order to import rice. 
The restrictions on maritime trade correlated with tributary relations during the Qing 
Dynasty. A complete maritime trade ban neither curbed potential security, which 
originated in the maritime activities along the south-eastern coast of China, nor 
improved regular commercial communications. However, the Qing court created a 
potential chance to maintain a balance between the two. In fact, the mode of tributary 
trade adapted from the Ming actually created a chance by the Qing period, and 
demonstrated the interest in opening commercial channels to foreign nations.17
With commercial development in Asia, the tribute trade, in tandem with the 
diplomatic tributary system, no longer met the demands of merchandise exchanges 
between Asian states and China. A great deal of Chinese migrated to Southeast Asia and 
pushed for local economic development. Meanwhile, the Chinese enhanced the 
commercial contacts between China and Southeast Asia. Sino-Southeast Asian 
commercial communication by the tribute system decreased. Soon afterwards, Chinese 
migration to Southeast Asia occurred at the end of the nineteenth century as the last 
phase of Chinese commercial expansion.
  
18
                                                 
17 Sarasin Viraphol, Tribute and profit: Sino-Siamese trade, 1652–1853 (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on 
East Asian Studies, Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 45. 
18 Fairbank, Trade and diplomacy on the China coast, pp. 36–37. 
 In diplomatic rhetoric, the relations between 
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the Qing and other countries were being supplanted by fair trade or equally diplomatic 
relations, which was reflected in the change of terms that Beijing used to call Western 
countries from chao gong guo (朝贡国, tributary country) into bang jiao (邦交, 
diplomatic relations) or hu shi guo (互市国, trading country) in the Draft History of the 
Qing Dynasty (清史稿) or in the Official compendium of institutions and usages of 
Imperial Qing (大清会典). This alteration was the result of a change in ideology and 
the decline of the traditional tributary system.19 Subsequently, Western ‘expansion’ and 
‘impact’ on Asia directly or indirectly contributed to the decline of the Asian trade zone 
that had been based on the tributary system, and deterred the change from the tributary 
system to the treaty system.20
     
  
3. The evolution of Sino-Vietnamese relations 
3.1. The Sino-Vietnamese traditional relationship before the Nguyễn Dynasty 
The traditional Sino-Vietnamese relationship can be traced back to the Qin Dynasty in 
China. Some parts of northern Vietnam were administrative units of China during the 
Qin and Han dynasties. Han defeated Triệu Đà in northern Vietnam, and set up Jiao Zhi 
                                                 
19 Li Yunquan 李云泉, chao gong zhi du shi lun 朝贡制度史论 [Studies on the history of paying 
tribute system]. Beijing, Xin hua chu ban she,北京，新华出版社, 2004, p. 142. 
20 Takeshi Hamashita, 'The tribute trade system and modern Asia', p. 8. 
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(Giao Chỉ), Jiu Zhen (Cửu Chân) and other seven districts. The name Jiao Zhi came 
about at that time.21
3.2. Sino-Vietnamese relationship in Nguyễn dynasty 
 
The relationship between Vietnam as an independent state and China began during 
the Song Dynasty of China. The tributary relationship became a formal 
Sino-Vietnamese diplomatic relationship. Vietnam’s frequent tribute activities and the 
Song’s bestowal of titles were accompanied by occasional wars. Tribute, intertwined 
with wars, continued for several hundred years from the Song era. During this period, 
successive dynastic changes occurred in Viet. By 1600, Vietnam had separated into two 
parts, which were controlled by the Trinh and Nguyễn families respectively. This 
division lasted more than 200 years until the establishment of the Nguyễn dynasty in 
1802. The traditional Sino-Vietnamese tributary relationship was adapted by the Qing. 
The most important procedure for Viet was to get the official titles from China to 
confirm its legitimacy as its own kingdom within the tributary system. Therefore, any 
usurper to the throne needed to request acknowledgement from China, as did the 
Nguyễn Brothers of Tây Sơn and Nguyễn Phúc Ánh later on.  
    
Gia Long period (1802–1819) 
                                                 
21 Phan Thanh Giản 潘清简, Khâm Định Việt Sử Thông Giám Cương Mục 钦定越史通鉴纲目 
[Outline by imperial decree of the mirror of the history of the Great Viet]. Rare books in Chinese library. 
National University of Singapore. Tiền Biên Vol. 2, p. 3. Hereafter VSTGCM. 
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In 1802, Nguyễn Phúc Ánh reunited Vietnam and established the Nguyễn Dynasty. In 
one respect, it was necessary for Nguyễn Phúc Ánh to be acknowledged as the only 
legitimate ruler of Vietnam. In another respect, after three decades of civil war, Nguyễn 
Vietnam needed time and safe surroundings to recuperate and multiply its population. It 
was indispensable for the Nguyễn Dynasty to maintain a friendly relationship with its 
giant northern neighbour. Besides these two reasons, the most important aspect was that 
the Nguyễn needed to recover the tribute trade and other commercial transactions at the 
governmental level under the traditional Sino-Vietnamese tributary relations. 
In 1802, Emperor Gia Long dispatched Trịnh Hoài Đức (郑怀德), President of the 
Revenue Board; Ngô Nhân Tĩnh ( 吴仁静), Right Honourable Grand Secretary of the 
War Board; Hoàng Ngọc Uẩn (黄玉蕴), Right Honourable Grand Secretary of the 
Punishment Board; and other followers on a mission to China to foster cordial 
relations.22 All of them were Minh Hương in Vietnam. In addition, the Vietnamese 
officials took Mo Guanfu (莫观夫) and other Qi Wei pirates, who were active in both 
Chinese and Vietnamese waters.23
                                                 
22 ĐNTL, Chính Biên I, Vol. 17, p. 9. 
 Apparently, whether it was the extradition of pirates 
23Kì Nguy Hải Phỉ (Qi Wei hai fei, 奇桅海匪) was one branch of the Chinese pirates who were active in 
Chinese and Vietnamese waters during the eighteenth and nineteenth century. These Chinese pirates 
colluded with the Vietnamese, who were also utilised for Nguyễn Quang Toan by the late eighteenth 
century. On one hand, Nguyễn Quang Toan utilised them to fight Nguyễn Phuc Ánh in Huế. On the other 
hand, the plunders by these Chinese pirates could supplemented Nguyễn Quang Toan’s military 
equipment. These Chinese pirates’ ships mostly came from the Fujian, Guangdong, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang 
provinces of China. (Zhong guo she hui ke xue yuan li shi yan jiu suo 中国社会科学院历史研究所, Gu 
 54 
or the dispatch of high-ranking Minh Hương missions to China, this was a kind of 
gesture aimed at revitalising Sino-Vietnamese tributary relations, and acquiring 
legitimacy for the Huế authority. 
Besides submission, Vietnam made other requests. In 1803, Emperor Gia Long had 
dispatched the envoys to request China’s approval to change the state’s name to Nam 
Việt.24 As part of their prerogative as suzerain, the Chinese would bestow a certain title 
on the Vietnamese ruler, but this name was not usually used in Vietnam. Therefore, the 
name of ‘the kingdom of An Nam (安南国王)’ was only used by the Chinese; the 
Vietnamese among themselves would not call themselves An Nam. China had known 
Viet as Jiao Zhi or Jiao Zhou since the Han Dynasty.25
                                                                                                                                               
dai zhong yue guan xi shi zi liao xuan bian 古代中越关系史资料选编[The compilation on the ancient 
Sino Vietnamese relations]. Bei jing zhong guo she hui ke xue chu ban she北京: 中国社会科学出版社, 
1982. p. 581. Nguyễn Quang Toan entitled these pirates by imperial order. Wu Shi’er was a good 
example. He got the title from Nguyễn Quang Toan as General Ninh Hải 宁海大将军 and obtained a 
bronze official seal. (ming qing shi liao geng bian di san ben明清史料庚编第三本 in Gu dai zhong yue 
guan xi shi zi liao xuan bian 中越古代关系史资料汇编. 1982. p. 581. Nguyễn Quang Toan used Zheng 
Qi (郑七) to recruit pirates for the sake of defeating Nguyễn Phúc Ánh. In 1802, Nguyễn Phúc Ánh 
captured Zhang Yalu (张亚禄), a Qi Wei pirate, and killed Zhengqi and repatriated their pirates (jun ji 
chu fu lu zou zhe 军机处录副奏折 in zhong yue gu dai guan xi shi zi liao hui bian 中越古代关系史资
料汇编 1982, p. 583; ĐNTL, Chính Biên I, Vol. 18, p. 5. 
24 ĐNTL, Chính Biên, I, Vol. 19, p. 9. 
25 VSTGCM, Tiền Biên Vol. 2, p. 3, p. 30. 
 In 679, the Tang set up the An 
Nam Protectorate (An nan du hu fu, 安南都护府) in Vietnam. An Nam as Viet’s name 
at the time. However, An Nam as the name of a country can be traced back to the Song 
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Dynasty. In 116426, the Song Dynasty bestowed this title on the Viet kingdom and 
changed Jiao Zhi to An Nan Guo (安南国).27
As for the names themselves, during the Han Dynasty, Triệu Đà was known as Nam 
Việt Vương (南越王).
 
28 From the Han to the Tang, kingdoms in Việt also called 
themselves different names, such as Lý Bôn (李贲)’s Nam Việt Đế (南越帝), Việt 
Vương (越王) by Triệu Quang (赵光) and Nam Đế (南帝) by Lý Phật Tử (李佛子).29 
In 968, Đinh Bộ Lĩnh (丁部领) named his kingdom Đại Cồ Vi ệt(大瞿越).30 In 1054, 
Đại Cồ Việt (大瞿越) was changed by the Vietnamese kingdom to Đại Việt (大越).31
    In fact, renaming was the most important issue in Sino-Vietnamese 
negotiations. The Qing court refused this request, and argued that Nam Việt in 
Sino-Vietnamese history had included many of China’s regions, such as Guangdong 
and Guangxi, whereas the areas united by Nguyễn Phúc Ánh were the regions that had 
been called Giao Chỉ (交趾) in the past. As to the kingdom of Nam Việt, it was because 
of the memory of that kingdom that the Chinese refused the request. However, the 
Vietnamese usually used Đai Nam inside the country even though the Qing gave them 
  
                                                 
26 As Lịch Triều Hiến Chương Loại Chí recorded, it was in 1179 that Song bestowed Viet as An Nan 
Guo and gave the kingdom seal. Vol. 46, p. 4; Phan Huy Chú潘辉注 Lịch Triều Hiến Chương Loại Chí.
历朝宪章类志 [A reference book of the institutions of successive dynasties]. Hereafter LTHTLC. 1962. 
27 VSTGCM, Chính Biên Vol. 5, p. 12, Ming hui yao 明会要 [Documents pertaining to Ming official 
matters], zhong hua shu ju 中华书局, 1956, p. 1510. 
28 LTHTLC, Vol. 46, p. 4. 
29 VSTGCM, Tiền Biên Vol. 4, pp. 2, 7, 13. 
30 VSTGCM, Chính Biên Vol. 1, p.1. 
31 VSTGCM, Chính Biên Vol. 3, p. 20. 
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the name Việt Nam. Furthermore, this request for renaming the state after defeating 
Nguyễn Quang Toản by force made the Chinese court suspicious that Nguyễn Vietnam 
intended to militarily occupy the Guangdong and Guangxi regions of China.32
Emperor Gia Long’s attitude toward China is not clear. On one hand, Nguyễn Phúc 
Ánh endeavoured to recondition the traditional tribute system. On the other hand, 
Vietnam openly requested the renaming of the state, which annoyed China. The obscure 
stand held by the Nguyễn on Sino-Vietnamese tributary relations during the Gia Long 
period should be attributed to two main aspects. With eyes on its internal affairs, Huế 
continued to ensure Nguyễn legitimacy in Vietnam. Besides, it would take some time to 
consolidate Nguyễn sovereignty in Vietnam, improve the economy, increase central 
revenue and recondition the bureaucratic system, and so on. With respect to external 
affairs, the Nguyễn mitigated a potential threat from the north. Therefore, in the early 
 The 
Qing court’s worry was based on two apparent motives. One was that Chinese troops 
had been defeated by Tây Sơn. Soon afterward, Emperor Gia Long defeated Tây Sơn, 
and united the whole of Vietnam by force. Therefore, the increasing military power in 
Nguyễn Vietnam would be a great threat to the peace and order of the south-eastern 
frontier of China. The other was that the Vietnamese envoys went to China on a tribute 
mission not by land, as stipulated by current regulations in the Sino-Vietnamese 
tributary system, but by sea, and this further aroused the suspicion of the Qing court. 
                                                 
31 Ren zong shi lu 仁宗实录. Vol. 106, p. 25 in qing shi lu shi liao zhai chao, 1985, p. 283. 
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period of the Nguyễn Dynasty, the main purpose of Nguyễn Phúc Ánh was to revive the 
traditional Sino-Vietnamese relationship held since the Lê Dynasty. 
However, at the outset of the Nguyễn, Emperor Gia Long actually undertook 
commercial activities which were not allowed by regulations that China stipulated under 
the Sino-Vietnamese tributary system. In 1803, Vietnamese tribute ships intended to 
ship back more items than the Qing approved in Guangdong. Eventually, the Chinese 
emperor allowed the Vietnamese official vessels to sail back with these cargoes in order 
to express the ideas of conciliating barbarians. Furthermore, Emperor Gia Long had 
ordered a load of more than 101,000 jin of silk, bronze wares, and an official robe with 
gold designs of pythons.33
                                                 
33 Gu gong bo wu yuan 故宫博物院, Qing dai wai jiao shi liao 清代外交史料行—嘉庆朝[The 
historical materials on diplomacy of Qing dynasty (Jiang Qing)]. Tai bei, cheng wen chu ban she台北成
文出版社，, 1968, pp. 39–41. 
 As a symbol that represented the sovereign rule of the Qing 
emperor, an official robe with gold designs of pythons was definitely prohibited for 
export by Qing. Furthermore, 101,000 jin of silk was many times far beyond the quota 
stipulated by the Qing. From this event, the trade with China had become indispensable 
under the traditional Sino-Vietnamese relationship at the governmental level. 
Nevertheless, the Huế Court failed to seek more room for mass trade. The economic 
aspects in the Sino-Vietnamese relationship consistently influenced the 
Sino-Vietnamese tributary relations. The aberrance in political relations that originated 
from economic motives became obvious by the Minh Mạng period.   
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Minh Mạng period (1820–1840) 
Unlike the Gia Long period, some obvious traits occurred under the tributary relations 
during the Minh Mạng period in Vietnam. The new trait originated from the Vietnamese 
first, and the greatest motif was to create more Sino-Vietnamese trade opportunities at 
the governmental level. Firstly, the Huế implored the emperor to modify the schedule 
and regulation of paying tribute to the Qing. Secondly, there was the Huế court’s veiled 
criticism of the attitude of the Qing court when they settled international affairs such as 
the First Opium War. Finally, Nguyễn began to seek more room for trade from the 
tributary obligations, such as extraditing criminals and sending Chinese shipwrecks to 
China, and the like. 
 
Schedules and regulations for tribute 
The timetables and regulations of Vietnam’s tribute were not regular before the Lý 
dynasty. Vietnam would only go to China to pay tribute after an indication from 
China.34 In 1257, Tran dispatched missions to the Mongols, and the Mongols issued the 
timetable that Vietnam had to pay tribute once every three years.35 In 1263, Vietnam 
dispatched a mission to Yuan. Yuan gradually began to regulate payment of tribute 
from Vietnam once every three years.36 In 1374, Ming restated that Vietnam pay tribute 
once every three years.37
                                                 
34 LTHTLC, Vol. 46, p. 78. 
35 Ibid. p. 78. 
36 Ibid. p. 79. 
37 long wen bin, ming hui yao, 1956, Vol. 78, p. 1510. 
 During the Wan Li period of the Ming, China specified that 
Vietnam should pay tribute twice in a six-year period. In 1669, the Emperor Kang Xi 
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revived this schedule.38 By the eighteenth century, Vietnam paid tribute to China either 
once every two years, or once every three years, and even twice every four years during 
the Qing Dynasty period. In 1785, Qing China changed the schedule, and stipulated that 
Vietnam should pay tribute to China once every two years, replacing the former 
three-year interval. Additionally, Vietnam could dispatch envoys to China once every 
four years instead of once every six years.39
There are no documents to show that the Huế court requested the Qing to modify the 
timetable and regulation of tribute during the Gia Long period. By contrast, the Emperor 
Minh Mạng openly sought to expand the frequency of tribute to China. In 1828, Nguyễn 
Vietnam dispatched envoys to China on a tribute-paying mission. The tribute mission 
included Nguyễn Trọng Vũ (阮仲瑀), Nguyễn Đình Tân, (阮廷宾) and Đặng Văn Khải 
(邓文启).
  
40 The following year, they arrived in Beijing and had an audience with the 
Chinese emperor to bring forward a petition to change the tribute route from land to sea 
as will be discussed below.41
                                                 
38 VSTGCM, Chính Biên Vol.33, p. 24. 
39 Kun gang 昆冈, Qin ding da qing hui dian钦定大清会典[Official compendium of institutions and 
usages of the Imperial Qing]. Shang hai Shang hai gu ji chu ban she上海: 上海古籍出版社, 1995, Vol. 
503, p. 56. 
40 ĐNTL, Chính Biên, II, Vol. 55, p. 5. 
41 Xun zong shi lu 宣宗实录 Vol. 158, p.36 in qing shi lu shi liao zhai chao, 1985, p. 296. 
 The high-ranking (president or vice president of Six 
Boards) envoys sent to China indicated how the Huế stressed the importance of this 
petition, even though it was refused. Requests for modifying the timetable and 
regulation of tribute were set aside by the Manchu court until 1839, when the activities 
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of the Western powers became urgent and of vital importance in Qing diplomatic affairs 
around the first Opium War. In 1839, the Qing court declared that Vietnam should pay 
tribute once every four years to Beijing instead of twice every four years.42
The usual route for Vietnamese missions since the Song Dynasty was from northern 
Vietnam via Guangxi and onward into China. However, this route was not fixed 
officially until the Ming period. This was the official road to China from Vietnam, 
whether for paying tribute, or for other diplomatic issues, such as extraditing criminals, 
releasing prisoners of war, and so on. However, there were two cases in which Vietnam 
violated this precedent in history. In 1394, Vietnam dispatched missions to pay tribute 
from Guangdong by sea. The Ming emperor was too angry to accept the Vietnamese 
tribute payment.
 According 
to this new tributary regulation, besides Vietnam, the opportunities for tribute from the 
Ryukyus and Siam also decreased.   
 
Soliciting waterborne trade and violating precedents  
43
                                                 
42 Kun Gang.qin ding da qing hui dian shi li. Vol. 504, p. 63. 
43 Long wenbin. ming hui yao, 1956, Vol. 15, p. 249. 
 The likely reason for his rage was that the Ming would face more 
potential threats from China’s southeast coast if Vietnam’s tribute to Beijing by sea was 
approved as regulation. The security along coast and sea was a chief concern throughout 
the Ming dynasty. Therefore, the Ming did not approve the request of Vietnam, which 
had traditionally paid tribute by land, to change the tribute route and increase the threat 
from coast and sea. Besides, in 1457, the Lê Dynasty had taken criminals to China from 
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Longzhou in Guangxi via Yunnan.44
In 1829, the Nguyễn court deployed officials to take crews back to China on 
Vietnamese ships. Moreover, the official, Nguyễn Văn Chương (阮文章), formally 
presented the petition to trade by sea in Guangdong.
 Aside from these two cases, there are no more 
documents on Vietnamese violation in the official records. However, by the Minh Mạng 
period, Vietnam had initiated its request to enter Guangdong by sea. 
45
                                                 
44 Long wenbin. ming hui yao, Vol. 78, p. 1511. 
45 Xuan zong shi lu 宣宗实录 Vol. 159, p. 21. In qing shi lu shi liao zhai chao, 1985, p. 296. 
 There was no specific document 
to show the reasons why Vietnam made this request. It is likely that Vietnam requested 
this change due to two reasons. One was the geographical aspect, as entry to China by 
sea was easier, faster and more convenient than by land since the Sino-Vietnamese 
overland borders were full of jungles and mountains. The other was that Vietnam could 
carry more cargo by sea than they could by land. It was significant that the Huế court 
not only requested a sea route for tribute, but also requested to trade directly with and 
openly in Guangdong, even though the Qing rejected this petition. From the perspective 
of the Chinese rulers, compared with the other countries that had only used the sea route 
for tribute trade missions, the land routes were sufficient for the Huế, since the 
Vietnamese had received approval to conduct tribute trade by land in areas such as in 
Qinzhou (钦州) in Guangdong and Shuikou (水口) Custom in Guangxi. The Qing court 
was worried that with the increase in entrance points, more suspicious people would 
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enter China and make trouble if the Nguyễn ruler was permitted to trade or pay tribute 
by sea instead of by land.46
Besides openly requesting trade opportunities, Huế did not obey the regulation on 
extraditing and repatriating bandits and pirates, or that on rescuing shipwrecks by land. 
According to Chinese regulations, Vietnam should extradite all criminals to the nearest 
customs in China, such as Qinzhou, by land, even if they were pirates captured on the 
waters.
  
47 The Huế court did not violate this regulation during the Gia Long period. 
However, under Minh Mạng, Vietnam did not toe the line. In 1835, the Huế court 
arrested some Chinese pirates, Liang Kaifa (梁开发) and two others, and repatriated 
them by sea.48 This ‘aberrance’ that appeared in the Minh Mạng period became 
conspicuous by the Thiệu Trị and Tự Đức periods. Nguyễn Vietnam again extradited 
pirates and bandits by sea several times, such as in 1843, 1844, and 1845. In 1845, the 
Huế court dispatched four officers to repatriate Chinese pirates by sea.49
                                                 
46 Liang Tingnan 梁廷楠, Yue hai guan zhi 粤海关志 [Discourse on the Canton maritime Custom]. Tai 
bei, Wen hai chu ban she台北: 文海出版社, 1975, Vol. 24, p. 33. 
47 Xuan zong shi lu 宣宗实录 Vol. 272, pp. 5–6; Vol. 295, p. 13–14 in qing shi lu shi liao zhai chao. 
1985, p. 314–315. 
48 Ibid. 
49 ĐNTL, Chính Biên III, Vol. 48, p. 5. 
 Apart from 
extraditing Chinese bandits arrested in the Sino-Vietnamese borderland by land, most 
Chinese pirates had been repatriated by sea since the Minh Mạng period. The motive 
behind this ‘aberrance’ was economic profit. This point is discussed in the extraditing 
and repatriating section. 
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Criticism on the Opium War  
In addition, there was Nguyễn Vietnam’s veiled criticism on the attitude that the Qing 
court held when it settled the international affairs around the Opium War. In 1839, 
Trương Hảo Hợp (张好合), Nguyễn Văn Công (阮文功) and Phan Hiển Đạt (潘显达) 
were sent to China on official business.50 At the end of this year, the officials came 
back and reported to Emperor Minh Mạng on the incident wherein the opium was 
destroyed by Commissioner Lin Zexu (林则徐) in Guangzhou. Also, the fight between 
the Qing and the Western powers lasted a long time, and neither side had won a decisive 
victory before the main force of the British troops arrived. On this point, Emperor Minh 
Mạng offered veiled criticism on the Chinese dejection and apathy during this event.51 
In Emperor Minh Mạng’s mind, he was mortified that the Qing, as a great power, had 
not defeated the British troops after around six or seven months of fighting. Therefore, 
the Nguyễn rulers viewed the Qing court with disdain. Furthermore, there was a hidden 
reason behind the Vietnamese scorn of the Qing court: the Sino-Vietnamese trade route 
by sea was obstructed by the Opium War, and trade was not running as smoothly as it 
had before. Many essential cargoes, such as medicine and tea, could not be transported 
to Vietnam.52
                                                 
50 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 202, p. 24. 
51 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 208, p. 27. 
52 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 208, p. 32; Vol. 209, p. 6. 
 In addition, the criticism of the Opium War exposed the pervasive fear of 
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the Huế court that British intervention would cause the traditional international trade 
between Vietnam and China to come tumbling down.53
By the Thiệu Trị and Tự Đức periods, the Chinese emperor used the long distance 
between Beijing and Huế as a pretext to postpone the time that the Vietnamese paid 
tribute. However, Huế lost not only the opportunities to pay tribute, but also the choice 
 
 
Thiệu Trị (1841–1847) and Tự Đức periods (1847–1883)  
China began to decline in many respects relating to the economy, commerce and 
diplomacy once the first Opium War broke out. The tributary system, which China 
established to settle relations with its neighbours, was increasingly giving way to the 
treaty system with the arrival of the Western powers after the first Opium War. 
Unquestionably, as one part of the Chinese tributary system, the Sino-Vietnamese 
relationship was also greatly influenced by the traditional diplomatic pattern of China. 
The Nguyễn court was at a complete loss about what to do when faced with China’s 
decline, since the Nguyễn had used ideas similar to those of the Chinese to settle affairs 
between Vietnam and its neighbours. The only way that the country could manage was 
to continue to place great hopes in the recovery of the Chinese world order. It was 
possible that the Huế court did not want to give up the good choice of trade by paying 
tribute. 
                                                 
53 Alexander Barton Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese model: a comparative study of Vietnamese and 
Chinese government in the first half of the nineteenth century (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian 
Studies, Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 280. 
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for trade. In 1842, Vietnam had intended to pay tribute. Unfortunately, the Chinese 
emperor postponed the tribute to the next time due to the Opium War.54 The Nguyễn 
court had to look for another way to continue trade in China, since the opportunities of 
trading while paying tribute were lost. Vietnamese officials were thereby dispatched to 
China by taking Chinese ships to trade in Guangdong.55 The following year, the 
Nguyễn court did this again.56
During the Tự Đức period, the Taiping Rebellion made China an area of troubled 
waters, in particular in Guangdong and Guangxi. Liang Guang was the only possible 
route for the Vietnamese tribute envoys to Beijing. Besides, the Western powers’ entry 
into China changed a vital aspect of diplomatic relations. The Sino-Southeast Asian 
relationship had given way to Sino-Western relations. Fear of the Western forces left the 
Qing with no time and energy to consider the Vietnamese tribute. Therefore, the 
Chinese emperor postponed the payment time of Vietnam in 1849, 1850, 1852, and 
1861. Even in 1861, when Emperor Xian Feng (咸丰) died, the Chinese court still did 
not recondition tribute, due to complicated diplomatic relations with Western countries 
and domestic unrest, in particular rebellions in Southeast China at that time.
  
57
                                                 
54 ĐNTL, Chính Biên III, Vol. 18, p. 25.  
55 Ibid. Chính Biên III, Vol. 58, p. 1. 
56 Ibid. Chính Biên III, Vol. 68, p. 25. 
57 Mu zong shi lu 穆宗实录, Vol. 82, p. 32–33 in qing shi lu shi liao zhai chao, 1985, p. 330.  
 The 
Sino-Vietnamese tributary relations lapsed until Vietnam was brought into a treaty 
system with the first Saigon Treaty signed in 1862.  
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In 1848, the Chinese emperor sent Lao Chongguang (劳崇光), the Surveillance 
Commissioner in Guangxi province, to present the imperial decree which conferred 
Nguyễn Phúc Thời with the title of the Vietnamese emperor Tự Đức.58 The Chinese 
officials went to Hà Nội (Thăng Long was the old name of Hà Nội) principally to confer 
an imperial decree. Huế was always the Nguyễn imperial capital, but apparently the 
Qing chose to ignore this at this point in time. Thereafter, the Huế court should accept 
the imperial decree in Hà Nội. However, Emperor Tự Đức solicited the Chinese 
emperor to proceed to Huế.59 This request was due to three considerations. On one 
hand, if the Chinese official went to Huế instead, the Qing court would have a clear idea 
that the Nguyễn was a completely separate dynasty from the previous one. On the other 
hand, accepting the Chinese imperial decree in Huế was a way to make the domestic 
situation stable, since Tự Đức had just succeeded to the throne. Ultimately, Tự Đức 
could save a great deal of money which was used to receive the Qing officials. The 
tributary state had an obligation to receive officials from the suzerain state in the proper 
manner. The decorations on houses along the roads cost the tributary state a lot of 
money. The reception also had to observe detailed rules, based on ritual regulations in 
Vietnamese history.60 For the Nguyễn, the cost of receiving officials from China in Huế 
was cheaper than in Hanoi. 61
                                                 
58 Xuan zong shi lu 宣宗实录，Vol. 461, p. 4–5 in qing shi lu shi liao zhai chao, 1985, p. 325. 
59 ĐNTL, Chính Biên IV, Vol. 1, pp. 31–32. 
60 LTHTLC, Vol Bang Giao, Vol. 46, p. 150–195. 
61 Sun Hongnian, qing dai zhong yue zong fan guan xi yan jiu, 2006, p. 151. 
 The Chinese emperor approved. Emperor Tự Đức was 
extremely proud, because this was the first time that Chinese officials had gone to 
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Vietnam personally to give an imperial decree on behalf of the Chinese emperor since 
the Nguyễn Dynasty had been established. This event indicates that Vietnam in the 
Nguyễn dynasty still emphasised its separate dynastic identity.  
 
4. New characteristics in Sino-Vietnamese tributary relations 
In general, tribute trade was a necessary part of the tributary system. Without exception, 
the Sino-Vietnamese tribute trade followed the normal Sino-Vietnamese tributary 
system in the nineteenth century. According to Mark Mancall, the tribute trade under 
China’s world order was processed into three parts: ‘gift trade’, ‘market trade’ and 
‘administrated trade’. To some degree, the Sino-Vietnamese tribute trade also fit this 
pattern. Gift trade was a basic part of the Sino-Vietnamese tribute trade. The quantity 
and kinds of tribute goods were not fixed during the Song Dynasty.62 The Ming 
regulated tribute goods including silver and gold wares and the like.63 There was no 
rigid or compulsory type of goods that Đại Việt had to present for tribute.64
                                                 
62 Xu song 徐松 song hui yao ji gao 宋会要辑稿 [Draft of documents pertaining to Song official 
matters]. Bei jing Zhong hua shu ju 北京中华书局， 1957, p. 7728–7730; LTHTLC, Vol. 46, p. 77. 
63 Shen shixing 申时行. Ming hui dian 明会典 [Official compendium of institutions and usages of 
Ming]. Shang hai shang wu yin shu guan, 1936, Vol. 105, p. 2287. 
64 Kun Gang. qin ding da qing hui dian shi li, Vol. 503, p. 56. 
 On some 
occasions, the vassals could obtain the exemption of duties. Apart from gift trade where 
Vietnam presented gifts to China and vice versa, the Vietnamese vassal also engaged in 
local deals in Beijing and frontier customs market trade. Ping’er and Shuikou as market 
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trade customs were licensed by the Qing court in 1790.65 From 1790 onwards, market 
trade with tribute was authorised in the local customs of Qinzhou in Guangdong and 
Shuikou Customs in Guangxi, as both were next to the frontier.66
4.1 Purchase on the way to the capital Beijing. 
  
Besides these common aspects of tribute trade, the Sino-Vietnamese tributary also 
sprouted some new traits at that time. These traits could be important clues to 
understand the evolution of Sino-Vietnamese relations in the nineteenth century. 
 
Aside from market trade at frontier markets or in Beijing, Vietnam also purchased 
articles on the tribute route since Nguyễn Vietnam became a vassal paying tribute to 
China by land. Besides the gifts given by Chinese officials during welcoming and 
sending-off ceremonies, the Vietnamese envoys also gave some articles in return. 
Concurrently, they also purchased items on the way to Beijing. Như Thanh Nhật Kí (如
清日记, the diary during the journey to China) provides us with a vivid picture of 
Vietnamese envoys to Beijing to pay tribute. This document recorded not only 
commercial but also daily activities. There were no documents to show the proportion 
of private trade and those of official Vietnamese trade during this journey. However, 
one example can give us some ideas about the private trade during tribute journey. Phan 
                                                 
65 Li bu wei nei ge chao chu liang guang zong du fu kang an deng zou yi hui 礼部为内阁抄出两广总督
福康安等奏移会 in Tai wan zhong yang yan jiu yuan li shi yu yan yan jiu suo 台湾中央研究院历史语
言研究所. Ming qing shi liao 明清史料（庚编） [The historical materials in Ming and Qing dynasty]. 
Zhong hua shu ju 中华书局，， 1987. 
66 Liang Tingnan, yue hai guan zhi, Vol. 24, p. 33. 
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Huy Chú (潘辉注) was found guilty because he bought more private goods than official 
merchandise.67
Some private deals also happened during gift trade. The Vietnamese envoys 
obtained shang shu (尚书, Confucian classics), sugar, elephant tusks, and other items 
from officials in Hubei province.
  
68 Vietnam also gave the local Chinese officials a 
variety of other goods, such as ivory fans.69 This archive also affords us a picture of  
the trade activities of Vietnamese missions in inland China. In December 1868, 
Vietnamese envoys dispatched retinues to buy items in Hanyang (汉阳) in China.70 In 
March and April of 1867, Vietnamese missions’ retinues were appointed to purchase 
goods, which sometimes included the collecting of books.71
From these accounts, we can see that Huế took a very pragmatic approach to trade 
en route. Apparently, ‘trade on the way’ could not be on a large scale either. On what 
kind of occasions did Vietnam obtain more trade opportunities under the 
Sino-Vietnamese tributary relations and how did the Huế court enlarge the trade fields 
in the tribute system? How did Vietnam’s endeavour to enlarge trade opportunities 
 As far as goods are 
concerned, it was possible for Vietnamese missions to buy necessities such as herbs and 
many volumes of articles for the Nguyễn government.   
                                                 
67 ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 79, p. 17. 
68 Như Thanh Nhật Kí 如清日记 [The journal to Beijing]. Viện Hán Nôm. A102,. p. 80. 
69 Ibid. p. 86. 
70 Ibid. p. 38. 
71 Ibid. p. 61–62. 
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appear under traditional Sino-Vietnamese relations? The other obligations they 
shouldered should offer clues to the answers to these questions. 
 
4.2 Rescuing the Chinese shipwrecks  
The obligation to rescue shipwrecked people was set up between China and its 
tributaries. Besides the gifts and goods returned by China during the payment of tribute, 
Huế’s vessels had privileges on trade such as the exemption of either import or export 
tax when Nguyễn sent shipwrecked Chinese crews back. This method was usually a 
shortcut for the Huế court to undertake maritime trade, which had never been accepted 
under the tribute system. 
Besides paying tribute, the rescuing of wrecked crews became a close connection 
between China and Vietnam in the nineteenth century. For China, the Chinese court 
rescued Vietnamese wrecked crews as a demonstration of its obedience. In contrast, for 
Vietnam, there was another hidden meaning. On one hand, it was in this way that the 
Nguyễn strengthened Sino-Vietnamese political contacts. On the other hand, the Huế 
court succeeded in conducting more deals than prescribed by the Sino-Vietnamese 
tribute system.  
Ðại Nam not only rescued the Chinese wrecks but also offered them many articles 
or necessities. In 1804, ten Chinese merchants drifted in Quảng Trị (广治) and Bình 
Định (平定) in Vietnam due to a typhoon. Every one of them received five dou rice and 
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one string of copper.72 In 1810, Li Qianzong (李千总) and Xiao Yuanhou (萧元侯), 
the officials in Taiwan, and their nine Chinese followers were stranded in Vietnam on 
the way to China. The Nguyễn administration not only gave them 60 strings of copper, 
four rolls of thin silk and 19 rolls of cloth, but also dispatched official ships to take them 
to Huế. Thereafter, the Huế court awarded Xiao Yuanhou’s family with extra items like 
various clothing and other articles for daily life, and sixty liang silver and one hundred 
string of copper.73
The real reason why Nguyễn Vietnam did not cease to escort the Chinese 
shipwrecks back was because they strove for increased trade opportunities in China. 
Apparently, the transaction value of trade by sea exceeded that of tribute trade by land 
more than tenfold. In 1829, the Huế court dispatched official ships to escort the 
Cantonese back to China and asked for permission to trade. The Chinese court allowed 
them to sell their cargoes and purchase goods in Guangzhou without tax, as a reward for 
rescuing them.
  
74 Escorting the Chinese shipwrecks back was, in fact, the most effective 
way to trade in China for the Vietnamese, even though the Chinese court had directly 
refused the Vietnamese petition for trade in Guangzhou by sea. In 1831, the Vietnamese 
officials, Trần Văn Trung (陈文忠) and Cao Hữu Dực (高有翼), escorted Li Zhenqing 
(李振青), his family, and their entourage back home.75
                                                 
72 KĐĐNHĐSL, Vol. 131, p. 9. 
73 KĐĐNHĐSL, Vol. 131, p. 10. 
74 Xuan zong shi lu 宣宗实录 Vol. 156, p.39–41 in qing shi lu shi liao zhai chao, 1985, p. 295. 
75 Xuan zong shi lu 宣宗实录 Vol. 197, p.14–17. xuan zong shi lu 宣宗实录 Vol. 156, p. 39–41 in 
qing shi lu shi liao zhai chao, 1985, p. 298. 
 Li was an ex-official of Fujian 
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Province. Apart from the gifts bestowed by Emperor Dao Guang and 14 rolls of 
superior quality brocades, the ballast from Vietnamese ships was allowed to be sold at 
the local seaport.76 This included cinnamon, birds’ nest, eaglewood, elephant tusks, 
rhinoceros horns, yellow wax, white tin, ebony, sugar, dried small shrimps, dried fish, 
rabbit fur, and other items.77
In the summer of 1833, a fleet of almost 70 official Chinese ships berthed in 
Vietnam’s waters. Liang Guodong (梁国栋) was an official who had died in a 
shipwreck. The Vietnamese government had rescued the ship and smoothly arranged the 
funeral rites for the deceased official. The Chinese court awarded the Vietnamese 
various brocades and other items and allowed them to trade without tax in 
Guangdong.
 
78 In March 1834, Chen Zilong (陈子龙), an official in Guangdong 
province, and about 27 Chinese subordinates were caught in a hurricane at sea, and 
moored in Thanh Hóa (清化) in Vietnam. Chen and his subordinates were rescued by 
the Vietnamese government. Moreover, the Nguyễn court dispatched Lý Văn Phức (李
文馥) to escort Chen back to China. The Vietnamese ships were authorised to sell the 
cargoes which they had loaded and buy goods in China without tax in Guangdong 
again.79
                                                 
76 Kun Gang, qin ding da qing hui dian shi li, Vol. 513, p. 167. 
77 Zhou Kai 周凯. Xia men zhi 厦门志 [The gazetteer of Xiamen]. Tai bei, Cheng wen chu ban she台
北: 成文出版社, 1967, Vol. 8, p. 19. 
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 Thereafter, the Nguyễn was vigilant and prompt about returning Chinese 
shipwrecks. It is certain that Vietnamese sea trade in local seaports without tax was 
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sanctioned, as can be seen by documents from 1844, 1845, 1851, 1855, and 1857. 
Obviously, the Vietnamese government attempted to improve Sino-Vietnamese 
maritime trade by rescuing and returning Chinese shipwrecks, as one important facet of 
Sino-Vietnamese tributary relations. 
Nguyễn Vietnam did not give up on improving Sino-Vietnamese maritime trade, 
particularly since the petition for altering the schedule and regulation to pay tribute had 
been refused time after time by the Chinese court. The Huế court, to some degree, had 
achieved its aim in maritime trade in the way described above, as this could not be 
realised under the regular pattern of Sino-Vietnamese tributary trade. As for the quantity 
of goods, it seems that the carrying capacity of vessels was larger than that of their 
chests. In this way, the Huế court increased its contact with Qing and optimised 
Sino-Vietnamese tributary relations in the process. 
 
4.3 Extradition and Repatriation 
The Sino-Vietnamese borderlands were the popular places where bandits and pirates 
were active. Cooperation between China and Vietnam, such as extraditing and 
repatriating the bandits and pirates, was a regular affair under the Sino-Vietnamese 
tributary system. For China, extraditing and repatriating bandits and pirates were 
obligatory in Sino-Vietnamese tributary relations. For Vietnam, extraditing and 
repatriating bandits and pirates was not only the reflection of close relations with China, 
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but was also another way to improve Sino-Vietnamese trade relations in the name of the 
Sino-Vietnamese tributary relationship. 
The frequent contact between the two countries through the extradition and 
repatriation of bandits and pirates can be attributed to two factors. In one respect, the 
maritime trade could easily be realised in this manner, since vessels for extraditing and 
repatriating had special tax-free trade privileges in China. Rescuing shipwrecks, and 
extraditing and repatriating pirates and bandits were also better ways to trade directly in 
China. In 1835, the Vietnamese moored with more goods for sale in Guangdong, when 
they repatriated Liang Kaifa and two other Chinese pirates. The Qing court eventually 
approved this trade, even though they did not believe it was a good way to do that.80
However, this admonishment did not have much effect. In 1843, Trương Hảo Hợp 
(张好合) and Nguyễn Cư Sĩ (阮居仕) repatriated eight Chinese pirates, Jin Erji (金二纪) 
and seven other followers. As a result of this effort, the Vietnamese official ships were 
rewarded with more goods, which included 30 ivory fans, 20 tortoise shells, five pairs 
of gold decorations and 15 pairs of silver decorations, 20 round-mouthed food vessels 
inlaid with tortoise shell, and including two or four loop handles, five liang of cerate 
with fragrance, twenty rolls of various voiles, ten rolls of various thin voiles, and ten 
rolls of pure white and fine silk, among other treasures.
 
81
In 1845, the Chinese pirates, Huang Jinxiu (黄进秀), Xu Yasan (许亚三) and others 
were arrested when they landed in Vạn Ninh (万宁) in Vietnam after being pursued. 
  
                                                 
80 Xuan zong shi lu 宣宗实录 Vol. 272, p. 5–6 in qing shi lu shi liao zhai chao, 1985, p. 314. 
81 KĐĐNHĐSL, Vol. 131, p. 16. 
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Four pirate ships were detained by the Vietnamese government.82 These Vietnamese 
official ships gained an opportunity for trade in Guangdong without any further tax, 
because they had respectfully and submissively extradited pirates.83
It is noteworthy that the Huế court repatriated and extradited frequently during the 
Thiệu Trị period, in 1843, 1844, 1845, respectively. Two factors could explain this. On 
one hand, there were restrictions on some items such as tea, corruption in customs, the 
entry of Europeans into economic affairs, and the great increase in smuggling and pirate 
rampancy around 1840s in China, which in turn caused more such activity in 
Vietnamese waters.
 
84  Accordingly, the frequency and scale of extraditing and 
repatriating Chinese pirates also increased. The Vietnamese government extradited 
around 200 Chinese pirates after repatriating Chen Wan (陈晚), Cao Er (曹二), Peng 
Yafu (彭亚福) and six other Chinese pirates in 1842.85
 
 On the other hand, intensifying 
extradition and repatriation for the Nguyễn became an alternative way of trade in the 
face of reduced opportunities for tribute from 1839, when Qing court decreased the 
occasions that Vietnam paid tribute because the Western powers became the most 
emergent issues around the time of the Opium War.     
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5. Như Đông Công Vụ: Going directly to Guangdong for official business 
It is noteworthy that Như Đông Công Vụ (如东公务, going directly to Guangdong for 
official business) under the Sino-Vietnamese tributary relationship occurred frequently 
during the nineteenth century. As far as researching Sino-Vietnamese relations is 
concerned, Như Đông Công Vụ was either neglected or was regarded as just one facet of 
tributary relations. Nonetheless, during the Nguyễn Dynasty, different dimensions of the 
Sino-Vietnamese relationship are revealed after taking Như Đông Công Vụ into account. 
    Như Đông Công Vụ was not explicitly mentioned in the main history records in 
Vietnam before the Nguyễn Dynasty was established. It was recorded frequently in the 
actual records of the Nguyễn Dynasty, but the purpose or activities of Như Đông Công 
Vụ were not detailed in these records. Based on the official documents of Nguyễn, it can 
be generally inferred that Như Đông Công Vụ included some official commercial 
activities and other obligations and issues under Sino-Vietnamese tributary relations. 
Như Đông Công Vụ can be regarded as one part of Sino-Vietnamese relations. On most 
occasions, Như Đông Công Vụ was both the official title and reason in their country that 
Huế invented to go to Guangdong so that they could trade. The purpose of this label of 
Như Đông Công Vụ was to disguise their trade in Qing since the latter never approved 
of Vietnam paying tribute to China by sea and paid tribute trade. 
Normal tributary trade, gift trade, and market trade at the frontier or in Beijing could 
not accomplish trade on a large scale. Rescuing Chinese wrecked crews and repatriating 
and extraditing bandits and pirates to some extent fulfilled the goal of ‘a big deal’ for 
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the Nguyễn within the framework of Sino-Vietnamese tributary relations, but rescues or 
repatriations were, by nature, haphazard opportunities that could not be carried out on a 
regular basis. As such, trade was still limited. Since the Gia Long period, Như Đông 
Công Vụ increasingly became a way for the Vietnamese government to directly engage 
in maritime trade. 
Trading under the name of Như Đông Công Vụ had some striking merits during the 
Nguyễn Dynasty. Firstly, Như Đông Công Vụ became a regulation during the Nguyễn 
Dynasty. The Nguyễn proceeded to undertake Như Đông Công Vụ 19 times from 1802 
to 1864, six times in the Gia Long period, eight times in the Minh Mạng, three times 
under Thiệu Trị, and twice in the Tự Đức period, even though the precedent on Như 
Đông Công Vụ had been openly rescinded in Vietnam before 1863.  
Secondly, trade on a larger scale at the governmental level occurred alongside Như 
Đông Công Vụ. The amount of money that officers carried illustrated, in a sense, that 
the transaction amounts of Như Đông Công Vụ by sea exceeded that of market trade 
under Sino-Vietnamese tributary trade. In 1806, Lương Chân Quan (梁真观) and 
Trương Bảo Thiện (张宝善), who both carried 30,000 strings of copper, were appointed 
as the officials to be sent to China to purchase cargo.86 Four years later, in 1810, 
Trương Bảo Thiện (张宝善) and Lữ Hữu Định (吕有定), who were in Minh Hương in 
Gia Định, took 20,000 liang of silver to Guangdong to purchase goods.87
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 In 1814, Tạ 
Bằng Chu (谢鹏周) and Chu Tứ Kí (周泗记), who were both Chinese Thanh Nhân (清
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人), were commissioned by the Vietnamese government of Bắc Thành (北城) to take 
10,000 liang of silver to Guangdong to purchase goods.88
Finally, the Chinese were an essential part of trade for the Nguyễn government. As 
Anthony Reid points out, Siam and Vietnam had always commissioned pure Chinese 
merchants to make deals with China since the seventeenth century. This factor 
dramatically accelerated the control of commerce by the Chinese, as a crucial part of the 
Southeast Asian world in the latter part of the eighteenth century.
  
89
Of the four times that Như Đông Công Vụ occurred during the Gia Long period, the 
Nguyễn court commissioned the Chinese to Guangdong for the purchase of goods three 
times. Most of the officials sent to Guangdong were Chinese or Minh Hương. Trương 
Bảo Thiện was Minh Hương, while Tạ Bằng Chu and Chu Tứ Kí were Chinese 
merchants in China. Nguyễn dispatched officials to Guangdong in 1820 twice, 1822, 
1823, and 1827. After 1829, Nguyễn Vietnam appointed officials to Guangdong only 
three times, in 1832, 1837, and 1839. Prior to the Gia Long period, Vietnam dispatched 
officials to China to purchase goods named Thải Mãi Hóa Hạng (采买货项). Moreover, 
by the Minh Mạng period, Thải Mãi Hóa Hạng as the reason for going to Guangdong, 
 This pattern was 
still practised in Vietnam in the Nguyễn period. Here, the Chinese were either Minh 
Hương or common Chinese merchants, who were travelling merchants or sojourned in 
Vietnam for deals. 
                                                 
88 Ibid. Chính Biên I, Vol. 48, pp. 19–20. 
89 Anthony Reid, “A New Phase of Commercial Expansion in Southeast Asia, 1760–1850” in Anthony 
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was changed to Như Đông Công Vụ by virtue of the failure of the petition for open trade 
in Guangdong in 1829.90
    This feature became conspicuous during the Thiệu Trị and Tự Đức periods, with 
the opportunities for tribute lessening in 1839.
  
91  The Huế court did not halt 
commissions to conduct trade, even though the Chinese government severely restricted 
trade by its tributaries in Guangdong. The Chinese government reiterated this point after 
the Chinese Jin Xieshun Enterprise (金协顺) and Chen Chengfa Enterprise (陈澄发) 
had gone to Guangzhou to trade with Siamese royalty in 1807. 92  Obviously, 
admonishment did not influence the Sino-Siamese trade, which was characterised by the 
‘acquiescence of Chinese authorities in the Siamese practice of employing Chinese for 
official and semi-official trade,’ and the ‘Chinese merchants’ supremacy and undisputed 
role in the Sino-Siamese trade.’93
In 1846, Ngô Kim Thanh (吴金声) and five other officials went to Guangdong to 
purchase goods through Chinese commercial ships.
 As in Siam, the Chinese merchants engaged in the 
official trade of the Nguyễn government with Qing. Furthermore, the Chinese 
merchants played an undisputed role in the official trade for the Nguyễn when the 
normal Sino-Vietnamese tributary trade started to decline.    
94
                                                 
90 Xuan zong shi lu 宣宗实录. Vol. 156, p. 39–41 in qing shi lu shi liao zhai chao, 1985, p. 295. 
91 Xuan zong shi lu 宣宗实录. Vol. 320 p. 37 in qing shi lu shi liao zhai chao, 1985, p. 317. 
92 Ren zong shi lu 仁宗实录. Vol. 185, p. 6–10 in qing shi lu shi liao zhai chao, 1985, p. 913. 
93 Sarasin Viraphol, Tribute and profit: Sino-Siamese trade, 1652–1853, 1977, pp. 160–161. 
94 ĐNTL, Chính Biên III, Vol. 58, p. 1. 
 In 1847, the Nguyễn Court 
commissioned Li Tailu (李泰陆), a Chinese merchant in Quang Nam in Vietnam, to go 
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to Guangdong to purchase goods for the Huế court.95 In the same year, Đỗ Văn Hải (杜
文海) and Hồ Đức Tuyên (胡得宣) were appointed to purchase goods in Guangdong.96
In the first year of Emperor Tự Đức’s reign, the Nguyễn court accepted the official 
memorial by Nguyễn Văn Chấn (阮文振) to abrogate Như Đông Công Vụ for two 
reasons. Firstly, it was not consistent with frugality, because goods purchased during 
Như Đông Công Vụ included some valuable antiques and jadeware. Another concern 
was that it would be inappropriate to ship back too many luxury items by Như Đông 
Công Vụ in the mourning period after Thiệu Trị’s demise.
 
Apart from Li Tailu, all of the officers who were appointed to Guangdong sailed on 
Chinese merchant vessels.   
97 However, the Huế court 
started this again in 1863, after the Chinese court paused the Vietnamese payment of 
tribute in 1860.98 The Nguyễn court deployed Trần Như Sơn (陈如山) to Guangdong 
again by Chinese merchant vessels for purchasing goods in 1863.99
Besides Như Đông Công Vụ as a pattern of trade, the Vietnamese court also 
commissioned Chinese merchants or vessels to China to purchase official goods. Chen 
Chingho has pointed out that the Nguyễn used Chinese merchants to sell certain special 
 It is possible that 
the Nguyễn court needed this kind of trade to meet their demands for luxury items from 
China. Therefore, they had to restart Như Đông Công Vụ.  
                                                 
95 Ibid. Chính Biên III, Vol. 64, p. 12. 
96 Ibid. Chính Biên III, Vol. 68, p. 25. 
97 Ibid. Chính Biên IV, Vol. 1, p. 32. 
98 Ibid. Chính Biên IV, Vol. 25, p. 15. 
99 Ibid. Chính Biên IV, Vol .28, p. 33. 
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articles such as pepper, high quality eaglewood, bird’s nests, and other 
items.100Additionally, he also pointed out that some influential Chinese merchants 
monopolised all the cargoes for royalty and the Vietnamese government under the 
Nguyễn.101
The Chinese merchants had this prerogative to be exempted from tax. The value of 
the articles they carried back determined the extent of their tax exemption. These ships 
were free of duty if the value they shipped back was beyond 6,000 strings of coppers.
 The cargoes were usually both Chinese and Western goods. Most of them 
were for the government and for royalty. The Nguyễn court gave every Chinese ship 
that moored in different ports of Vietnam some money, ranging from 3,000 or 5,000 to 
10,000 or 20,000 strings of copper for purchasing goods in China. The Chinese 
merchants handed in these goods to the Vietnamese government when they returned to 
Vietnam in the following year. The Board of Revenue passed a commodities list drawn 
up by the Armoury section of the Imperial Household Department to the Chinese 
merchants. They would not be subject to tax when they returned with the official goods.   
102 
In 1856, the Nguyễn court commissioned some Chinese commercial vessels to bring 
back Chinese and Western goods.103 Furthermore, many princesses in the Huế court 
also bought exotic things from the Chinese commercial ships that came to Vietnam.104
                                                 
100 Chen Chingho陈荆和. Cheng tian ming xiang she he qing he fu 承天明香社和清河甫 [Ming 
Hương Xã and Thanh Hà village in Thua Thien]. Xin ya xue bao新亚学报 Vol. 4, p. 314. 
101 Ibid, p. 324. 
102 KĐĐNHĐSL, Vol 36, p. 17. 
103 ĐNTL, Chính Biên IV, Vol. 14, p. 40. 
104 Ibid. Chính Biên IV, Vol. 23, p. 27. 
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In addition, the Nguyễn court purchased goods directly from Chinese border 
provinces such as Yunnan. In 1805, Bắc Thành presented marble from Yunnan to the 
Nguyễn court.105 In 1806, the Nguyễn court sent La Sĩ Đông (罗士东) to China to buy 
goods. La Sĩ Đông took 300 hu of silver to China to purchase silk, dam ask, and other 
cargo by the land route.106 In 1831, the Nguyễn government appointed officials in Bắc 
Thành to buy good horses and gems in Yunnan via the land route.107
From these examples, Như Đông Công Vụ was an attempt to build a more frequent 
and regular trade between the Nguyễn government and China. The Chinese were 
indispensable in the Nguyễn Vietnamese practice of the official trade under Như Đông 
Công Vụ. In addition, regular commercial relations between the Vietnamese government 
and the Chinese world, and even the outside world became the exclusive domain of the 
Chinese. ‘In Vietnam, this pattern of indirect trade with China influenced the 
Sino-Vietnamese conduct of international relations. It ensured that the Nguyễn court’s 
whole view of foreign trade would be dominated by the idea of employing 






                                                 
105 Ibid. Chính Biên I, Vol. 27, p. 6. 
106 Châu Bản [Vermillion Books of the Nguyễn dynasty], microfilm in Australia National University 
libraries’ collection, Reel 2.  
107 ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 73, p. 5. 
108 Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese model, p. 277. 
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China’s tributary system, in place since the Han dynasty, was stable but started to 
decline by the Qing dynasty, especially after the Opium War. From the Opium War 
onwards, the tributary system began to evolve into the treaty system. Concurrently, 
tribute trade also transformed with the evolution of the tributary system. This 
transformation exerted an influence on Sino-Vietnamese relations. During this period, 
the Qing did not concentrate on in territorial aggression or defence, but were content 
with the ritual of receiving tribute as a suzerain which in turn bestowed commercial 
benefits to its vassals. That China placed more emphasis on ritual rather than aggression 
in the tributary system created many opportunities or grey areas for Vietnam and even 
other kingdoms in Southeast Asia to profit. However, the trade opportunities tributary 
system created were limited. Furthermore, by the nineteenth century, the tributary 
system as a normative pattern to handle international affairs became ineffective in the 
increasingly complicated relations between China and other countries.  
Conversely, as one aspect of China’s world order, Vietnam also made indispensable 
contributions to China’s tributary system. The demand for commerce spurred Nguyễn to 
intensify political contact with China by the tributary system, and Sino-Vietnamese 
diplomatic and political relations appeared stable. The flexibility of China’s tributary 
system offered Vietnam chances to strengthen its status as a separate state or a dynastic 
identity recognised by China. Both smooth diplomatic relations and status were very 
significant for Nguyễn to survive in the shadow of its giant northern neighbour. 
Concurrently, Vietnam enlarged the trade fields through irregular practices in the 
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tributary system such as repatriation and dispatching Chinese to trade in Guangdong 
and the like. The tribute trade could no longer be confined to the few ways regulated by 
China. This paved the way for the transformation from tribute trade to maritime and 
even open foreign trade, and from the tributary system to equal state-to-state relations 
with the outside world.  
Apart from the improvement of Sino-Vietnamese relations by some special ways in 
the tribute system, the domestic trade activities with the Chinese, in a sense, also 
influenced Sino-Vietnamese relations such as authorised trade contacts. This point will 













Chapter 3: Sino-Vietnamese private trade and the trade system in northern 
Vietnam 
 
1. Introduction  
The Sino-Vietnamese tribute trade played a crucial role in Sino-Vietnamese tributary 
relations. Tribute trade created the contacts necessary to complete merchandise 
exchanges at the governmental level, even though fewer Chinese merchants under the 
service of the Nguyễn government participated in tribute trade. However, tribute trade 
did not dominate Sino-Vietnamese trade communications. Officially sanctioned trade in 
northern Vietnam created more trade opportunities for the Chinese merchants. The 
private traders enlarged the Sino-Vietnamese trade contacts. Among these merchants, 
some merchants iterated southern China and northern Vietnam to make deals while 
others plied the South China Sea and the Tonkin Gulf to make their fortunes. These 
travelling merchants either resided in Vietnam or travelled back and forth.  
It is well known that Chinese merchants played an important role in the junk trade 
between China and regions in Southeast Asia, especially in the early modern period. 
Historians documenting China’s maritime trade have produced a number of excellent 
research works focusing on the maritime trade between Chinese merchants and the 
Vietnamese, particularly in the Mekong Delta in southern Vietnam.1
                                                 
1 On this point, see Nola Cooke and Li Tana, ed., Water frontier: commerce and the Chinese in the 
Lower Mekong Region, 1750–1880 (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2004); Wang Gungwu and 
Ng Chin-keong, ed., Maritime China in transition 1750–1850 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2004); Li Tana, 
Nguyễn Cochinchina (Ithaca, N.Y.: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1998). 
 However, in the 
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nineteenth century, Chinese merchants still contributed to Sino-Vietnamese commercial 
communications by both sea and land. 
What kind of role did Chinese merchants play in Sino-Vietnamese trade 
communications? How did trade contacts between southern China and northern 
Vietnam, cross-border and maritime trade, northern and other parts of Vietnam work? 
With the aim of answering these questions, this chapter explores the internal mechanism 
that effectively turned these regions into a single economic unit, and discusses the roles 
played by cross-border and maritime trade in Vietnam. 
         
2. Overland and maritime trade in northern Vietnam 
To the central government of China, Yunnan and Liangguang (两广) were southern 
frontiers. The frontier became one part of northern Vietnam when Nguyễn Phúc Ánh 
declared the capital to be Huế in 1802. Northern Vietnam’s borderlands were adjacent 
to the border provinces in Qing China, namely Yunnan, Guangxi and Guangdong. In the 
eighteenth century, Sino-Vietnamese cross-border trade flourished with the 
development of mining in border provinces in southern China as well as northern 
Vietnam, and local trade along the tribute route from Hà Nội to the Southern Pass in 
Guangxi. Furthermore, Vietnamese waters in the north were also connected with 
southern Chinese waters. The Tonkin Gulf was a huge arena for traders. In addition, the 
ocean in northern Vietnam, which was adjacent to Qinzhou and Lianzhou (廉州) in 
China, had many islands further out to sea. The commercial connections among these 
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islands always figured in the maritime trade network. The maritime trade network, 
which was characterised by short –travel –routes among these islands, was a variation 
of coastal trade. Maritime, coastal, and cross-border overland trade in northern Vietnam 
were united into multi-faceted internal and external trading networks, rather than a 
simple, one-way commercial model. 
Cross-border and maritime trade constituted one huge trade network in northern 
Vietnam and southern China, connecting border provinces on both sides of China and 
Vietnam, and running from the mountainous regions to the sea internally and externally. 
Due to the geographical proximity of southern China and northern Vietnam, the growth 
in commerce on one side of the border could generate important developments on the 
other side. A remarkable growth in commerce in southern China, such as in Yunnan, 
created change in northern Vietnam, as Giersch noted: ‘The growth of local commerce 
that drew frontier people into large commercial regions and the integration of the 
Sino-Southeast Asian borderlands into a more elaborate long-distance trade network.’2
 
 
Furthermore, an effective transportation system via the Red River supported 
cross-border and maritime trade networks, stimulating Sino-Vietnamese commerce 
during the Nguyễn dynasty. In the seventeenth century, Europe had taken note of the 
excellent transportation system along the Red River that linked Yunnan directly to 
northern Vietnam. By the early nineteenth century, Crawfurd also described it thus:  
                                                 
2 Patterson Giersch, Asian borderlands: the transformation of Qing China's Yunnan frontier (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 184. 
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The capital of Tonquin is situated upon this stream at a distance of about 
120 miles from the river mouth. This river, which fertilises a large area, 
is the principal source of the productivity of Tonquin, and, having its 
origin in the centre of the great Chinese province of Yun-nan and 
extending throughout the whole of Tonguin, it would appear to provide a 
very extensive and useful internal navigation channel.3
Besides this channel of employment for our capital via the maritime river 
ports of China, a new and mostly untried channel is given to us for 
disseminating our products among the Chinese; the connection between 
the northern portions of Cochin China and the provinces of China which 
immediately border upon it, particularly the extensive province of 
Yunnan. An international trade in bricks is at present conducted between 
these countries, as well as our opium and some of our European 
manufactures, which find their way from Canton to the Western 
provinces through the route of Tonquin.
  
 
Furthermore, they also noticed that the Red River was connected to the border 
provinces of Southern China and could form a huge, effective commercial network:  
 
4
                                                 
3 “Crawfurd’s report on the state of the Annamese Empire” in Alastair Lamb, The mandarin road to old 
Hué: narratives of Anglo-Vietnamese diplomacy from the 17th century to the eve of the French conquest 
(London: Chatto & Windus, 1970), p. 258. 




2.1. Dimensions of the trade route connecting northern Vietnam and southern 
China        
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The major routes connecting the different parts of the regions around the Gulf of Tonkin 
and the Sino-Vietnamese borderlands were shaped by Chinese military conquests in 
northern Vietnam, Vietnam paying tribute to China by land and local cross-border 
caravan trades.   
Commercial communications existed among the local people, both Vietnamese and 
Chinese, in the borderlands and waterways of northern Vietnam and southern China. 
The roads from Yunnan, Guangdong, and Guangxi to northern Vietnam constituted a 
network and provided communications to China, Vietnam, and Southeast Asia. The 
documentation regarding these roads gives us a clearer understanding of the context of 
regional trade along the Sino-Vietnamese borderlands and waterways.  
The maritime channel from Vietnam to China was via Guangdong. Based on 
Chinese records, the route from Guangdong was the earliest one used by China’s 
government.  
Departing from Danzhou (儋州, now Hainan) in the Guangdong province, it was 
around two days’ voyage west to Vạn Ninh, followed by a three-day voyage to Vân 
Đồn (云屯). From Yazhou (崖州, now Haikou海口) in the Hainan province, it was a 
two-day southward voyage to Champa.5
                                                 
5 Zhang Yuesong 张岳崧, Qiong zhou fu zhi 琼州府志 [The gazetteer of Qiong Prefecture].影印本. 
1841, Vol. 3, p. 55. 
 If one departed from Guangzhou at the end of 
autumn, it would be a three-day southward voyage to Dapeng (大鹏), Xiangshan (香山), 
Yashan (崖山), Gaozhou (高州), Leizhou (雷州), and Qiongya (琼崖), after which 
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travellers could easily sail south to Champa and Siam.6 If one departed from Wu 
Leishan (乌雷山) in Lianzhou of the Guangdong province, it only took one or two days 
to sail northward to the Hải Đông (海东) prefecture in Vietnam, but it took around six 
or seven days to sail along the coast to the Hải Đông prefecture in Vietnam if one 
departed from Wu Leishan. It would then take three or four days to continue sailing 
southward along the coast to Vietnam’s sea river ports, where one could enter Vietnam 
via the Bạch Đằng (白藤), Yên Đông (安东), and Đồ Sơn ( 山) river ports.7
As recorded in Đại Nam Nhất Thống Chí, Vietnam established the Vân Đồn District, 
also known as the Vân Đồn prefecture, many centuries before the Nguyễn period. It is 
located in the area bordering the islands adjoining the sea of China, and it contains only 
two settlements. In 1835, the throne first announced the names of local officials who 
reported to the governor of the sub-prefecture of Vạn Ninh (万宁知州). In 1843, the 
name of Vân Đồn Châu (云屯州) was abolished, and the area became the Canton of 
Vân Hải (Vân Hải Tổng, 云海总). The use of officials was discontinued while the 
 
    Many islands were scattered along the coast and in the Gulf of Tonkin. Important 
river ports such as Vân Đồn and Tràng Sơn (撞山) emerged thanks to the flourishing 
trade among these islands off the coast in the Gulf of Tonkin. 
                                                 
6 Lan Dingyuan 蓝鼎元, “Chao zhou hai fang tu shuo 潮州海防图说” [The delineating by maps on 
coast defense in Chaozhou] in He Changling贺长龄，huang chao jing shi wen bian皇朝经世文编 
[Statecraft writing of Qing period]. Tai bei, Guo feng chu ban she 台北，国风出版社 1963, Vol. 83, p. 
2112. 
7 Gu zu yu顾祖禹, Du shi fang yu ji yao读史方舆纪要 [The notes on geography while reading history]. 
Zhong hua shu ju 中华书局, 2005, p. 4991. 
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position of district chief was created. He would fall under the jurisdiction of the Nghiêu 
Phong (荛封) district.  
Đại Việt Sử Ký Toàn Thư refers to the commercial contact between the Vietnamese 
river port of Vân Đồn on the edge of the Red River delta, ships from Java, the islands, 
and the areas around the Gulf of Siam during different eras.8 Vân Đồn was consistently 
involved in foreign trade via river ports in the frontier and independent periods as well 
as the Chinese colonial era. An independent official was established there to deal with 
the frequent commercial contact via the South China Sea with the rest of Southeast 
Asia.9
Most of the local people in Vân Đồn were fishermen. Many foreign merchants 
gathered here. Cai Tinlan (蔡廷兰), who was Chinese, floated to Vietnam after being 
shipwrecked and proceeded to travel around northern Vietnam, later describing the 
prosperity in Vân Đồn.
  
10 Tràng Sơn was in Quảng Yên (广安), an eight-hour voyage 
from Vân Đồn. Many maritime vessels moored here.11
                                                 
8 Ngô Sĩ Liên 吴士连. Đại Việt Sử Ký Toàn Th ư大越史记全书 [The complete history of Imperial 
Vietnam], ed., Chen Jinghe陈荊和编校 (Tokyo: 东京大学东洋文化硏究所, 1985). Hereafter ĐVSKTT. 
Vol. 281, p. 295.  
9 Yamamoto, Tatsuro: “Van Don, A Trade River port in Vietnam” in Memoirs of the Research Department 
of the Toyo Bunko, No. 39, Tokyo, 1981, pp. 1–33. 
10 Gao Qijin高启进, Kai peng jin shi cai ting lan yu ‘hai nan za zhu’ 开澎进士蔡廷兰与《海南杂著》 
[Cai Tinglan and hai nan za zhu]. Peng hu xian ma gong shi, peng hu xian wen hua ju澎湖县马公市, 澎
湖县文化局, 2005, p. 158. 
11 Đại Nam Nhất Thống Chí 大南一统志 [Gazetteer of Imperial Vietnam]. Tokyo, 1941. Hereafter 
ĐNNTC. Vol. Quãng Yên, pp. 17–18. 
 Chinese merchant vessels could 
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be found mooring as far as hundreds of li away from Tràng Sơn.12
矺
 Besides Tràng Sơn, 
Cát Bà (葛婆) and Thac Mang ( ) were also famous areas in northern Vietnam. Cát Bà 
was located in the Chân Châu (真珠) village in the Nghiêu Phong (荛封) District in 
Quảng Yên, and many Chinese vessels berthed there. Many Chinese markets were 
located on the banks of Cát Bà.13 Thac Mang, which had many shops such as Yên 
Lương (安良), Yên Lạc (安乐), Na Tiền (那前), Mã Tê (马嘶), Đại Hoàng (大黄) and 
so on, was a booming area in the Vạn Ninh prefecture. ‘Many Chinese merchants came 
together and it became a township; row upon the row of shops lined here; it was 
prosperous indeed.’14
Many islands were situated further seawards and were far away from the coastline 
of northern Vietnam. Some were located in the internal Gulf of Tonkin, nearer to the 
coast, and others were vital stops along the coast in Vietnam. Some islands were 
popular gathering places for pirates and smugglers. These islands became vital river 
ports for the central government of Nguyễn in terms of coastal defence and commerce. 
Bai Longwei (白龙尾, Bạch Long Vĩ) in the Yên Lương village in Quảng Yên lay 
adjacent to Fang Cheng (防城) in Qinzhou, China. During the Ming dynasty, China had 




                                                 
12 Minh Mệnh Chính Yếu, 明命政要 [Essentials of government in Minh Menh period], Viện Hán Nôm. 
A57/10, Vol. 23, p. 41. 
13 ĐNNTC, Vol. Quãng Yên, p. 28. 
14 Ibid. Vol. Quãng Yên, p. 38. 
 Some islands were located along the main official route from northern 
15 Ibid. Vol. Quãng Yên, pp. 20–21. 
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Vietnam to China. Châu Sơn, which was adjacent to Qing China, was an example of 
such islands. The official diplomatic communications between China and Vietnam were 
delivered by sailing from Châu Sơn to Zhushan (竹山) town in China. One road in Châu 
Sơn (硃山) connected with Si Le Dong (思勒峒) in China.16
The second route departing from Guangxi was utilised as a tribute route. Many 
flourishing townships along this route appeared along with the beginning of the 
payment of tribute. This second route also had sub-routes, one of which departed from 
Ping Xiang (凭祥) in the Guangxi. It ran via Nan Quan (南关隘) to Văn Uyên (文渊) in 
Lượng Sơn (谅山), Thoát Lãng (脱朗) in Lượng Sơn, Uẩn Châu (温州) in Lượng Sơn, 
and the Bảo Lộc (宝禄) and Yên Việt (安越) districts of Bắc Ninh. The second 
sub-route started at Long Zhou (龙州) in the Guangxi. From Long Zhou, it crossed the 
Ping’er (平而) port and ended in the Yên Việt (安越) District. This route passed 
through the Văn Lan Bình Gia Xã (文蘭平茄社) and Thất Uyên Districts (七渊县), 
Quỷ 
  
Môn Quan (鬼门关), and Ti Nông District (司农县).17
This route was a regularly used commercial road since Emperor Qian Long 
approved the launch of the Ping’er and Shuikou ports for trade between the Vietnamese 
and Chinese after Quang Trung asked the Chinese emperor to re-open Sino-Vietnamese 
 Both of these sub-routes 
converged in the Yên Việt District (安越县) and over the Phúc Lãng Giang (富浪江, 
now the Red River) to Vietnam. 
                                                 
16 Ibid. Vol. Quãng Yên, p. 15. 
17 Da qing yi tong zhi 大清一统志 [Gazetteer of Imperial Qing China]. Shang hai shu dian 上海书店, 
1984, Vol. Vietnam, p. 12. 
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commercial markets in 1793. This route became the Sino-Vietnamese commercial route 
along Zhen Nanguan (镇南关) and Long Zhou in Guangxi, as many small lanes led to 
Zhen Nanguan from Guangxi.18 Some towns in Vietnam developed in tandem with 
Sino-Vietnamese commercial development along this route. Mục Mã (牧马) in Cao 
Bằng and Khu Lư (駈驴) in Lạng Sơn were the main areas where markets were 
established because many merchants were from Ping’er, Shuikou, and You Ai’cun (油
隘村) in the Guangxi province in China.19 During the Nguyễn dynasty, Khu Lư was an 
important riverside market town along the road to Guangxi. It was a vital river port as 
well as a booming metropolis in the borderlands upriver of Bắc Kỳ.20 Cai Tinglan 
mentioned Khu Lư when he journeyed through Vietnam during the Minh Mạng 
period.21
                                                 
18 Zhao Erxun 赵尔巽, qing shi gao 清史稿 [The Draft History of Qing]. Chang chun, ji lin ren min 
chu ban she长春: 吉林人民出版社, 1995. bin zhi兵制 Vol .8, Bian fang边防, p. 545. 
19 li bu wei nei ge chao chu liang guang zong du fu kang an deng zou yi hui 礼部为内阁抄出两广总督
福康安等奏移会 ingu dai zhong yue guan xi shi zi liao hui bian古代中越关系史资料汇编. 1982, p. 
599. 
 Vietnam also established markets in the Hoa Sơn (花山) area in Lượng Sơn in 
order to cater to the merchants from Ping’er, as Hoa Sơn was the first stop after entering 
Vietnam, which the merchants had to access by crossing the water first. Furthermore, 
20 Các Tỉnh Chí各省志, [The gazetteers of provinces ]. Viện Hán Nôm.Vhv.1716, Vol. Lạng Sơn. As for 
Bắc Kỳ and Nam Kỳ, during the Gia Long period, Vietnam set four military camps (dinh) near the capital 
Huế and eight local military provinces (trấn), two cities (Thành) (Bắc Thành and Gia Định Thành) and 23 
local provinces (trấn). Minh Mạng set 30 provinces (tỉnh), 80 prefectures (phủ), 283 districts (huyện) and 
39 departments (Châu) as well. Bắc Kỳ included 13 provinces, Ninh Bình, Hà Nội, Nam Định, Hưng Yên, 
Hải Dương, Quảng Yên, Sơn Tây, Hưng Hóa, Tuyên Quang, Bắc Ninh, Thái Nguyên, Lạng Sơn, Cao 
Bằng. Nam Kỳ included six provinces, Biên họa, Gia Định, Vĩnh Long, An Qiang, Định Tường, Hà Tiên. 
Đại Việt Cổ Kim Duyên Cách Địa Chí Khảo. A.77, pp. 42–48.  
21 Gao qi jin, Kai peng jin shi cai ting lan yu ‘hai nan za zhu’. 2005, p. 161. 
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rows and rows of villages were lined up in the Hoa Sơn area, making it very convenient 
for the merchants to establish markets there. 
The final route was from Yunnan to Vietnam. This route also had two sub-routes. 
One began in the Mengzi County (蒙自) in Yunnan province and passed through Lian 
Huatan (莲花滩), now located in the middle of the Red River and He Kou County (河
口) in China, to Vietnam. It crossed the Trình Lan Đồng (程澜峒), Thủy Vĩ (水尾), Văn 
Bàn (文盘), Trấn Yên (镇安), Hà Hóa (夏华), and Thanh Bo (清波) districts along the 
right bank of Thao River (洮江) on the way to Bạch Hạc and would then pass by the 
Phúc Lãng River. The other sub-route began from the He Yang (河阳) river port, and 
ran along the left bank of the Thao River and through Bình Nguyên (平源), Phúc Yên 
(福安), Tuyên Giang (宣江), and Đoan Hùng (端雄), lastly passing by the Phúc Lãng 
River. The first sub-route was used more regularly as the second one was fraught with 
hardships and dangers.22
Many markets along this route from Yunnan to Vietnam opened along with the 
establishment of the river ports in the Sino-Vietnamese borderlands. The Bai Ma River 
port was vital, and Meng Zi was a significant river port where merchants itinerated 
between China and Vietnam along the Sino-Vietnamese borderlands.
 
23
                                                 
22 Qing chao wen xian tong kao 清朝文献通考 [Encyclopedia of history and biography in Qing 
dynasty]. Hang zhou, zhe jiang gu ji chu ban she杭州: 浙江古籍出版社, 2000. Vol. 296, p. 1747. 
23 Zhao Erxuan, qing shi gao. Bin zhi Vol.8, Bian fang, p. 545. 
 Customs 
departments around Lian Huatan were set up to collect taxes during the Guang Xu 
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period in Qing China.24 Vietnam also had some flourishing markets and townships 
appearing with the development of local commerce along the Sino-Vietnamese land 
frontier. Bảo Thắng (宝胜) in the Hưng Hóa area in Vietnam was adjacent to He Kou in 
Qing China. It was a flourishing township due to the Sino-Vietnamese cross-border 
trade.25 Liu Yongfu (刘永福) conquered this area and established a customs office to 
collect taxes in the 1870s.26 Hưng Yên Hiến Nam Cố Dinh (宪南故营), in the  area in 
                                                 
24 You Zhong尤中, Yun nan di fang yan ge shi 云南地方沿革史 [The historical geography of Yunnan]. 
Kun ming, yun nan ren min chu ban she 云南人民出版社. 1990, p. 445. 
25 Các Tỉnh Chí各省志 [The gazetteers of provinces ]. Viện Hán Nôm.Vhv.1716, Vol. Hưng Hóa. 
26 Liu Yongfu was the principal subordinate of Wu Lingyun (吴凌云) and his son, Wu Yazhong (吴亚
忠), who were rebels from the Heaven and Earth Society (天地会), and then took part in the uprising in 
Guangxi, China while the Taiping rebellion threatened southern China. In 1865, Liu Yongfu established 
Black Flag (黑旗军) in Guangxi as the Taiping Rebellion subsided and rebellions in Guangxi were also 
being exterminated by the Qing authorities. Liu Yongfu wanted to withdraw to northern Vietnam to 
escape a Qing expedition. He finally settled his militia forces among upland villages in Bao Thang district 
near modern-day Lão Cai (老街). Shortly thereafter, they recruited other so-called ‘bandits’ who were 
viewed in a similarly negative manner by officials along the Sino-Vietnamese frontier. Liu was conferred 
official titles by the Nguyễn court shortly after he eradicated the local tyrants. Branches of rebellions by 
Wu Yazhong retreated to northern Vietnam in the struggle for survival while the Qing annihilated 
rebellions. The rebels with Wu Yazhong were from different areas and fought each other for bases in 
northern Vietnam after Wu died. One of them was Yellow Flag (黄旗军), occupied by Huang Chongying 
(黄崇英), who was an important subordinate of Wu Yazhong. On this occasion, the majority of Wu’s 
rebels, led by Huang Chongying, occupied Hà Dương (河阳) and other provinces as these bases 
interfered with the expansion of Liu Yongfu’s Black Flag. Nonetheless, they did not defeat and 
compound any single group. Soon afterwards, Huang Chongying colluded with the French, who intended 
to explore the Red River and enter Yunnan from northern Vietnam. At the request of the Nguyễn Court, 
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Vietnam, was full of foreign merchants. It was second only to Hà Nội and became a 
booming emporium in Bắc Kỳ.27 Bình Di Phủ (平夷甫) was a booming township in the 
borderlands in Tuyên Quang from the time when it was founded by a local headman 
under the local headman system (Tusi, 土司). However, it was not as prosperous as it 
had been before the Nông Văn Vân Revolt.28 Ngọc Bi Phủ (玉 否甫) was also a 
flourishing township in Tuyên Quang.29 By the end of the nineteenth century, Hải 
Phòng (海防) became a flourishing township with the development of local commerce 
along the coast. ‘Row upon of row of westerners’ houses, emplacements, dockyards, 
and ironworks lined up in Hải Phòng for nearly five or six li.’30
                                                                                                                                               
Black Flag marched southward and conquered Yellow Flag, thus defeating the French in Hanoi. 
Thereafter, the Huế Court bestowed a higher official title upon Liu Yongfu, together with an official seal 
that confirmed his legitimacy in northern Vietnam. Based on Luo xiang lin edit 罗香林编, Liu yong fu li 
shi cao 刘永福历史草 [The draft history of Liu Yongfu]. Shang hai zhengzhong shu ju上海, 正中书局, 
1947; Tang jing song 唐景崧, Qing ying ri ji 請纓日記 [The diary on volunteering for Sino-French 
war]. Shang hai gu ji chu ban she上海古籍出版社, 1995; Guang xi zhuang zu zi zhi qu tong zhi guan广
西壮族自治区通志馆，zhong fa zhan zheng diao cha shi lu中法战争调查实录[The documents on 
Sino-French War], , guang xi ren min chu ban she 广西人民出版社， 1982; Zhong fa zhan zheng zi liao 
中法战争资料 [The documents on Sino-French War]. Tai bei wen hai chu ban she台北, 文海出版社, 
1967. 
27 ĐNNTC, Vol. Hưng An, p. 16. 
28 Ibid., Vol .Tuyên Quang, p. 31. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Fu jian shi fan da xue li shi xi福建师范大学历史系. Yue nan you ji越南游记 [The journal to 
Vietnam]. Wan qing hai wai bi ji xuan, 晚清海外笔记选 [The selection of overseas journals in the late 
of Qing dynasty] (Beijing, hai yang chu ban she北京: 海洋出版社, 1983), p. 47. 
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The routes, from Guangxi or Yunnan, connected with the transport system of the 
Phúc Lãng River (Red River) and then ran to the middle of northern Vietnam. Therefore, 
the Red River transport system was vital. Some market towns located along the bank of 
Red River in Bắc Ninh were Đan Lương market (丹梁市), Đồng Tỉnh market (桐井市), 
and Xuân Thư market (春梂市). The Bát Tràng market (钵场市) was located in the Gia 
Lâm (嘉林县) District, which was near the northern bank of the Red River in Thăng 
Long. Merchants vessels gathered in this prosperous area; many markets and shops 
were located on the bank.31
Some parts of northern Vietnam, which were adjacent to the Gulf of Tonkin, were 
rich in excellent sea ports as well as remote islands off the coast. These islands and sea 
ports became popular places for maritime vessels at which to stay or transfer. The total 




2.2. Maritime trade 
In Sino-Vietnamese trade history, the trade by sea between China and Vietnam was 
easier than that by land. Northern Vietnam was peppered with jungles, mountains, rivers 
and inlets. It was not easy for tradesmen to cross the jungles and mountains to conduct 
their trading deals. In contrast, it only took caravan traders three days if they sailed with 
favourable winds from Guangdong to Vietnam. 
32
                                                 
31 ĐNNTC, Vol. Bắc Ninh, p. 40. 
 Furthermore, these sea ports were linked to the estuarine river ports 
32 Thông Quốc Duyên Hải Chư通国沿海诸 [The seaports in Imperial Vietnam]. Viện Hán Nôm . A.79. 
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downriver of the Red River. Sea ports such as Liêu (辽), Lịch (栎), Hà Lạn (霞烂), Ba 
Lạt (巴氵辣), and Kì (麒) in the Sơn Nam (山南) District were directly connected to 
the Red River. Others, such as the Chính Đại (正大), Hãn (瀚汛), and Dạng (蛘汛) sea 
ports in Thanh Hóa were linked to river tributaries in northern Vietnam.33
The central government of Nguyễn also imposed taxes on the Chinese merchants’ 
ships. The customs tax, which was 80 per cent of that in Gia Định Thành (嘉定城),
 
34 
was the same in Bắc Thành, Quảng Nam, Bình Định (平定), Phú Yên (富安), Bình Hòa 
(平和), and Bình Thuận (平顺) in 1803. The vessels were levied taxes based on their 
places of origin and the volume of the vessels.35 These foreign vessels usually also 
needed to pay Lễ Lệ Tiền (礼例钱)36
                                                 
33 Thông Quốc Duyên Hải Chư, A.79; Đại Nam Nhất Thống Toan Đồ  大南一统全图 in 1834 
34 For the rule of the newly unified territory, Gia Long set four military camps (dinh) near the capital Huế 
and eight local military provinces (trấn), located the areas stretching from Ninh Bình to Bình Thuận. 
Furthermore, he also set two cities (Thành) (Bắc Thành and Gia Định Thành) and 23 local provinces 
(trấn). Eleven military provinces in northern Vietnam which were called Bắc Thành and five military 
provinces in southern Vietnam which were called Gia Định Thành were also set. 
35 KĐĐNHĐSL, Vol 48, pp. 13–34; ĐNTL, Chính Biên I, Vol. 39, p. 5, II, Vol. 6, p. 5. 
36 All money and goods collected from junks were called tariff. Lễ Lệ Tiền (礼例钱) was a part of tariff. 
As far as commercial junks is concerned, junks from different places paid different taxes. Furthermore, 
the import tax was different from export tax. All junks had to pay Lễ Lệ Tiền besides import or export tax. 
Generally, Lễ Lệ Tiền as a kind of gift to Vietnamese officials in seaport customs or local government and 
so on was not actually metal currency but silk or other goods. During the Nguyễn Lord period, all the 
taxes on foreign junks were divided into two parts: 60 per cent belonged to central revenue; 40 per cent 
was awarded to soldiers, officials; and so on. By the Minh Mạng period, the taxes were also separated 
into two parts; one was tariff, the other was Lễ Lệ (礼例). However, the percentage of Lễ Lệ was only 12 
per cent. As for Lễ Lệ Tiền, refer to [越]朱海 Chu Hải ；李娜译, Li Na Translated. 十九世纪越南阮朝
的华人政策, shi jiu shi ji yue nan ruan chao de hua ren zheng ce。 [The policy on the Chinese in Nguyễn 
Dynasty of Vietnam in the nineteenth century]. 东南亚纵横, Around Southeast Asia. 广西. Guangxi, 3. 
2003, p. 56. ĐNTL, Tiền Biên , Vol. 10, p. 26; ĐNTL, Chính Biên, II, Vol. 6, p. 6. 
 and tax. These maritime vessels were usually 
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from parts of southern China including Guangdong, Fujian (福建), Zhejiang (浙江), 
Hainan (海南), Shanghai (上海), Macao, Chaozhou (Tieochow), and regions in 
Southeast Asia such as Malacca, Java, Hà Châu (下洲, regions near Batavia), and so on. 
The ships from Guangzhou came from Zhaozhou (昭州), Nanxiong (南祥), Huizhou 
(惠州), and the Zhaoqing (肇庆) prefectures. Chinese vessels also came from the 
Leizhou (雷州), Lianzhou (廉州), Gaozhou (高州), and Qiongzhou (琼州, now Hainan 
province) prefectures. Nguyễn Vietnam levied taxes on the Chinese vessels in some 
vital areas along the coast such as Quảng Yên, as the maritime trade developed in 
northern Vietnam. In 1811, the government imposed taxes on the Chinese vessels in the 
Vạn Ninh prefecture in Quảng Yên, which were 50 per cent of the customs tax in Gia 
Định Thành. In 1820, Quảng Ngoãi was levied exactly the same amount of tax.37
All kinds of commodities, food and other wares were displayed on the 
floor. It is called “Pai Hang Zhan” (排行栈), with a morning market and 
an evening market in one day. Various commodities were for sale in 
markets. Among them, tea, herbs, porcelain, and clothing were from 
China, which were shipped back by the Chinese merchant…
  
The zone of the most active trade involving northern Vietnam and Chinese 
merchants from southern China, particularly from Guangdong, stretched from the Red 
River to the Gulf of Tonkin. Cai Tinglan described the prosperity of the markets: 
 
38
                                                 
37 KĐĐNHĐSL, Vol. 48, pp. 10, 14, 19. 




The backbone of the maritime trade network in northern Vietnam was small junks, 
rather than larger ones. This suggests a strong local or regional, rather than 
long-distance, trade. In the nineteenth century, small boats formed what may have been 
the most numerous and dynamic commercial networks, legally and illegally, in the Gulf 
of Tonkin. Hải Dương (海阳), Kinh Môn (荆门), Thượng Hồng (上洪), Hà Hồng (下
洪), Nam Sách (南策), Thuận Yên (顺安), and Hoài Châu (怀州) were located in the 
eastern parts of Jiaozhou in northern Vietnam, and were not far from the sea. Many sea 
ports and sub-sea ports were located here and stretched hundreds and thousands of miles. 
Therefore, the people from northern Vietnam regularly shipped commodities in 
flat-bottomed and smaller vessels because larger ones could not enter the ports 
readily.39 The junks here were mostly smaller ones than those in Hà Nội, Bình Thuận 
(平顺) and other provinces. The commodities from Guangdong in China were dominant 
here. The smaller junks were called ‘Ya Zai Chuan’ (牙仔船). 'The bilge was plaited 
with rattan. The outside was coated with coconut oil. The deck was made of wood. 
Other junks were the same. The bilges of some junks were made of wood and rattan that 
had been over-sewed.’40 In 1820, two vessels from Guangdong, captained by Li 
Yongfa, berthed with commodities in the Lịch sea port in the Sơn Nam District of 
northern Vietnam. The width of one vessel was 11 chi and nine cun.41
                                                 
39 Gu zu yu, Du shi fang yu ji yao. 2005, p. 4992. 
40 Gao qi jin. Kai peng jin shi cai ting lan yu ‘hai nan za zhu’. 2005, p. 173. 
41 Châu Bản, Reel 6. Libraries of Australia National University.  
 While that of the 
other was 12 chi, six cun, and eight fen. In the same year, two ships from China loaded 
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cargos at the Hội (会) Sea Port in Nghệ An. One was captained by Yang Lishun (杨李
顺), from Huizhou; the other, whose captain was Chen Xishun (陈喜顺), was from the 
Guangzhou prefecture in Guangdong province. The width of Chen Xishun’s junk was 
nine chi and four cun. Yang Lishun’s vessel was 12 chi and two cun wide. It was 
obvious that both of them were not among the larger vessels if they were measured by 
the width that was the standard of the Nguyễn court in levying river port duty. The 
width of the largest vessel was above 35 chi.42
Not all the vessels that plied between southern China and northern Vietnam were 
small. There were larger vessels that navigated southern China and northern Vietnam 
according to the annual monsoons. Crawfurd reported the character and volume of 
Chinese trade in Ka Cho (Hanoi) as being around 1,822, including 18 Chinese junks 
from Hainan. Each one had 2,000 piculs of cargo. Eleven Cantonese and seven Fujian 
junks each had 2,250 piculs of cargo; seven Jiangnan and Zhejiang junks each had 
2,500 piculs of cargo.
  
43
Northern and central Vietnam were integrated by the regional and the long distance, 
deep and shallow, internal and external trade activities. It also connected trade networks 
if we look further southwards to Quảng Nam. The regional network in northern 
Vietnam that was connected to that of middle Vietnam was an indispensable factor 
affiliated with the maritime Silk Road from China to Southeast Asia. Compared with 
 
                                                 
42 On the standard of the Nguyễn court, please refer to KĐĐNHĐSL Vol. 48, pp. 1–23; and ĐNTL, 
Chính Biên I, Vol. 39, II, Vol. 6, pp. 16, 109, 199. 
43 “Crawfurd’s Report on the state of the Annamese Empire” in Alastair Lamb, The mandarin road to old 
Hué, p. 264. 
 103 
the types of ships in the Gulf of Tonkin mentioned above, the junks had a much deeper 
draught when moored, which was a convenient design for long-distance ocean travel. 
The following example highlights the type of vessels in Quảng Nam during the Nguyễn 
dynasty. In 1805, a ship in Quảng Nam originally from Fujian, with the name Chen 
Lutai (陈陆泰), was loaded with the following cargo: 1,800 piculs of betel nuts, 15 
piculs of villous amomum shells, nine piculs of villous amomum, 10 piculs of cinnamon, 
and five piculs of shark’s fin.44 From the example above, it is reasonable to assume that 
the junks berthed in middle Vietnam were larger ones rather than the smaller junks, 
since both the sea route and the sea river ports were well-suited to long-distance ocean 
travelling vessels. In 1820, a vessel from Qiongshan (琼山) County in Qiongzhou 
prefecture of the Guangdong province returned to China on time. The total number of 
crew in this ship was 85. Obviously, compared with Ya Zai Chuan, this type of junk had 
a much deeper draught when loaded. In 1823, a ship from Yongning (永宁) in 
Guangdong was loaded mainly with various grades of cinnamon and villous amomum. 
The total amount of these goods was 141 xie, four yan, and five jin. Based on the 
weights and measures of Nguyễn Vietnam, one xie was equal to around 100 jin. 
Accordingly, the volume of this ship was above 14,100 jin, namely above 141 piculs.45
Maritime trade was definitely not one way either. The rice trade between China and 
Vietnam was a good example of this. Vietnam was rich in rice and without doubt, rice 
was a vital item which was exported to China, in particular, during the period of 
 
                                                 
44 Châu Bản, Reel 1, libraries of Australia National University  
45 Thương Tầu Thuế Lệ商艚税例 [The regulations on commercial junks]. Viện Hán Nôm. A3105 
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overpopulation in the era of the Qing dynasty. The booming population in China at the 
turn of the seventeenth century generated tremendous social pressure on the Qing. 
Shortages of food grain ensued with a growing population, made worse by a series of 
bad harvests during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. A dearth of rice forced the 
Qing court to turn to commercial activities to solve this problem. Rice shortages were a 
main concern when rescinding the maritime ban and partially revitalising trade with 
Southeast Asia in 1717. Demand for rice spurred the rice trade with Southeast Asia and 
the emergence of important seaports such as Amoy along the southeast coast of China.46 
Furthermore, all the rice-bearing ships from Siam, which were associated with the 
King’s name and sanctioned by royalty, not only provided the bulk of China’s rice, but 
also benefited the Siamese kingdom. The rice trade with China was indispensable to the 
rise of Bangkok’s power in the nineteenth century.47 Vietnam also became a part of the 
rice trade during the development of the rice trade between China and other regions in 
Southeast Asia. Saigon was the eventual regional hub for the rice trade in southern 
Vietnam. Concurrently, the inter-regional trade network between southern Vietnam and 
other regions in Southeast Asia, particularly Singapore, ensured that the rice trade in 
southern Vietnam flourished.48
                                                 
46 Ng Chin Keong, Trade and Society, the Amoy Network on the China Coast 1683–1735, Singapore 
University Press, 1983. pp. 95–137. 
47 Sarasin Virapjol, Tribute and trade, 1977. 
48 Li Tana, “Rice from Saigon: The Singapore Chinese and the Saigon Trade of the Nineteenth Century” 
in Wang and Ng, Maritime China in transition. 
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The rice trade with China in northern Vietnam cannot be ignored. By virtue of the 
geographical proximity between southern China and northern Vietnam by sea, the 
maritime route became a gateway for Vietnamese merchants who entered China and 
vice versa. During the famine in Nguyễn Vietnam, rice was also imported from China 
since Vạn Ninh, Vân Đồn, Hải Phòng, and other areas in northern Vietnam were 
adjacent to parts of southern China, such as Hong Kong. It was not surprising that the 
rice trade was regularly made via seaborne junks plying southern China and areas along 
the coast, even littoral islands, in northern Vietnam. In 1823, people suffered a massive 
famine due to a great flood in Guangdong. The Qing government encouraged rice 
imports by providing favourable conditions for trade.49 The price of rice per picul in 
Guangdong was around five liang silver. Many merchants in Vietnam flocked to ship 
rice to Qinzhou and Lianzhou in Guangdong by sea. This event received the most 
attention from the Nguyễn court, since the volume of rice for trade was limited by the 
Huế Court during the Nguyễn dynasty.50
Hải Phòng was located on the Cua Cam River, with access both to the 
sea and connections to Hà Nội and other river ports on the Red River, 
which made it geographically suit[ed] to the needs of international 
 It is also worth noting that Hải Phòng was a 
popular city for the rice trade: 
 
                                                 
49 Liang Tingnan, yue hai guan zhi. 1975, Vol. 8, p. 618. 
50 Minh Mệnh Ngữ Trị Văn 明命御制文 [The papers and documents by Minh Mệnh], Viện Hán Nôm. 
A.118/1 Vol. 6, p. 15. 
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shipping during the late nineteenth century, when it was declared a 
French concession.51
Martinez argued that Chinese rice trade and shipping from Hải Phòng and the 
independence of Chinese business in trade could be seen from the nineteenth century to 
the 1930s. By the end of the nineteenth century, Vietnam also imported rice to 
ameliorate local famines. In 1886, the Nguyễn court imported rice from Hong Kong by 




The maritime trade was one part of Sino-Vietnamese commercial contacts during 
the nineteenth century. Where geographical conditions were concerned, to assorted 
tradesmen, trade by sea was more expedient than by land. However, the maritime trade 
did not make up the backbone of commerce in northern Vietnam. It has already been 
mentioned that small junks were the regular vessels that engaged in the 
Sino-Vietnamese trade in northern Vietnam even though bigger junks were also 
involved in the maritime trade. Furthermore, as for maritime trade tariffs, the Nguyễn 
dynasty could only levy five per cent or less tax from maritime customs along the coast 
Cochin China in the early period of the nineteenth century.
 
53
                                                 
51 Julia Martinez, “Chinese Rice Trade and Shipping from the North Vietnamese River port of 
Haiphong,” in Chinese Southern Diaspora Studies, Vol. 1, 2007, p. 83. 
52 Lại Bộ吏部 [The Ministry of Personal ]. Viện Hán Nôm. A.917, p. 10. 
53 Li Tana, “The eighteenth-century Mekong Delta and its world of water frontier” in Anthony Reid and 
Nhung Tuyet Tran, ed., Viet Nam Borderless Histories (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), p. 
155. 
 The incoming fiscal duties 
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from maritime trade did not occupy a large share of national revenue. Even then, 
maritime trade activities contributed to Sino-Vietnamese commercial contacts.  
 
2.3. Cross-border trade 
The payment of Vietnamese tribute to China was processed by land instead of by sea. 
The route for the payment of tribute to Beijing was stipulated to be from northern 
Vietnam via Lạng Sơn, crossing the Sino-Vietnamese borderlines and into China. The 
Sino-Vietnamese trade was conducted in frontier markets with the payment of tribute. 
In addition, official journeys to China could improve the growth of markets that 
supplied provisions along the way. Furthermore, the cross-national trade and 
inter-ethnic commercial contacts along the Sino-Vietnamese borders were a kind of 
driving force for trade in northern Vietnam as a whole. The Chinese made great 
contributions towards trade contacts in ferries, river ports and market towns in northern 
Vietnam. 
Apart from the seafaring route from Vietnam to China, there were two roads by land. 
One was from Yunnan, and the other one was from Guangxi. The route from Guangxi 
had been used since the Song dynasty, while the route from Yunnan had been used from 
the Yuan and Ming dynasties onwards.   
In the 1870s, the Sino-Vietnamese cross-border trade was still flourishing even 
though people in the Sino-Vietnamese borderlands suffered rebellions and revolts on 
both sides. ‘Yunnan was located on the northwest of Vietnam. Commodity circulation 
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here was speed[y] and great.’54 As recorded in Qing Chao Xu Wen Xian Tong Kao, in 
1895, the sum of commercial transactions between China and Vietnam amounted to 
310,000 liang silver dollars. The total value of transactions was second only to those of 
Japan and Macao.55
Cross-border trade by the Red River waterway was linked to maritime trade in 
northern Vietnam, and had been an important part of the extensive network of the 
Southwest Silk Road from Yunnan. This extensive network was also connected to the 
maritime Silk Road.
   
56 It was not new that trade between China and Vietnam occurred 
along the Sino-Vietnamese borderlands. Bilateral trade could be traced back to the Han 
dynasty in China, when Vietnam imported ironware from China. The horse trade was 
also a good example of the bilateral trade between China and Vietnam. Bin Yang points 
out: ‘During the Sun and Wu period, the control of Jiaozhou (northern Vietnam) was 
extraordinarily crucial to the Wu kingdom, because it would not only give them access 
to the profitable overseas trade, but also allow them to gain access to horses from 
Nanzhong (Yunnan) through the Yunnan-Vietnam connection.’57 The trade did not 
cease during the Nguyễn dynasty; the Nguyễn government also directly imported horses 
from Yunnan.58
                                                 
54 Luo Xianglin, ed., Liu yong fu li shi cao, 1947, p. 76. 
55 Liu Jinzao刘锦藻, Qing chao xu wen xian tong kao淸朝续文献通考 [Encyclopedia of history and 
biography in Qing dynasty]. Shang hai, shang wu yin shu guan上海: 商务印书馆, 1936, p. 11399. 
56 on this point, see Bin Yang, 'Horse, Silver, and Cowries: Yunnan in Global Perspective',  Journal of 
World History, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2004,. pp. 287–289. 
57 Bin Yang: 'Horse, Silver, and Cowries', p. 296. 
58 ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 73, p. 5. 
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During the Emperor Yong Zheng’s reign in China, the bulk of mineral commodities 
were imported by China via Sino-Vietnamese cross-border trade. Sino-Vietnamese trade 
along the borderlands became bustling, with the markets which were closed or ruined 
by war or turbulence in frontiers being reopened along the borderlands during the end of 
the Qian Long period. Vietnam established markets along the borderlands when border 
markets such as the Mục Mã market town in Cao Bằng and Khu Lư in Lạng Sơn 
developed. Merchants departing from the Ping’er and Shuikou river ports had to get 
certifications of approval from officials in Long Zhou, in the Guangxi province of 
China. Merchants from You Ai village had to get their certification from the Ning Ming 
(宁明) prefecture.59 By the end of the eighteenth century, cross-border trade prospered 
with the re-opening of border markets in China and Vietnam. The volume of 
commodities exported from China to Vietnam always exceeded that of imports. Many 
Chinese smuggled commodities to Vietnam to obtain huge profits. The commodities 
exported from China were usually damask, fabric, shoes and socks, paper, tea, sugar, 
candy and herbs.60
Cross-border trade did not cease during the Nguyễn dynasty; it was still a major part 
of Sino-Vietnamese trade relations. As far as cross-border trade was concerned, Li Tana 
compared the prices of over 300 commodities in the Inner Five provinces (Sơn Nam 
Thượng, Sơn Nam Hà, Sơn Tây, Kinh Bắc, and 
  
Hải Dương) in the Red River Delta and 
the mountainous Outer Six provinces (Hưng Hóa, Tuyên Quang, Thái Nguyên, Lạng 
                                                 
59 Zhong yue gu dai guan xi shi zi liao xuan bian, 1982, pp. 599–601. 
60 Ibid., pp. 591, 603, 
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Sơn, Cao Bằng, Quảng Yên) together with other sources and pointed out that 
cross-border trade along the Sino-Vietnamese borderlines was more dynamic than trade 
in inland northern Vietnam.61
The Chinese merchants who itinerated between China and northern Vietnam for 
trade came mainly from Guangxi, Yunnan, Guangdong and Chaozhou (潮州). 
Compared with maritime transport, it was easier to itinerate between China and northern 
Vietnam by land. Generally, they returned the following year if the merchants arrived 
by sea in a certain year. However, if one travelled by land, merchants usually itinerated 
between China and Vietnam twice or more annually. The shortest travelling period was 
three months. Growing numbers of Chinese merchants who went to 
  
Lạng Sơn and other 
border provinces for trade attracted the increasing attention of the Nguyễn rulers, who 
levied taxes on these Chinese merchants.62 The Chinese merchants captured during the 
suppression of the Nông Văn Vân rebellion in northern Vietnam during the 1830s shed 
some light on the nature of the Chinese merchants who travelled between China and 
Vietnam. In 1833, Nguyễn Vietnam captured four Chinese merchants who traded in 
Tuyên Quang in Vietnam.63
                                                 
61 Li Tana, “National” and “overseas” markets in the early 19th century Vietnam: a view from the 
mountains and the sea. For the workshop “Dynamic Rimlands and Open Heartlands: Maritime Asia as a 
Site of Interactions”, Nagasaki, 27–28 Oct. 2006. 
62 KĐĐNHĐSL, Vol. 44, p. 65. 
63 Khâm Định Tiễu Bình Bắc Kỳ Nghịch Phỉ Chính Biên钦定剿平北圻逆匪正编[The documents on 
exterminating bandits in northern Vietnam], Viện Hán Nôm. Vhv.2701/6, Vol. 22, p. 20. Hereafter 
KĐTBBKNPCB. 
 Nguyễn Vietnam arrested a Chinese merchant who was 
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from the Nan’ning (南宁) prefecture in Guangxi. He itinerated between the Thượng 
Lang (上琅) District in Cao Bằng and the Zhen’an prefecture in Guangxi for trade.64
Li Tana points out that the merchants from Chaozhou were a dominant part of 
Sino-Vietnamese commerce in northern Vietnam.
 
65 It is noteworthy that the Chinese 
from Chaozhou, namely Teochiu, comprised a significant part of the Nông Văn Vân 
rebellions. They formed the main part of the remainder of the rebellion when Nông Văn 
Vân and his followers were pursued and defeated by the Nguyễn government.66 It was 
likely that some of them were merchants in northern Vietnam. In 1828, Zhang Zeng 
reported to Emperor Dao Guang of the Qing dynasty that foreign metal currency had 
been circulated in Guangdong province. This currency included the Quang Trung Thông 
Bảo (issued by Quang Trung), Cảnh Hưng Thông Bảo (issued by Cảnh Hưng), Cảnh 
Hưng Cự Bảo, Cảnh Hưng Đại Bảo (issued by Cảnh Hưng when they retreated to Bac 
Ha around the 1790s), and Gia Long Thông Bảo (issued by Gia Long). The ‘barbarian 
metal currency’ was mostly circulated in Chaozhou. The metal currency of the Qing 
was being completely replaced by ‘barbarian metal currency’ in some areas.67
                                                 
64 KĐTBBKNPCB.Vhv.2701/17, Vol. 63, p. 12. 
65 Li Tana, “National” and “overseas” markets. 
66 KĐTBBKNPCB.Vhv.2701/10, Vol. 35, pp. 12–15. 
67 Zhong yue gu dai guan xi shi zi liao xuan bian, 1982, p. 611. 
 
Regarding this point, Li Tana noted: ‘The Teochiu network thus stands out as very 
likely being one of the most important trading networks of northern Vietnam in the 
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early 19th century … Teochiu connections may well have played a dominant role in 
northern Vietnam’s commerce.’68
The trade between Yunnan and northern Vietnam depended on the Red River’s 
transportation system. Hà Nội, located on the banks of the Red River, had become an 




Generally, Chinese merchants who were going to Yunnan to trade had to go by the 
waterway in Hưng Hóa and cross Thủy Vĩ to enter Yunnan, and vice versa.
 Besides Hà Nội, there were also some important market towns in northern 
Vietnam. Here, Bảo Thắng serves as a good example to explain the extensive 
cross-border trade occurring along the Red River in northern Vietnam—this was a vital 
road connecting Yunnan to northern Vietnam. 
70 Bảo 
Thắng, located in Hưng Hóa, held the most important custom office, which was located 
in the estuarine river port upriver of the Red River. The taxes from Bảo Thắng and other 
subsidiary custom offices comprised an essential part of the central revenue of Nguyễn 
Vietnam. The tax in Bảo Thắng was 43,000 strings of copper in the eighteenth year of 
Emperor Gia Long’s rule. After the first Opium War, the amount of taxes shrank 
because of revolts along the Sino-Vietnamese borderlands. The tax in 1844 was 30,000 
strings of copper, and 7,500 string of copper in 1848.71
                                                 
68 Li Tana, “National” and “overseas” markets, p. 14. 
69 Fu jian shi fan da xue, Ed. yue nan you li ji, 1983, p. 61. 
70 Tuyên Quang Tấu Tư Tạp Lục.宣光奏资杂录 [Miscellaneous notes on memorials in Tuyên Quang]. 
Viện Hán Nôm. A1139. 
 Liu Yongfu conquered Bảo 
71 KĐĐNHĐSL, Vol. 49, p. 12;. Hưng Hóa Tỉnh Công Văn兴化省公文[The official documents in Hưng 
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Thắng by the end of nineteenth century and re-imposed the tax, leading Nguyễn 
Vietnam to complain about Liu Yongfu’s control of Bảo Thắng: ‘Liu Yongfu levied 
heavy taxes so that fewer merchants arrived. The tax in the whole of northern Vietnam 
was around 300,000 strings of copper.’72 Thus, tax from the border trade was an 
important part of the central revenue of Nguyễn Vietnam. Furthermore, metal in 
Yunnan was regularly transported through northern Vietnam, and Nguyễn Vietnam also 
benefited from it. However, Liu Yongfu obstructed the route, so merchants had to 
change routes and avoid the previous route. In the end, the profits of Nguyễn Vietnam 
were diminished.73
Chinese merchants in Bảo Thắng also transferred Western commodities to Yunnan. 
There were around 140–150 Chinese shops in Bảo Thắng.
  
74 Herbs and tea were the 
bulk of the commodities in the Sino-Vietnamese trade in northern Vietnam before 
Tonkin (northern Vietnam) completely became a French colony. Around 100,000 picul 
of herbs per annum were imported from China to northern Vietnam at a price of around 
1,000,000 yuan.75
                                                                                                                                               
Hóa]. Viện Hán Nôm. A.2293/a 
72 Tấu Nghị Tiền Tập奏议前集 [Memorials and public papers]. Viện Hán Nôm. Vht.43/1, Vol. 1, pp. 
28–31. 
73, Ibid. , pp. 28–31. 
74 Fu jian shi fan da xue, yue nan you li ji. 1983, p. 62. 
75 Ibid., p. 59. 
 If we consider the abovementioned trade, it strongly suggests that the 
huge commerce networks still existed or had never shrunk, even though it had suffered 




Besides tribute trade, authorised cross-border and maritime trade with the Chinese were 
significant parts of Sino-Vietnamese commercial relations during the Nguyễn dynasty. 
Tribute trade was, in a sense, political trade which met the royal, court, government and 
even the Nguyễn emperor’s demands. However, Chinese merchants were the active 
force that spurred commercial development in northern Vietnam and enhanced 
Sino-Vietnamese trade relations. Accordingly, the Chinese became an indispensable 
part of northern Vietnam’s economy.  
Lying at the crossroads of different trade currents, the areas ranging from the 
mountainous to the maritime regions in northern Vietnam formed a crucial link in an 
active trading network that connected southern China with other regions in Southeast 
Asia. What the above shows us is a well-used series of trade routes and some crucial 
market towns dotting the Gulf of Tonkin and in the Sino-Vietnamese borderlands, 
which connected southern China with northern Vietnam. Sino-Vietnamese cross-border 
and maritime trade played a dominant role in bridging the two trading systems of 
southern China and northern Vietnam. It also acted as an external component of the 
integrated trade system between northern, middle, and even southern Vietnam.  
The authorised trade that private merchants engaged in was one part of 
Sino-Vietnamese commercial contacts during the nineteenth century. There was yet 
another group, namely the smugglers, who were also involved in Sino-Vietnamese 
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commercial activities along the Sino-Vietnamese borders. These smugglers and 









































Figure 1:  
 










Chapter 4: Fraudulent and illicit trading activities  
 
1. Introduction 
Sojourned and travelling Chinese merchants from southern China conducted frequent 
commercial activities in northern Vietnam. The Chinese merchants made great 
contributions to the Sino-Vietnamese overland trade in northern Vietnam since the Huế 
court did not collect a great deal of revenue from Sino-Vietnamese maritime trade in the 
same area. Some significant commercial markets and towns, such as Phủ Hiến and Hoa 
Sơn, flourished in northern Vietnam with the growth of Sino-Vietnamese trade. Apart 
from government-authorised trade in northern Vietnam, assorted smuggling rings were 
active in northern Vietnam which influenced Sino-Vietnamese commercial, diplomatic, 
and political relations in different aspects. Mountains peppered with jungles and woods, 
tiny inlets and meandering waterways along the coast, and remote islands in the sea 
comprised a huge arena for smuggling groups of all kinds, and a broad spectrum of 
actors was involved, each participating for their own reasons.  
Some vital questions about clandestine trade are explored in this chapter. Why did 
illicit trade occur frequently during this period? Who engaged in ‘trade on the sly’? 
What was the mechanism of ‘stealthy transport’? And how do we define terminology 
such as ‘bandits’ or ‘pirates’ in a historical context? This chapter will delve into these 
questions, explore the Nguyễn dynasty’s policies on security behind these illicit 
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economic activities, and provide an alternative perspective on the Sino-Vietnamese 
relations.  
 
2. Climate and political geography 
Certain historical phenomena have originated from many complex factors such as 
climate, sociology, and human activities. Soil, climate, original vegetative cover, and 
similar factors can influence population densities. A prolonged drought or flood can 
destroy harvests and push up food prices.1
As far as the Guangdong and Yunnan provinces are concerned, the climate 
worsened during the nineteenth century. Based on local Chinese gazettes, floods, 
earthquakes, and storms occurred nearly every year since the Jia Qing period.
 
2
                                                 
1 Peter Boomgaard, Freek Colombijn and David Henley, ed. Paper landscapes: explorations in the 
environmental history of Indonesia (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1997), pp. 3–4. 
  
2 See table 3.2 and local gazetteers: Li Yulan 李毓兰, Yun nan sheng zhen nan zhou zhi lue 云南省镇南
州志略 [The concise gazetteer of Zhennan Prefecture in Yunnan Province]. Tai bei cheng wen chu ban 
she 台北 ,成文出版社, 1975, Vol. 4, pp. 263–264; Ming Yi明谊, Guang dong sheng qiong zhou fu zhi 
广东省琼州府志 [The gazetteer of Qiong Prefecture in Guangdong Province]. Tai bei cheng wen chu 
ban she成文出版社, 1967, Vol. 24; Zhang Yuesong 张岳崧, Qiong zhou fu zhi 琼州府志 [The 
gazetteer of Qiong zhou]. 1841, Vol. 44, p. 862; Liang Dingfen 梁鼎芬, pan yu xian xu zhi 番禺县续志 
[The continuation of gazetteer of Panyu]. Taibei xue sheng shu ju 学生书局. 1968. Chen BoTao 陈伯
陶，dong guan xian zhi 东莞县志 [The gazetteer of Dongguan]. 1921, Vol. 34–35, pp. 1249–1300; He 
Fuhai 何福海, Xin ning xian zhi 新宁县志 [The gazetteer of Xinning]. Tai bei xue sheng shu ju 台北
学生书局. 1968, Vol. 14, pp. 601–648; Hou Kunyuan 侯坤元, Chang le xian zhi 长乐县志 [The 
gazetteer of Changle]. Tai bei xue sheng shu ju 台北学生书局. 1968, Vol. 7; Zhou hengchong 周恒重, 
Guang dong sheng chao yang xian zhi 广东省潮阳县志 [The gazetteer of Chaoyang County in 
Guangdong Province]. Tai bei cheng wen chu ban she台北, 成文出版社, 1966, Vol. 13, pp. 186–188; 
Wang Dalu 王大鲁, Guang dong sheng chi xi xian zhi 广东省赤溪县志 [The gazetteer of Chixi County 
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The population growth in southern China is integral to understanding the political 
and intellectual crises that wracked China during the nineteenth century.3
Social disorder and revolts ensued with the worsening climate in south-eastern 
China. Secret societies, rebellions, and unorthodox organisations of all kinds, which 
were initiating pattern as potential pirates, bandits, and other types of smugglers, were 
frequent by the middle of the nineteenth century. Northern Vietnam and southeast China 
also suffered from worsening climates during the nineteenth century. From the 1850s 
onwards, floods and storms occurred frequently in Nguyễn Vietnam.
 
4
The geographical proximity of south-eastern China and northern Vietnam explains 
the similarities between them in terms of climate. Malaria, dengue, and other tropical 
fevers are good examples of common diseases in both areas. Malaria and other tropical 
fevers were called zhang (瘴) in Chinese records. During the Ming and Qing periods, 
zhang was rampant in Yunnan and other south-western areas of China, due to frequent 
interactions of all kinds including military and commercial interactions. Zhang also 
 These led to 
disastrous consequences such as famine, plague, and so on, which catalysed rebellions 
and social turmoil. People engaged in robbery, depredation, and other criminal activities 
and formed ‘illicit’ groups of bandits and pirates. 
                                                                                                                                               
in Guangdong Province]. Tai bei cheng wen chu ban she 台北 成文出版社, 1967, Vol. 7, pp. 152–153; 
Yang Yang 阳仰, Yun nan sheng lu feng xian zhi tiao mu 云南省禄丰县志条目 [The list of the 
gazetteer of Lufeng County in Yunnan Province]. Tai bei cheng wen chu ban she 台北. 成文出版社, 
1975, p. 22. 
3 Robert B. Marks, Tiger, rice, silk, and silt: environment and economy in late imperial South China 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 333–337. 
4 See the appendix: Natural disaster in Bắc Kỳ . 
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hindered military operations which the Chinese central government organised on the 
south-western frontier of China.5
Lạng Sơn
 Zhang was also a widespread problem in northern 
Vietnam, particularly in the Sino-Vietnamese borderlands. Zhang was referred to as 
Lam Truong (岚瘴) or Lệ (沴) in Nguyễn documents, and was a common infectious 
disease in northern Vietnam during the Nguyễn dynasty, especially in the  and 
Điện Biên Phủ areas.6
History, affected by man’s environment, keeps changing, and is also influenced by 
human actions.
 Floods, droughts, storms, typhoons, and earthquakes, along with 
widespread climate-caused diseases such as zhang, led to plagues and later to unrest and 
social turmoil in northern Vietnam and south-eastern China.  
7 The pattern of human actions that were shaped by similar ecological 
elements could be influenced and altered by different powers in different geopolitical 
units. Strife emerged in areas that had similar climates and different geopolitical 
characteristics. From a historical perspective, the political and social practices in 
northern Vietnam and China possessed similarities as they were in the same climatic 
and geographical sphere. This included the densely populated Red River Delta in 
northern Vietnam.8
                                                 
5 Bin Yang, Zhang (瘴) On the Southern Frontiers: Image, Diseases, Environment, and Chinese Imperial 
Colonialism. Manuscript. 2007, p. 22. 
6 ĐNTL, Chính Biên IV, Vol. 4, p. 43, p.6,  p.20, p. 19 p. 22. 
7 Envir onment and history (Middletown, Conn: Wesleyan University, 2003), p. 42. 
8 Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the age of commerce, 1450-1680 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1988-1993), Vol. 1, p. 8. 
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Northern Vietnam and southeast China were interconnected and interdependent; any 
ecological and socioeconomic change in southeast China affected northern Vietnam and 
vice versa. By the nineteenth century, Chinese society had suffered from the huge 
population boom at the end of the eighteenth century. At this time, Chinese commoners 
felt that commercial growth did not necessarily mean more prosperity or security, but a 
thinner margin of survival in a crowded and competitive society.9
At the end of the eighteenth century, the Qing designated Canton as the sole open 
port for foreign trade, especially for Westerners. Other vital sea ports, such as the Amoy 
sea port, started to decline due to bans on essential commodities such as tea, as well as 
 Increasing numbers 
of Chinese either tried their luck in the seafaring world, or became bandits in order to 
survive harvest failures. Increasing numbers of impoverished fishermen, as well as 
occasional and professional pirates viewed piracy along the coast of southeast China 
and the Gulf of Tonkin as a temporary survival strategy. This viewpoint persisted for a 
few centuries.  
 
3. The boom in maritime and overland smuggling   
Booming maritime and overland trade encouraged smuggling, as smugglers profited 
more from illicit trade compared to their honest counterparts. Piracy and plundering 
were the regular activities of bandits and pirates, who lurked along busy seafaring and 
overland trade routes.  
                                                 
9 Philip A. Kuhn, Soulstealers: the Chinese sorcery scare of 1768 (Mass: Harvard University Press, 
1990), p. 16. 
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the change in policy on rice imports. By the Jia Qing and Dao Guang periods, more and 
more merchants resorted to smuggling due to corruption in the customs offices and 
losses from pirate raids at sea.10 The corruption in customs offices accelerated the 
dwindling of legal trade and the subsequent boom in illicit trade. The customs tariffs 
were so high that, rather than paying exorbitant fees to the customs officers, increasing 
numbers of merchants took the risk of smuggling.11 After the introduction of opium by 
Westerners and the abolition of the English East India Company’s privileges in 1833, 
contraband trade was open to all merchants. After 1840, William Scott described the 
commercial conditions in Canton thus: ‘The only way you can get to the inhabitants of 
China is by smuggling.’12 ‘From the 1850s onwards, the lawless and turbulent class of 
people who posed as wreckage scavengers or other legitimate occupations of various 
kinds engaged in smuggling in the coastal regions, from Hong Kong to the countless 
bays and creeks on the thousands of miles of coast in the Guangdong province. The 
Chinese officials despised smugglers rather than fearing them, and connivance, rather 
than prevention, made the administrative system incapable of regulating vast amounts 
of traffic.’13
                                                 
10 Chen xiyu, Zhong guo fan chuan yu hai wai mao yi. pp. 227–229. 
11 Liang Jiabin 梁嘉彬, Guang dong shi san hang kao 广东十三行考 [The studies on the thirteenth 
Hong]. Shang hai shu dian 上海书店, 1989,  pp. 363–384. 
12 Neville Williams, Contraband cargoes, seven centuries of smuggling (Hamden, Conn. Shoe String 
Press, 1961), p. 224. 
13 Ibid., pp. 223–226. 
 All of these encouraged merchants to smuggle regularly, eluding taxes by 
using small sea ports.        
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4. Main concepts 
A key question emerges when specific schemes on pirates and bandits are examined in 
this chapter: how do we define ‘pirates’ or ‘bandits’?  Piracy neither was nor is an 
unchanging phenomenon; rather, it is a concept that is still evolving. Generally, piracy 
is a recorded human activity related to travel and trade. ‘It may be assumed that various 
enterprising individuals perceived the great profits of transporting goods and intercepted 
these goods on the way.14 Plundering, with or without violence, is an ancient practice.15
Richard Leirissa proposes piracy as ‘a kind of trade based on theft instead of 
exchange’.
 
16 The salient hallmark of piracy and banditry is the aim of procuring 
material wealth by robbery, heist, and even murder and other violent methods. These 
activities were all described as illicit by authorities. They could be viewed as organised 
crime, once they were conglomerated into confederations. They signed agreements and 
proceeded to carry out periodic illegal maritime or overland commercial activities. 
Trade was a pull factor for pirates. The flourishing trade routes and sea ports were 
usually staked out by pirates. Just as Joseph Campo points out in his analysis on Rayat 
(orang laut), piracy was a voluntary business activity with the specific goal of profit.17
                                                 
14 Philip Gosse, The history of piracy (London: Longmans, 1932), p. 1. 
15 Charles Grey, Pirates of the eastern seas (1618-1723), a lurid page of history (London: Sampson Low, 
Marston, 1933), p. 8. 
16 Richard Z. Leirissa, “Changing maritime trade in the Seram Sea” in G.J. Schutte, State and trade in the 
Indonesian archipelago (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1994), p. 112. 
17 Joseph NFM a Campo, “Discourse without Discussion: Representations of Piracy in Colonial 




4.1. Definition of pirates 
It is worth noting who the pirates in Sino-Vietnamese waters were. In fact, these pirates 
were often made up of traders, fishermen, and even inlanders from China and Vietnam. 
Their status was ambiguous in the eyes of the Nguyễn dynasty and even to themselves; 
they would only be labelled ‘pirates’ or ‘smugglers’ in Vietnamese chronicles once they 
dealt with contraband commodities prohibited by the Nguyễn court. Therefore, these 
pirates could switch roles from fishermen to pirates or merchants to smugglers at any 
time. The line between fishermen, soldiers, ship crew, and even merchants was blurred, 
as was the line between ‘licit’ and ‘illicit’ activities. ‘Licit’ and ‘illicit’ activities were 
defined by the administration depending on whether they defied or threatened the ruler’s 
interests, be they political or economic.  
Based on this situation, pirates were generally called Tặc (贼, thief) or Phỉ (匪, 
bandits or pirates), Thanh Phỉ (清匪, Qing pirates), Nghịch Phỉ (逆匪, treacherous 
bandits or pirates), or Hải Phỉ (海匪, seafaring pirates). Only the pirates who were listed 
in the Vietnamese official documents of Huế Court are analysed in this study, so the 
conflict between the Nguyễn authorities and ‘culprits’ in the eyes of the Huế rulers are 
clearly delineated. ‘Pirates’ named by the Nguyễn court appeared in Chinese records as 
Di Phỉ (夷匪, barbarian pirates), Di Phạm (夷犯, barbarian perpetrators) or Nan Di (难
夷, barbarian refugees).18
                                                 
18 Xuan zong shi lu 宣宗实录, Vol. 265, p. 35, in qing shi lu shi liao zhai chao, 1985, p. 313; Vol. 230, 
pp. 6–8, p. 302 ren zong shi lu 仁宗实录, in qing shi lu shi liao zhai chao, 1985, Vol. 163, pp. 12–13, p. 
 It is noteworthy that Thanh Phỉ in Huế records included 
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Chinese pirates, who cruised southeast China, the Gulf of Tonkin, and even the ocean 
frontier in southern Vietnam and the Gulf of Siam. The meaning of Thanh Phỉ cannot 
be accurately clarified, because records in the documents of the Nguyễn dynasty were 
vague. Since people from Qing China were called Thanh Nhân (清人), it is logical that 
the pirates from Qing China were called Thanh Phỉ (清匪, Qing pirates). It was possible 
that they were from southeast China, northern Vietnam, or Cochin China.   
Among these ‘pirates’, some were professional, some were occasional, and the rest 
were reluctant pirates because they feared arrest.19 Occasional pirates were usually 
part-time and seasonal fishermen. In the seasons when fishing was poor and hazardous, 
looting was the best way for them to ease the pressure of survival.20
In 1829, around 10 ships’ worth of Chinese came to Quảng Yên. These Chinese 
ships declared to local officials that they were just passing through and fishing there. 
However, they did not have any certification to moor in Vietnam.
 
21
                                                                                                                                               
289. 
19 Robert J. Antony, Like froth floating on the sea: the world of pirates and seafarers in late imperial 
south China (Berkeley, Calif: Institute of East Asian Studies, 2003), pp. 88–103. 
20 Dian H. Murray, 'Living and Working Conditions in Chinese Pirates Communities, 1750–1850' in 
David J. Starkey, E.S. van Eyck van Heslinga, J.A. de Moor, ed., Pirates and privateers: new 
perspectives on the war on trade in the 18th and 19th centuries (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1977), 
p. 50. 
21 Phan Thúc Trực. Quốc Sử Di Biên. Minh Mệnh period. 
 It is possible that 
they were fishermen as well as pirates. This pattern is apparent in official documents, 
which recorded other similar cases where Sino-Vietnamese pirates were captured. In 
1834, many Chinese ships journeyed in Vietnamese waters, smuggling rice. In addition, 
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they frequently attacked passing trade junks.22 Usually, honest fishermen were also 
armed with weapons to defend themselves from pirates. Thus, it was difficult to 
distinguish pirates from honest fishermen.23
Hải Dương
 It is possible that they were fishermen as 
well as pirates, even if they declared themselves fishermen during official interrogation 
after their capture. In 1839, the General Governor of the  and Quảng Yên 
provinces arrested a gang of Chinese pirates led by Li Gongsong (李公宋). This gang of 
Chinese pirates comprised approximately 60 people who were fishermen in the area.24 
In 1839, nearly 500 Chinese ships assembled around the Chang Son in Quảng Yên 
province from August and September to March or April the following year. These 
Chinese ships were fishing in Quảng Yên waters.25 Besides Chinese fishing ships, 
Chinese pirates also included many merchants.26
The multitudinous accomplices of pirates and bandits included seafarers, mariners, 
soldiers, fishermen, and paddlers. Whether pirates or bandits, they were mobile and 
flexible. They usually formed large networks from sea to land. Bandits would scurry to 
the sea, while pirates would flee to the land once they were pursued. The difference 
between bandits and pirates was blurred. As Eric Tagliacozzo noted, there was no 
ontological category of ‘pirates’; they often moved in and out of piracy and many other 
  
                                                 
22 ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 121, p. 14. 
23 Captain AG Course, Pirates of the Eastern Seas (Frederick, Muller, 1966), p. 165. 
24 ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 200, p. 10. 
25 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. l93, p. 14. 
26 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 201, pp. 19–21. 
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professions. 27
In Chinese history, banditry was associated with rebels. In general, banditry was a 
series of various complex plundering and looting activities which connected a great deal 
of ‘contradictory strains’. In most cases, their enterprises represented endeavours to 
seek more resources under the strain of sudden or endemic disasters. In a sense, banditry 
was only an organised form of survival behaviour. The banditry at higher levels 
 Furthermore, the huge networks made by bandits and pirates were 
interconnected. Chinese secret societies and rebellions were supported by Chinese and 
Vietnamese pirates. Some of them were pirates and bandits as well. They were people in 
the lowest class of society, viewed as ‘scum’.   
 
4.2. Description of bandits  
Chinese bandits must be examined by virtue of the interconnections between Chinese 
and Vietnamese bandits before Vietnamese banditry is explored in this chapter. Bandits, 
outlaws, rebels and secret societies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were 
confusingly known by similar terms like dao (盗, robber), zei (贼, thief)，zei fei (贼匪, 
thieves and bandits), fei (匪, bandits and pirates), hui fei (会匪, bandits organised into 
associations), and ni fei (逆匪, treacherous bandits or pirates). There were no accurate 
terms to demarcate the different groups, particularly in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries when secret societies became a part of ‘delinquent’ and repressive gangs.  
                                                 
27 Eric Tagliacozzo, Secret trades of the Straits: smuggling and state-formation along a Southeast Asian 
frontier, 1865-1915 (Ann Arbor, Mich: University Microfilms International, 2005), p. 239. 
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probably had some political aims and sometimes evolved into open rebellions.28 Perry 
divided banditry into three categories: the gang, the semi-permanent gang, and the 
banditry arm, all sorted by size, composition, geographical scope, and durability.29
Wakeman delineated the distinctions among bandits (dao, 盗), outlaws (zei, 贼), 
and secret societies (mi mi hui she, 秘密会社). He generalizes that bandits were rural 
gangs that robbed at random and temporarily; they did not exist as one large, stable 
confederation. Outlaws existed in the social periphery and had little contact with the 
peasantry. Levying tolls, kidnapping travellers, collecting harvest taxes, and 
occasionally attacking small administrative centres were common activities for them. 
They were generally opposed by the peasantry. In the secret societies, there were a great 
number of peasants who had left their land and were driven by the state of the economy 
to steal or commit robbery for survival.
 
30
The secret societies merit more attention because their activities were salient in 
Chinese society in the nineteenth century. Most scholars contend that Chinese ‘secret 
societies’ had an open organisational structure and political dissidence, and did not 
 
                                                 
28 Elizabeth J. Perry, Rebels and revolutionaries in north China, 1845-1945 (Stanford, Calif: Stanford 
University Press, 1980), p. 75. 
29 Ibid., pp. 66–74. As to the different stages of evolving gangs of bandits, Eberhard categorised them 
into four stages: the petty group of bandits symbiosis with local villages; the gangs of bandits 
incorporated into near gangs in number; the victorious gang expanded to the nearest city; the huge gangs 
of bandits co-operated with local gentry and achieved ultimate victory in establishing the new dynasty 
and turning into the new elite. Eberhard, Wolfram, Conquerors and rulers, social forces in medieval 
China (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1965), pp. 101–106. 
30 Frederic, Wakeman, Strangers at the gate: social disorder in south China, 1839-1861 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, c1966), pp. 121–122. 
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comprise marginal groups. Some feel that they signified ‘the formation of the illegal 
petty bourgeoisie’.31 Jean Chesneaux defined them as ‘social bandits’. In general, they 
were armed robbers. They also kidnapped for ransom and attacked government 
convoys.32
Only peasants and their community could create ‘social bandits’ and endow 
them, as well as other socially displaced and unattached itinerant laborers, 
preachers and story-tellers, with mythic savior-like powers. Estranged and 
geographically distanced from political centers, as the bandits had similarly 
been outlawed, peasants could express their communities’ moral 
cohesiveness and political opposition to the regime by supporting the 
guerilla activities of the bandits.
   
‘Social banditry’ was interlinked with China’s peasant rebellions. Irwin Scheiner 
points out:  
 
33
‘Secret societies’ functioned as rallying forces for rebels and bandits in the nineteenth 
century, helped by the severe social turbulence created by rebellions, in particular, the 
Taiping Rebellion, even though the rebels did not regard rebellion, but rather, mutual 
aid and criminal entrepreneurship as their raison d’être. Therefore, the line separating 
  
 
                                                 
31 Jean Chesneaux, “Secret society in China’s history evolution” in Jean Chesneaux, ed., Popular 
movements and secret societies in China, 1840-1950 (Stanford, Calif, Stanford University Press, 1972), p. 
17. 
32 Jean Chesneaux, Secret societies in China in the 19th and twentieth centuries (London: Heinemann 
Educational, 1971), p. 61. 
33 Irwin Scheiner, “The mindful peasant: sketches for a study of rebellion”, in Journal of Asian Studies 
hereafter JAS, 32, 4 (August 1973): 581. 
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banditry, ‘secret societies’, and rebel activities became ambiguous. The benchmark used 
by the Qing authorities to define and suppress rebels and pacify insurrections in the 
nineteenth century was the fact that they were bandits, rather than members of secret 
societies.34
Apart from socio-economic and climatic factors, the government’s ineptitude in 
matters such as frontiers, disparate trade partners, overlapping zones for political power, 




Hence, it was not surprising that bandits, rebels, outlaws, and secret societies were 
ebullient and mutually dependent in the Sino-Vietnamese frontiers during the nineteenth 
century when rebellions and secret societies were rampant in southern China. 
Furthermore, there was not a big difference in the views of the two governments. 
Outlaws (贼) and bandits or rebels (匪) meant essentially the same thing in Huế and 
Beijing. Consequently, from the perspective of the Nguyễn authorities, bandits, outlaws, 
rebels (Chinese who fled to Vietnam, as well as Vietnamese), and Chinese secret 
society members who fled to Vietnam created social turbulence and threatened their 
legitimacy. Thus they were called Tặc (贼) or Phỉ (匪), Sơn Tặc or Sơn Phỉ (山匪
mountain bandits), Hội Phỉ (会匪), Thanh Phỉ (清匪), or Nghịch Phỉ (逆匪). Here, the 
  
                                                 
34 Cai Shaoqing 蔡少卿, Zhong guo jin dai hui dang shi yan jiu 中国近代会党史研究  [A study of 
societies and parties in pre-modern China]. Bei jing, zhong hua shu ju 北京, 中华书局, 1987, p. 24. 
35 David G. Atwill, “Trading Places: Resistance, Ethnicity, and Governance in 19th Century Yunnan” in 
Robert J. Antony and Jane Kate Leonard, ed., Dragons, Tigers and Dogs (Ithaca, NY.,: Cornell University, 
1998), pp. 245–271. 
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bandits who joined rebellions and confronted the government were publicly named 
Nghịch Phỉ (逆匪), and the government endeavoured to exterminate them. The bandits 
who did not join the rebellions were named Sơn Tặc or Sơn Phỉ. The central 
government also sought to neutralise them, even though they did not join the rebellions.  
In conclusion, these groups were a potential threat to the authorities in terms of 
security and the economy. They were defined by the administration as illegal groups. 
This was attributed to the fact that their activities were classified as violations of law 
and order. Their activities regularly caused turmoil and even rebellions, which could 
potentially overthrow the rulers. Thus, Vietnam’s rulers endeavoured to quell pirates, 
bandits, and other groups that might threaten their position. With regards to the 
economy, the material wealth that should have been acquired by legitimate merchants 
and the rulers was drained by pirates and bandits. The state did not obtain quite enough 
profit from monopoly and tax regimes for its own financial survival. Thus, the state had 
to demarcate the line between ‘licit’ and ‘illicit’ trade and activities in order to maintain 
political and economic power as well as security among its rivals.36
People who engaged in illegal trade during this period can be categorised into four 
groups: private merchants who engaged in illegal trade activities, complicity by 
Vietnamese officials, bandits and pirates. However, the lines between these groups, as 
    
 
5. Four main types of illicit trade  
                                                 
36 Eric Tagliacozzo, Secret trades of the Straits, p. 5. 
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well as between legal and illegal trade, were blurred. Illegal trade was conducted quite 
frequently via collaboration between Chinese merchants and pirates, pirates and bandits, 
Vietnamese officials and Chinese merchants, and so on. Accordingly, these four 
categories of unsanctioned trade were not only interconnected throughout northern 
Vietnam and southeast China, but also fostered new trading patterns in areas not easily 
reached by legal trade. Tax evasion by Chinese merchants and illicit trade activities 
under the name of Vietnamese officials, or in cooperation with corrupt officials, formed 
a part of the extensive historical context of smuggling. 
    
5.1. Private merchants involved in smuggling 
Chinese merchants were a vital source of smuggling contacts along the 
Sino-Vietnamese overland and maritime borders. Smuggling items were usually goods 
like rice and opium, which could provide Chinese merchants with quick, lucrative 
profits. Tax evasion was the usual method that Chinese merchants used in 
non-authorised trade. There were many methods of tax evasion, but the primary method 
was alteration of the size and type of ship used in trade.  
Chinese vessels were levied different taxes based on the taxation regulations of the 
Huế Court. Taxes also varied in different sea ports, ranging from Nam Kỳ to Bắc Kỳ. 
Furthermore, Chinese vessels from different places in China had to comply with 
different tax regulations in order to maintain balance in the kingdom while encouraging 
more Chinese merchants to trade there. The Nguyễn had complicated tax regimes in 
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order to curb any type of tax evasion. However, many Chinese merchants utilised a 
loophole in the Huế taxation system to carry out non-sanctioned trade activities. 
Thereby, the taxation system in Nguyễn was undermined by various clandestine trade 
activities. 
Trade junks regularly conducted ‘secret trade’ by altering the class of their vessels. 
Chinese junks did not always match the vessel class or place of origin listed in the 
vessels’ register. In 1811, Zhu Fuguan (朱富观) and Li Wenyuan (李文远), two 
Cantonese merchants, chartered Hainanese junks to trade in Gia Định in order to evade 
tax, as the tax on Hainanese vessels was lower than the tax of vessels from Guangdong. 
Their plot came to light, and the customs authority forced them to pay taxes as 
Cantonese ships.37 As frequent tax evasion occurred, the Huế Court had to overhaul the 
taxes on Chinese junks. In 1817, according to the memorial of Nguyễn Đức Xuyên (阮
德川), many Chinese ships from Hainan came to Vietnam, carrying more goods and 
passengers than vessels from other provinces, for lucrative profits. Nguyễn Đức 
Xuyên’s advice was that the government should take practical measures to stem 
smuggling. Gia Long approved of Xuyên’s suggestion, and revised the tax regulations. 
Chinese junks were levied taxes as Guangdong or Fujian vessels if there were cargoes 
and passengers from Guangdong or Fujian on the ship. The tax was pegged to a certain 
area if the proportion of cargoes from that area was the largest, even if the junk was 
loaded with cargoes and passengers from other regions or provinces.38
                                                 
37 ĐNTL, Chính Biên I, Vol. 42, pp. 4–5. 
 
38 Ibid. Chính Biên I, Vol. 55, p. 9.  
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Due to the tax exemption given to Chinese shipwrecks, many Chinese trade junks 
carried out smuggling activities by disguising themselves as shipwrecks. In 1816, 
Nguyễn Đức Xuyên, who was in charge of Grand Transportation System, reported on 
the thriving smuggling to Gia Long. Some vessels faked the ship’s register to evade 
taxes; others posed as shipwrecks to avoid paying taxes.39 In 1838, a group of Chinese 
merchants hatched a scheme for tax exemption. These Chinese junks worked with 
Vietnamese on the shore for around five or six months and made clandestine deals.40
Vietnamese vessels of the Grand Transportation System were categorised into many 
classes.
   
41
                                                 
39 Ibid. Chính Biên I, Vol. 53, p. 6. 
40 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 196, p. 7. 
41 The Grand Transportation System in the Huế Court was the primary transportation system that 
combined domestic waterways and ocean waterways into a huge transportation system in order to 
transport crucial goods such as rice, copper, and military items or other provisions throughout the whole 
of Vietnam. Compared with authorised private junks, the ships belonging to the Grand Transportation 
System had an obligation to transport vital goods for the court and country. Thus, they were flexible; they 
were official junks but also acted as commercial vessels. For these junks, transporting and trade 
proceeded in turns. Furthermore, their tax exemptions were different, something the ordinary private 
junks did not have. KĐĐNHĐSL, Vol. 256, pp. 12, 29, 257. 
 These vessels were allowed to undertake commercial activities in the next 
year as long as they finished certain duties such as shipping rice from southern Vietnam 
to northern Vietnam. The Vietnamese government offered them lower traffic or free 
duty when they traded based on the amount of governmental duty accomplished. 
However, these junks of the Grand Transportation System did not engage in commercial 
activities as freely as common trade vessels. To some degree, they were half-official or 
official junks. In addition, the Grand Transportation System of Vietnam also included 
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many sojourning Chinese junks.  In 1832, the Vietnamese government had to prevent 
Vietnamese ships from posing as common Chinese ships, because many Chinese junks 
or Vietnamese vessels disguised as common Chinese junks were smuggling rice to 
China for lucrative profits.42 In 1833, a Chinese junk which belonged to the Grand 
Transportation System of Nguyễn, as one of the Đại Dịch Thuyền (代役船), left Hà Nội 
to trade abroad and never returned. It was later observed that many Chinese merchants’ 
ships as Đại Dịch Thuyền smuggled rice to China. However, their junks were not Đại 
Dịch Thuyền but changed other-class junk to entry Vietnam when they returned to 
Vietnam. Thereafter, Minh Mạng forbade sojourning Chinese vessels in Vietnam from 
going abroad to areas such as Hạ Châu, and other countries, limiting them to domestic 
regions.43 In 1837, some Chinese in Gia Định who had Đại Dịch Thuyền, tried to trade 
in Nam Kỳ to Bắc Kỳ. However, Emperor Minh Mạng refused this request, considering 
the fact that many Chinese took advantage of manufacturing ships to smuggle rice and 
opium.44
In addition, Chinese merchants deliberately reported cargoes incorrectly in customs. 
In 1816, a Chinese named Zeng Shiliang (曾仕亮) captained a vessel from Fujian to Gia 
Định for trade. He stored six big pearls in the cargo, but did not declare them to the 
local customs office.
   
45
                                                 
42 ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 78, p. 8. 
43 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 88, p. 8. 
44 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 177, pp. 27–28. 
45 Ibid. Chính Biên I, Vol. 52, p. 1. 
 In 1831, some Chinese merchants were arrested for smuggling 
opium. These smugglers were forced to pay 3,000 taels more than they had to lawfully 
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pay according to the amount of their cargoes, which was worth approximately 20,000 
taels.46
Corruption in customs and bribes from Chinese merchants to cover up illicit trade 
were rife. In 1811, Pan Yuanji (潘原记) from Hainan bribed a local official at the Sa Kỳ 
seaport Lâm Ấn to let him avoid declaring goods for tax.
 
 
5.2. Complicity by Vietnamese officials  
Chinese merchants usually improved their deals by taking advantage of the clout of 
Vietnamese officials. Chinese merchants obtained more profits when they under-traded 
under the cloak of Vietnamese officials. Clandestine trade, Chinese merchants, and 
Vietnamese officials were interdependent. 
47 In 1836, Lê Văn Nhuận (黎
文润), a local official in Vĩnh Long ( 永隆) and Yên Thái (安泰) in the south, was 
bribed to allow Chinese merchants to leave Vietnam while smuggling rice.48
                                                 
46 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 77, p. 6. 
47 Ibid. Chính Biên I, Vol. 43, p. 4. 
48 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 169, pp. 7–9. 
 In 1844, 
Hoàng Văn Lộc smuggled silk and opium to Vietnam, but was later reported to the 
Vietnamese government. He was released after the first trial. After his release, Hoàng 
Văn Lộc (黄文禄) gave Trần Văn Thông (陈文聪), the Provincial Administration 
Commissioner, money as a token of thanks for releasing him, but Thông refused. 
However, Nguyễn Văn Lý (阮文理), the Surveillance Commissioner in Phú Yên, 
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accepted 50 taels of silver and two taels of high-quality eaglewood from Hoàng Văn 
Lộc.49
 Some Vietnamese officials helped the ongoing smuggling by Chinese merchants, 
as certain officials could be kept in the dark about illegal activities. Others turned a 
blind eye to the illegal trade of the Chinese merchants. In 1830, Pan Huiji (潘辉记), a 
Chinese under the patronage of Duke Định Viễn (定远公) in the Nguyễn court, used an 
official ship for trade in order to pay less tax.
  
50 In 1832, Duke Diên Khánh (延庆公) 
allowed the Chinese merchant, Ye Lianfeng (叶连丰) to trade without paying taxes. 
However, Ye’s junk was not duty-free but, rather, an altered common vessel.51 In 1837, 
Huang Ye (黄叶), a Chinese merchant in Gia Định, registered his private junks as 
official vessels for trade in southern Vietnam, northern Vietnam, China, and other 
Southeast Asian regions with the help of Duke Kiến Yên (建安公) for about a decade 
without paying any tax.52
Lastly, some Vietnamese officials not only directly collaborated with Chinese 
merchants in illegal trade, in particular, the rice and opium trade, in Southeast Asia, but 
also faked certificates of registry and built junks illegally. In 1832, a Vietnamese 
official, Mạc Hầu Hy (莫侯
  
熺), smuggled rice to Hạ Châu by intercepting Siamese 
pirates.53
                                                 
49 Ibid. Chính Biên III, Vol. 40, p. 22. 
50 ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 67, p. 6; Minh Mệnh Chính Yếu  A57/7 Vol. 16. 
51 ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 78, p. 16. 
52 Ibid.  Chính Biên II, Vol. 179, pp. 29–30. 
53 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 79, p. 26. 
 In the same year, Hoàng Công Tài (黄公才), the Provincial Governor of Ninh 
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Bình (宁平), built ships and traded illegally. Furthermore, he also faked the ships’ 
certifications for carrying contraband items. Phan Bá Đạt (潘伯达) was appointed the 
official to investigate this matter, which ended in Hoàng Công Tài committing suicide 
to escape punishment when the officials discovered opium in his vessels.54 In 1833, 
Nguyễn Hữu Khôi55 deployed soldiers to the mountains to chop wood without approval 
from the Nguyễn court, and either sold this wood to Chinese merchants in Qing China 
or manufactured vessels illegally under the protection of Lê Văn Duyệt (黎文悦).56
Besides merchants and Vietnamese officials, occasional and professional pirates were a 
large group of smugglers. Differing from private merchants, pirates usually procured 
 
 
5.3. Pirates  
                                                 
54 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 85, p. 34. 
55 Gia Long established Gia Định Thành Tổng Trấn. Before Minh Mạng abolished Gia Định Thành Tổng 
Trấn,  three general governors managed Gia Định Thành,  Lê Văn Duyệt was the longest one as the 
governor-general of Gia Định Thành among other two counterparts (1812–1813, 1820–1832.) 
Furthermore, he was the most prominent. After Lê Văn Duyệt’s death, Minh Mạng abolished Gia Định 
Thành Tổng Trấn Quan instead of governor-generals in every province. Bạch Xuân Nguyên (白春元), 
who was the provincial administration commissioner in Gia Định province investigated crimes committed 
by Lê Văn Duyệt and punished Duyệt’s subordinates. Lê Văn Khôi was one of Duyệt’s subordinates. 
Prior to the 1830s, Nguyễn Hữu Khôi from Cao Bằng was pursued by the government and fled to Thanh 
Hóa due to his rebellion. At that time, Lê Văn Đuyệt was in charge of Thanh Hóa. Therefore, Nguyễn 
Hữu Khôi surrendered to Lê Văn Đuyệt. Soon afterward, Nguyễn Hữu Khôi obtained Lê Văn Đuyệt’s 
trust and was adopted as his son. Nguyễn Hữu Khôi then followed Lê Văn Đuyệt back to Gia Định and 
was appointed as a high-ranking official. Furthermore, he changed his name to Lê Văn Khôi. In 1833, 
Khôi killed Bạch Xuân Nguyên (白春元) and his family. Afterwards, he killed Nguyễn Văn Quế (阮文
桂), the governor-general in Gia Định province. At that time, Khôi instigated revolts. Khôi and his 
followers quickly occupied most of southern Vietnam. However, the revolts by Khôi were ultimately 
quelled by the Nguyễn court. 
56 ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 90, p. 10. 
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goods by violent methods such as pillage. Additionally, they were not only a potential 
security threat at sea, but also on land. They shared not only the lucrative profits, but 
also the power of the administration.  
 
Waves of Chinese pirates 
Chinese pirates usually cruised around the South China Sea, the Gulf of Tonkin, and 
further southwards due to the geographical proximity of southeast China and northern 
Vietnam. The connection between Chinese and Vietnamese pirates was ubiquitous. The 
rise and fall of Chinese pirates had an inevitable impact on their Vietnamese 
counterparts. The noteworthy height of pirate activity occurred in the Gulf of Tonkin 
and further southwards at the end of the eighteenth century and during the nineteenth 
century. The first peak of the pirates, which was characterised by frequent activity led 
by Zheng Yi, Cai Qian, Zhu Fen, and Zhang Bao, occurred from the end of the 
eighteenth century to 1810.57 The initial rise of pirates was due to the asylum they 
obtained from Tây Sơn, such as safe headquarters and protected bases, which supported 
piracy in both Vietnam and China.58
                                                 
57 Antony, Like froth floating on the sea, pp. 43–51. 
58 Dian H. Murray, Pirates of the South China coast, 1790-1810 (Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University 
Press, 1987), p. 49. 
 Hence, the second peak of Chinese piracy was not 
necessarily occasional. During this period, quelling Chinese pirates and peacekeeping in 
Vietnam’s waters were the main targets of the Nguyễn court in revitalising and fostering 
friendly Sino-Vietnamese tributary relations. At its height, Chinese pirate activity in the 
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Gia Long period was therefore not as rampant as it was in China. In addition, Huế did 
not indulge the Chinese pirates, but cooperated with the Qing administration in 
subduing them.    
The Chinese pirates who plagued the South China Sea and the Gulf of Tonkin were 
increasingly active from around 1832–1849. The Nguyễn court also suffered from 
Chinese piracy during this period. During the Minh Mạng period, the Chinese pirates in 
southeast China were a force to be reckoned with. Two prominent Chinese pirates 
during the piracy boom were Shap-ng-tsai (Shi Wuzai, 十五仔) and Chui Apoo (Xu 
Yabao, 徐保仔), who cruised the South China Sea and Hong Kong’s waters in order to 
pillage commercial junks. British trade suffered a huge blow from the privateers 
belonging to Chinese pirates. The second peak of Chinese piracy, from 1832–1849, 
ceased as soon as the British China squadron destroyed 57 pirate junks, killing more 
than 900 pirates.59
The emergence of the second peak in piracy can be attributed to three factors. First, 
the Chinese court did not enforce any effective measures or establish a strong naval 
force to quell pirates.
  
60
                                                 
59 Gosse, The history of piracy, p. 281. 
60 Hunt Janin, The India-China opium trade in the 19th century (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 
1999), p. 140. 
 Secondly, with the first opening of ports in Sino-Western 
treaties since the issue of the Nanjing Treaty after the first Opium War, more and more 
Westerners entered open sea ports such as Hong Kong in China. Increasing 
opportunities for trade between Westerners and Chinese encouraged more pirates to 
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plunder trade junks as well as Western vessels. Finally, a boom in China’s opium trade 
exacerbated the rampancy of pirate activity during this period. Prior to the early 
nineteenth century, the Qing court issued a ban on opium imports. However, by the 
1820s, the volume of opium imported into China was around three to four chests per 
ship.61 Western vessels and opium ships were thus plundered by pirates such as those 
on Hellas in 1840.62
Piracy was a significant problem in negotiations between the Qing and British, with 
piracy thriving from the 1850s onwards. The Treaty of Tianjin formally put this matter 
on the agenda, as pirates were a menace to the growing British trade; pirates plundered 
countless trade junks even though the British attempted to keep Chinese merchants 
away from Hong Kong.
  
63 Apart from Chinese pirates from overland secret societies, 
members of the Taiping rebellion cruised the South China Sea and the Gulf of Tonkin. 
From the 1850s onwards, the rise of Chinese pirates wreaked havoc on trade vessels 
along the Cochin-Chinese coasts, the Gulf of Siam, the east coast of the Malay 
Peninsula, and the settlement of Singapore.64
                                                 
61 Liang Jiabin, Guang dong shi san hang kao, p. 176. 
62 Hunt Janin, The India-China opium trade in the 19th century, pp. 138–139. 
 Around the 1860s, the activities of 
63 Grace Fox. British admirals and Chinese pirates, 1832–1869 (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner, 
1940), p. 143. 
64 Hooi, Christopher Liang-yin, Piracy and its suppression in Malayan waters, 1800-1867 (Academic 
exercise - Dept. of History, University of Malaya, 1957), p. 12. Hunt Janin, The India-China opium trade 
in the 19th century, p. 142. 
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Chinese pirates reached a new peak, prompting China to negotiate agreements with six 
other Western nations between 1861 and 1869 with the aim of controlling piracy.65




The Sino-Vietnamese pirates who plagued southeast China, the Gulf of Tonkin, and 
the coast of northern Vietnam possessed four vital headquarters on land that they used 
to dispose of loot, repair vessels, supplement provisions, and procure information. The 
first one was Jiang Ping (江坪) Jiang Ping was a natural choke-point situated in 
Guangxi en route from China to Vietnam. Furthermore, Jiang Ping was an ideal 
   
Pirates lived on the waves, which made them both mobile and versatile. However, 
isolated seafaring could not exist, as Chinese pirates and other seafarers were heavily 
reliant on land for their survival. They had to depend on people on the shore for victuals, 
water, matting, rope, and other provisions. Gunpowder, weapons and information were 
all necessary for the pirates’ security purposes. Furthermore, pirates had to dispose of 
their illicit goods as well as clean and even repair their junks. Thus, pirates had to 
establish bases in local villages on land in order to carry out their operations on land as 
well as at sea. They made contacts on shore with a cross-section of local societythat 
formed a huge network of accomplices comprising fishermen, merchants, soldiers, 
bandit gangs, secret societies, the remnants of rebellions, and so on.  
                                                 
65 Fox, British admirals and Chinese pirates, p. 145. 
66 Here we call them ‘Sino-Vietnamese’ not because they were overseas Chinese in Vietnam [yue nan hua 
qiao (越南华侨)] but because they operated across the Sino-Vietnamese borders at will. 
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headquarters for pirates; it was easily defensible due to deep, turbulent currents, and 
could be approached only by vessels of a certain size. Finally, because Jiang Ping was a 
frontier town, Chinese control of the region was not much stronger than that of the 
Vietnamese.67 By the 1790s, Jiang Ping had become a booming frontier town as well as 
a pirate lair. A large Vietnamese squatter population settled at the entrance to the 
harbour. Many of the residents traded in pirate loot and supplied their provisions. Local 
merchants from Jiang Ping also traded with pirates here.68
The second major hideout for Sino-Vietnamese pirates was Lian Zhou and Qiong 
Zhou (Hainan), which were in the lower prefectures of Guangdong. Lian Zhou was 
close to northern Vietnam by land, while Qiong Zhou was connected to northern 
Vietnam by sea. At the close of the eighteenth century, pirates from the qi bang (旗帮, 
Flag Gangs) in Guangdong steadily emerged from Lian Zhou. The Tian Di (天地会) 
and Niu Tou (牛头会) societies were established here to service the pirates’ operations. 
Furthermore, secret societies supported pirates in confrontations with the local 
government in Lian Zhou.
   
69 Some islands off the shore were also used by pirates as 
strongholds for their operations in Hainan. Naochou and Weichou flanked the peninsula 
located along the route of the salt fleets of Dian Bai, as well as vessels that passed 
through the narrow straits of Hainan.70
                                                 
67 Murray, Pirates of the South China coast, p. 20. 
68 Antony, Like froth floating on the sea, p. 123. 
69 Zheng Guangnan郑广南, zhong guo hai dao shi 中国海盗史 [The history of Chinese pirates]. hua 
dong li gong da xue chu ban she 华东理工大学出版社， 1999, pp. 313–314. 
 
70 Murray, 'Living and Working Conditions in Chinese Pirate Communities 1750-1850' in Pirates and 
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The third base of the Sino-Vietnamese pirates was the coastal villages and islands 
off the northern coast of Vietnam, which were dotted with reefs and inlets. Besides 
Jiang Ping, coastal regions further south in Vietnam such as Nghệ An, Doan Mien, and 
Huế were used as headquarters by pirates.71
Hải Dương
 Vân Đồn, Ba Phung, and Tràng Sơn in 
Quảng Yên, Đồ Sơn in , and Thanh Hóa in northern Vietnam surpassed Jiang 
Ping as the premier strongholds of both petty and professional pirates from the 1810s 
onwards. Quảng Yên, which was dotted with reefs, inlets, and islands, served as a 
natural location to ambush merchants, dispose of loot, and trade illegally with 
merchants. It was common for large numbers of Chinese merchants to flock to these 
lairs in order to trade with pirates. In 1838, Nguyễn Công Trứ (阮公著) reported to 
Minh Mạng that a great number of Qing merchants had clustered together in Tràng Sơn 
and its vicinities for illegal trade.72
The pirates managed not only to concentrate on certain areas, but also made their 
presence felt in all the rivers and streams that could accommodate them; small rivers 
flowing to the sea were the scenes of much pirate activity. The last pirate base was a 
group of sea ports on the shore that were interconnected with overland water systems 
and flourishing trade cities situated in estuaries in northern Vietnam. From Bạch Long 
Vĩ to the Red River Delta, there were off-shore rocks and reefs stretching for about 60 
 Squatter smugglers also transferred contraband rice 
to Qin Zhou and Lian Zhou from here. 
                                                                                                                                               
privateers, p. 58 . 
71 Ibid., p. 57. 
72Minh Mệnh Chính Yếu, AHv195/1-12, A.57/1-11, Vol. 23. 
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miles, some wooded, some bare, some low-lying, and others elevated. This terrain made 
it difficult to pursue pirates here. Furthermore, many creeks connected the rivers and 
river mouth to the sea, providing ample opportunities for the pirates to evade pursuers. 
Hải Phòng had a reputation as a ‘pirates’ nest’,  a supply stop once pirates landed or 
when bandits sailed to sea, or vice versa, when they were being pursued by the 
authorities. Sha-ng-tsai (Shi Wuzai) obtained supplies from Haiphong, antagonising the 
government.73
There were islands which became the haunts of pirates; here, they could easily rush 
out from concealment to attack incoming traders, refit their vessels, and stock up 
provisions. Pirates had plagued the ocean frontier where the authority wielded by 
Vietnam and China’s central governments was weak. Some land locations served as 
backups against the possibility of pursuit. They were also premier strongholds for 
trading with merchants and supplying provisions, since it was necessary for the pirates 
to dispose of booty and repair their vessels. The overland world was enmeshed with the 
seafaring world. This, together with Sino-Vietnamese pirate collusion and the mobility 
  
 
Collaboration of bandits from mountain to sea 
No pirates could survive once isolated from the land; supplies and other provisions had 
to be obtained from the land. Thus, making contact with the overland world was a 
necessity for pirates.  
                                                 
73 Captain AG Course, Pirates of the Eastern Seas, p. 165. 
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of these pirates, made the suppression of piracy much more difficult. Moreover, it was 
difficult for the Chinese and Vietnamese governments to capture pirates once the pirates 
shifted from the sea to the land. Many Chinese pirates who collaborated with 
Vietnamese pirates in the Gulf of Tonkin, for example, in Qin Zhou and Lian Zhou, 
were members of secret societies or the remnants of the Taiping rebellions.74 The 
Vietnamese women on shore also sold rice to the Chinese pirates.75 In 1845, Chinese 
pirates landed in Vạn Ninh in Vietnam in order to escape pursuit by the Chinese 
government from Chinese to Vietnamese waters. The Vietnamese officials arrested four 
Chinese pirate ships and repatriated them to Qinzhou in China.76 Interestingly, there is 
a unique example that shows Western missionaries were also involved in piracy and 
banditry during the Tự Đức period. In 1859, a Portugal missionary, who called himself 
a marshal, led two Western vessels, 10 Chinese ships, and around 200 pirate ships to 
fight with the Vietnamese armies at Hà Nam in Quảng Yên.77 During the Dao Guang 
period of the Qing dynasty, a Vietnamese, Trần Như Hải (陈如海), colluded with a 
Chinese, Yang Jiufu (杨就富), and raided the waters of Vietnam.78
                                                 
74 Zheng Guangnan, zhong guo hai dao shi (1999), pp. 313–314; Hunt Janin, The India-China opium 
trade in the 19th century, p. 143. 
75 Antony, Like froth floating on the sea, p. 114. 
76 KĐĐNHĐSL, Vol. 131, p. 20. 
77 ĐNTL, Chính Biên IV, Vol. 28, pp. 15–16. 
78 Wang Zhichun 王之春. Qing chao rou yuan ji 清朝柔远记 [Foreign Matters in Qing].  Zhong hua 
shu ju中华书局. p. 214. 
    
 
Chinese and Vietnamese pirates and smugglers   
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Chinese and Vietnamese pirates thrived in the Gulf of Tonkin and were far from 
well-mannered merchants. They lurked along busy trade routes to plunder and pillage. 
Many Chinese pirates cruised the Vietnamese ocean border and hid in Vietnamese 
junks.79 Other pirates pillaged the water frontiers of Fujian and Guangdong for a long 
time. They usually fled to the Vietnamese ocean borders to ask Vietnam for amnesty 
once they were pursued by the Qing government.80 In 1832, Nguyễn Bảo (阮保) 
conspired with Chinese pirates with 10 ships for heist.81 Apart from plundering vessels, 
these pirates also smuggled rice and other commodities to other Chinese in Vietnamese 
waters or traded provisions with the Vietnamese.82
Many Vietnamese pirates joined Chinese pirates’ gangs and vice versa. ‘Several 
years ago, long-haired Vietnamese cruised the waters of the Fujian and Guangdong 
provinces. Most of them joined the pirates for survival.'
 These illegal activities were viewed 
by Nguyễn court as threatening the security of Nguyễn’s dominance as well as 
jeopardising the economy. 
83
                                                 
79 Ren zong shi lu 仁宗实录, Vol. 11, pp. 15–16. in qing shi lu shi liao zhai chao, 1985, p. 273. 
80Ren zong shi lu 仁宗实录, Vol. 106, pp. 22–23, in qing shi lu shi liao zhai chao, 1985, p. 282. 
81 ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 83, p. 12. 
82 Ren zong shi lu 仁宗实录, Vol. 199, pp. 19–20. in qing shi lu shi liao zhai chao, 1985, p. 290. 
83 Ren zong shi lu 仁宗实录, Vol. 102, pp. 8–11, in qing shi lu shi liao zhai chao, 1985, p. 281. 
 Based on several official 
reports, in 1833, pirates plied the waters of Lianzhou and Qiongzhou, which were 
adjacent to Vietnam. Zhang Kuachun (张  春) reported that there were around 30 
corsairs and 100 pirates plundering the sea at the mouth of Hồng Loa Sa (红螺沙) and 
Bạch Long Vĩ. In 1833, Chinese officials arrested many pirates such as Ruan Yaguan 
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(阮亚管) and his followers in Zhushan (竹山) and the sea around Qinzhou. Li Yade (李
亚德) and his followers were apprehended in Hepu County (合浦县), while Liang 
Yayou (梁亚有), Lan Yawan (蓝亚晚) and their followers were captured in Wei Zhou 
(涠洲). In the Gu Island arrest, the chief leaders, such as Cái Hải Lão (盖海老), were 
Vietnamese and were also arrested.84
In 1843, Chinese pirates who cruised the Vietnamese ocean to attack trade junks 
were arrested, and their vessels and weapons confiscated by Vietnamese officials. Jin 
Er’ji (金二纪), who was the leader, admitted that they did ply the Vietnamese waters in 
order to plunder vessels.
 
85 Nguyễn Vietnam eventually beheaded Jin Er’ji and his 
followers in order to maintain order at sea.86
To the Nguyễn court, Chinese pirates were the main troublemakers in Vietnamese 
waters, as the many islands, reefs and inlets that peppered the coast of northern Vietnam 
served as pirate lairs. Nguyễn Vietnam endeavoured to quell pirates, whether they were 
Chinese or Vietnamese. In the first year of the Gia Long period, the Nguyễn 
government arrested nine Chinese pirates in Vietnamese waters and extradited them to 
the Tai Ping (太平) Prefecture in China.
  
87
By the Minh Mạng period, Chinese pirates regularly harassed passing junks in 
Vietnamese waters. Two Chinese pirate ships appeared in the waters off Quảng Bình in 
1831, and in 1838, a large group of Chinese pirates was found in the waters off the 
  
                                                 
84 Xuan zong shi lu 宣宗实录. Vol. 226, pp. 25–30, in qing shi lu shi liao zhai chao, 1985, p. 301. 
85 Xuan zong shi lu 宣宗实录. Vol. 395, pp. 26–27. in qing shi lu shi liao zhai chao, 1985, p. 320. 
86 KĐĐNHĐSL, Vol. 131, p. 17. 
87 Ibid. Vol. 131, p. 16. 
 149 
Khánh Hòa (庆和) province.88 By the Thiệu Trị period, Chinese pirates were still active 
in Vietnamese waters. In 1843, around 20 ships of Chinese pirates in Quảng Nam were 
discovered by the Nguyễn court. Later on, the two biggest ships, along with five other 
Chinese pirate ships, plundered the waters of Vietnam. In 1844, Nguyễn Vietnam 
captured three Chinese pirates, Huang Yayi, Xu Yasi and Su Bilan, in the Quang Yen 
province. Soon afterwards, Nguyễn Vietnam apprehended the Chinese pirates Huang Qi 
and Li Yali in the Quảng Yên province.89
Hải Dương
 From the Tự Đức period onwards, Chinese 
piracy in Vietnam grew. In 1849, Ye Yawu, Yan Yayang and another 140 Chinese 
pirates in Quảng Yên, along with 50 Chinese pirates in the  province, were 
arrested by Vietnamese authorities.90
The pirates used a wide variety of ships and weapons, which they secured by 
capture or purchase. The largest gangs of these pirates were composed of thousands of 
people and hundreds of junks; even the smallest gang had at least a few pirates and a 
couple of ships. In 1797, the Chinese pirates, Wu Daxiang (吴大相), Zhuang Deli (庄得
力), and Li Da’an (李大安) surrendered to the Qing court. The total number of their 
gangs was about 100, including followers and relatives.
  
91 In 1826, around 100 corsair 
ships showed up in Vietnam’s waters.92
                                                 
88 Ibid. Vol. 159, p. 16. 
89 Ibid. Vol. 131, p. 18. 
90 Ibid. Vol. 131, p. 21. 
91 Ren zong shi lu 仁宗实录. Vol. 18, pp. 15–16, in qing shi lu shi liao zhai chao, 1985, p. 275. 
92.Minh Mệnh Ngữ Trị Văn. A.118/2：Vol. 9. 
 In 1832, Lê Văn Quý ( 黎文贵) reported that 
 150 
about seven or eight pirate ships had appeared in Thanh Hóa to loot merchant ships.93 
In the Minh Mạng period, besides professional pirates, occasional pirates also plundered 
the Vietnamese waters. In 1833, Li Zengjie (李增阶) reported to the Emperor of Qing 
that the authorities had tracked these pirates to Dai Mao Island (玳瑁洲), situated on the 
Sino-Vietnamese ocean border. They found three pirate ships, each of which held about 
100–200 pirates.  Qing officials arrested 12 pirates, including their leader, Zhu Ya’er 
(朱亚二). Many pirates drowned in this endeavour. After that, pirates flocked to Giáp 
Châu Sơn Island, which was near Zhu Shan in China. About 30 pirate ships continued 
to pillage the waters. Moreover, they also occupied the Mã Châu (马洲), Giáp Châu (甲
洲), and Lão Thử Sơn (老鼠山) islands on the Vietnamese ocean border.94
Rice, money and weapons were necessities for pirates. They usually landed to exchange 
and obtain necessities from locals on the shore or dispose of loot to acquire weapons or 
money on the black market. In 1807, the Qing government secured 14 corsairs, more 
than 50 different types of cannons, more than 3,000 jin of gunpowder, and a large 
number of assorted weapons.
 
 
Smuggling items  
95
                                                 
93 Ibid. A.118/3,Vol. 2. 
94 Xuan zong shi lu 宣宗实录. Vol. 226, pp. 25–30, in qing shi lu shi liao zhai chao, 1985, p. 301. 
95 Ren zong shi lu 仁宗实录. Vol. 186, pp. 15–16, in qing shi lu shi liao zhai chao, 1985, p. 289. 
 In the same year, the Chinese pirates Zhou Da (周大) 
and Shi Er (石二) confessed that cannons weighing 5,000 and 2,000 jin in captured 
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ships had come from Vietnam.96 In 1808, two famous pirates, Cai Qian (蔡牵) and Zhu 
Ben (朱贲), lurked in Sino-Vietnamese waters, trading regularly with local people. 
Many Vietnamese on the shore provided rice, drinking water, vegetables, and other 
daily provisions97 to these Chinese and Vietnamese pirates98
In this section, the main objects of discussion are two parts. One is the rebels, who 
regularly had special political agendas to oppose the dynasty. The other is the bandits, 
 in return for silver and 
copper.  
 
5.4. Bandits and rebels  
Southern China and northern Vietnam were peripheral places to the Chinese and 
Vietnamese central governments. Itinerant people who were merchants or inhabitants 
increased the mobility and complexity of the Sino-Vietnamese overland frontiers. With 
regards to bandits in northern Vietnam, southern China was the best place to take refuge 
once they were pursued by the government of Nguyễn in Vietnam and vice versa due to 
the geographical proximity. Chinese and Vietnamese bandits journeyed through the 
Sino-Vietnamese borderlands at will. Here, as in Nguyễn Vietnam, it was difficult to 
distinguish ethnic Chinese from ethnic Vietnamese due to similarities in appearance. 
Usually, the Qing pigtail was an obvious clue. Some Vietnamese bandits even styled 
their hair in pigtails in order to evade the Huế court.   
                                                 
96 Ren zong shi lu 仁宗实录. Vol. 189, p. 7, in qing shi lu shi liao zhai chao, 1985, p. 290. 
97 Ren zong shi lu 仁宗实录. Vol. 199, pp. 19–20,. in qing shi lu shi liao zhai chao, 1985, p. 290. 
98 ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 60, p. 29. 
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who did not have any special political agendas and just made trouble. Both groups are 
described in this study since they quite often connected along the Sino-Vietnamese 
border. Many rebellions were composed of bandits, and many bandits joined rebellions 
to plunder more. Rebellions provided bandits with more chances to make trouble and 
raids. Bandits were also used by rebels to enhance their force to confront the present 
dynasty. Therefore, both the Chinese and Vietnamese governments used ‘Tặc’ (zei, 贼) 
or ‘Phỉ’ (fei, 匪) indiscriminately to describe rebels and bandits. 
 
Revolts in the Sino-Vietnamese borderlands 
In the nineteenth century in northern Vietnam, rebels and bandits were regularly 
interconnected. Some bandits joined the rebellions and antagonised the central 
government of Nguyễn, but others did not and survived by intermittent pillaging. To 
Nguyễn Vietnam, both groups were labelled as one: phi. The bandits who joined 
rebellions and confronted the government were called Nghịch Phỉ (逆匪), and the 
government endeavoured to exterminate them. The bandits who did not join the 
rebellions were called Sơn Tặc or Sơn Phỉ (山匪). The central government also sought 
to quell them even though they did not join the rebellions. Normally, when the petty 
bandits did not join the rebellions or threaten national security, the government seldom 
eradicated them on a large scale. However, the Nguyễn court initiated the annihilation 
of any anti-government groups once the rebellions, which comprised bandits and rebels, 
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became widespread.  Hence, the bandits and rebels were singled out as a group, as they 
were closely linked in northern Vietnam and southeast China in the nineteenth century.  
 During the nineteenth century, confederations of rebels (贼) were persistent in 
northern Vietnam. In the early nineteenth century, gangs of rebels with political agendas 
revolted in opposition to the present dynasty and, in some cases, attempted to restore the 
former one. Major turmoil was caused by bandits in northern Vietnam. Lý Khai Ba (李
开巴), who was indigenous to the region, revolted in Hung Hóa (兴化) in 1802, Phan 
Bá Dung (潘伯镕) in Nam Định (南定) in 1833, Lê Duy Lương (黎维良) in Ninh Bình 
in 1833, and Nông Văn Vân (农文云) in Tuyên Quang in 1833. These bandits revolted 
in different locations that were far away from Huế, so suppression of the revolts put 
tremendous strain on the Nguyễn court’s resources.  
    From the 1850s onwards, bandits in northern Vietnam were heavily influenced 
by the rebellions in southeast China. Many Chinese bandits, some in major gangs, fled 
to northern Vietnam and stirred up Vietnamese hostility towards the local government. 
Muslim rebellions led by Du Wenxiu (杜文秀) in the Yunnan province influenced the 
border regions in northern Vietnam which were adjacent to Chinese provinces in 
Yunnan. At nearly the same time, the Taiping Rebellion started in Guangxi and 
Guangdong. Soon afterward, the Taiping Rebellion swept through nearly the whole of 
South China. The Taiping Rebellion, along with the many local revolts in the Guangxi 
province in China during this period, had a negative effect on the internal security of 
northern Vietnam, and generated unease there. A prominent example is the Ba Đường 
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bandits (三堂匪) of Thái Nguyên in 1851,99
China was the natural refuge for Vietnamese bandits and vice versa. Therefore, 
Sino-Vietnamese bandits shuttling around the Sino-Vietnamese borderlands were 
ubiquitous during the nineteenth century. Nông Văn Vân 
 which included groups known as the 
Quảng Nghĩa Đư ờng (广义堂), Đức Thắng Đường (德胜堂), and Lục Thắng Đường 
(六胜堂). Chinese bandits such as Hoàng Tặc (蝗贼) in Tây Sơn (1854) and Tạ Văn 
Phụng (谢文奉) in northern Vietnam (1861) also joined and inflamed the revolts in 
Vietnam. 
 
Chinese and Vietnamese bandits 
100, who was the general of the 
Bảo Lạc prefecture in Nguyễn Vietnam, rebelled in northern Vietnam. He fled to the 
Zhen’an Prefecture in Guangxi when he was pursued by the Huế court, and took refuge 
by shuttling between Guangxi, Tuyen Quang, and Thai Nguyên in northern Vietnam.101
                                                 
99 Bandits were rampant in Guangxi. These bandits united into numerous gangs. They regularly named 
the main room of a house mou tang (某堂), where they came together to discuss how and what to plunder. 
They called themselves the same name as the main room where they gathered. They dismissed once they 
cut the melon from plunder. Zhang Yueqing 张月卿. Tang fei zong lu 堂匪总录 [The documents on 
Tang bandits]. Tai bei, xue she shu ju 台北, 学生书局, 1972. preface. 
100 He was not ethnic Vietnamese and the rebels by him was either not uprising by a minority people. 
101 KĐTBBKNPCB, Vhv.2701/19, Vol. 71, p. 2. 
 
The followers of Nông Văn Vân, such as Nông Hồng Thạc (农洪硕) and Nông Hồng 
Nhân (农洪仁), used the Sino-Vietnamese border regions as safe havens once the 
Nguyễn court captured them. Nông Hồng Thạc fled to the Guangling prefecture in 
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Guangxi.102 For the Chinese bandits in southeast China, northern Vietnam was also a 
place for them to reorganise their activities once they were pursued by the Chinese 
government. Wu Yazhong and Xie Ba and their followers, who were Tang Fei (堂匪, 
bandit gangs) that swept across the whole of Guangxi and Guangdong provinces in the 
1850s, were chased by Feng Zicai (冯子材), the provincial military commander, then 
fled to northern Vietnam.103 The Qing government pursued Wu Yazhong again, and he 
fled to Cửu Phong (九葑) in northern Vietnam three times.104 Zhao Huadan (赵华丹), 
who was one of Wu Yazhong’s followers, fled to Lũng T ỳ (    芘) and Cốc Canh 
(谷   ) in northern Vietnam.105
Compared to the Nông Văn Vân rebellion, it was not difficult for the central 
government of Nguyễn in Vietnam to suppress the Phan Bá Dung (潘伯镕) and Lê Duy 
  In the late nineteenth century, the Black Flag, led by 
Liu Yongfu, occupied Bảo Thắng in northern Vietnam. In the nineteenth century, 
Chinese bandits in northern Vietnam were a significant part of local rebellions in the 
country. Some Chinese fled to Vietnam and joined the local revolts, some crossed the 
borders solely for robbery, and others colluded with the local bandits in Vietnam. 
 
Rebellions and the Chinese 
                                                 
102 Ibid. Vhv.2701/11, Vol. 39; Vhv.2701/12, Vol. 45, p. 15. 
103 Tai ping tian guo ge ming shi qi guang xi nong min qi yi zi liao bian ji zu 太平天国革命时期广西农
民起义资料编辑组. Tai ping tian guo ge ming shi qi guang xi nong min qi yi zi liao 太平天国革命时期
广西农民起义资料 [The documents on rebellions in Guangxi during Taiping rebellion period]. Beijing, 
zhong hua shu ju, 北京，中华书局, 1978, p. 496. 
104 Zhang Yueqing, Tang fei zong lu. 1972, Vol. 11, p. 220. 
105 Ibid., Vol. 11, p. 224. 
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Lương (黎维良) rebellions along with other small gangs of bandits such as Lý Khai Ba 
in Hưng Hóa. Moreover, the revolts by petty bandits did not last very long. However, 
the rebellion by Nông Văn Vân put a strain on the Nguyễn Court’s resources and had 
far-reaching consequences. Revolts by Nông Văn Vân drew other petty bandits and 
consolidated his conflict with the Huế Court, which made the government’s attempts to 
quell these revolts difficult.  
It was common for the Chinese to participate in local revolts in northern Vietnam. In 
1826, Phan Bá Dung worked with 5,000 people, including Chinese bandits and pirates, 
to plunder Hải Dương.106 The gang of bandits led by Đinh Công Thự (丁公署) 
included many Chinese.107 Three thousand Chinese miners took part in the rebellions 
by Lê Văn Khôi (黎文).108 The bandits led by Nông Văn Vân mainly comprised the 
Chinese and locals in northern Vietnam. Apart from the Chinese who were engaged in 
agriculture, most of them were merchants, mine-owners, and peddlers living around the 
Sino-Vietnamese borders.109
珖
 In 1833, armed with weapons and guns, nearly 2,000 
bandits who were Chinese in Vietnam and Vietnamese peasants fought the Nguyễn in 
Bạch Thông (白通) in Tuyên Quang. General Đinh Quang Cân (丁 琎) thwarted the 
bandits at first but was eventually defeated by them. Soon afterward, the army deployed 
by the Nguyễn Court had to withdraw to Cảm Hóa (感化).110
                                                 
106 ĐNTL. Chính Biên II, Vol. 42, p. 19. 
107 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 91, p. 6. 
108 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 109, p. 24. 
109 KĐTBBKNPCB.  Vhv.2701/7, Vol. 25, p. 33. 
110 Ibid. Vhv.2701/6, Vol. 19, p. 26. 
 Nông Văn Vân not only 
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recruited Chinese and Vietnamese rebels, but also established his own army in the 
border regions of Qing China. In 1833, based on spy reports, one branch had 
approximately 200 people who were camped near Lạo Tuyền (涝泉) in the Zhen’an 
prefecture of Qing. The other branch consisted of nearly 2,000 people who were waiting 
in Milong (密   ), Youlong (油    ), and Xiao Xia (小峡), which were adjacent to 
Bảo Lạc (保乐) in Tuyên Quang of northern Vietnam. Among these bandits at the 
border of Qing, around 200 came from Shaozhou (韶州). Their leader was Huang Alian 
(黄阿连), who had not taken any action, but awaited Nông Văn Vân’s orders.111
From the 1850s onwards, increasing numbers of Chinese bandits crossed the 
Sino-Vietnamese borders directly to enter northern Vietnam and pillage while revolts 
and rebellions were sweeping southeast China. The Sino-Vietnamese borderlands were 
swarming with Vietnamese and Chinese bandits. In 1849, more than 3,000 Chinese 




 In the same 
year, Huang Wan (黄晚) led more than 7,000 Chinese bandits to  to plunder 
it.113 In 1853, Chinese bandits were pillaging Quảng Yên.114
Chinese Merchants and Bandits  
 By the Tự Đức era, 
northern Vietnam had suffered at the hands of Chinese bandits, with disorder, rebellions, 
and turmoil rampant in the Sino-Vietnamese borderlands.    
 
                                                 
111 Ibid. Vhv.2701/6, Vol. 21, p. 12. 
112 ĐNTL, Chính Biên IV, Vol. 4, p. 28. 
113 Ibid. Chính Biên IV, Vol. 6, p. 20. 
114 Ibid.  Chính Biên IV, Vol. 9, p. 4. 
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Chinese merchants were indispensable to the bandits in northern Vietnam in this era. 
They were usually coerced into banditry once they were captured, and procured 
commodities and money for the bandits, who viewed this as a shortcut to get provisions 
and other necessary articles such as money. It is not clearly recorded in the archives 
whether these Chinese merchants who joined the bandits served them by trading with 
other merchants or people. Without a doubt, the bandits benefited greatly from Chinese 
merchants in terms of the acquisition of supplies and disposal of loot. In 1833, Zheng 
Wenxi (郑文喜), Liang Wenzu (梁文足), and Ruan Wenlian (阮文莲) were arrested for 
banditry by the officials in Tuyên Quang. In this case, they were Chinese merchants 
caught stealing money and goods for bandits.115 Occasional communications probably 
existed between bandits and merchants. In 1834, the government caught several bandits, 
including Nguyễn Khắc Chung (阮克钟) and Hoàng Viết Trướng (黄曰长), who were 
followers of Nông Hồng Thạc. The Huế Court also captured three Chinese merchants, 
Bi Xihong (闭熙洪), Chen Ruju (陈如居), and Liao Xuanhe (廖宣和). These Chinese 
merchants declared to the officials that they lived there, and were not bandits. It was 
suspicious, however, that these merchants could not have any relations with local 
bandits after they were interrogated and released.116
                                                 
115 KĐTBBKNPCB. Vhv.2701/6, Vol. 22, p. 20. 
116 Ibid. Vhv.2701/11, Vol. 41, p. 6. 
  
 
Chinese mine owners and Bandits  
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It is worth noting that Chinese mine owners joined in bandits and rebels in northern 
Vietnam. A large number of Chinese migrated to northern Vietnam in the seventeenth 
century to exploit the rich mineral there. Consequently, Chinese miners were dominant 
in northern Vietnam. Furthermore, the government leased mines to Chinese merchants 
and collected tax as a central revenue per annum. It was easy for the Chinese miners to 
gather in large numbers to incite local unrest once they were instigated by local 
Vietnamese revolts. In 1833, Lê Văn Khôi recruited around 3,000 Chinese miners and 
colluded with the local headmen to start revolts in Lạng Sơn. Many roads in Lạng Sơn 
and Quảng Yên were blocked by them.117 In 1834, the government captured a bandit 
whose name was Hoàng Bảo Lin (黄宝铃). Based on his confession, a Chinese 
mine-owner, Wu Jinxian (巫进贤), who opened the Xa Lý (车里) gold mine in Lục 
Ngạn District (陆岸) in northern Vietnam, had joined the revolts. In 1833, Nông Hồng 
Thạc rebelled with his help. Wu Jinxian later fled to the Siling prefecture (思陵) of 
Qing China after the Vietnamese government circulated orders to arrest him.118
                                                 
117 ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 109, pp. 24–26. 
118 KĐTBBKNPCB. Vhv.2701/17, Vol. 64, pp. 6–7. 
 In 1834, 
Nông Hồng Nhân and his brothers, Nông Hồng Cẩn and Nông Hồng Huyền, together 
with Lương Quang Phượng (梁光凤), Lương Quang Trùng (梁光重), Lương Quang 
Thiện (梁光善), and Chinese mine-owners occupied the borders between the Tuyên 
Quang and Thái Nguyên provinces. The Chinese mine-owners were Zhang Fuwen, 
Zhang Changzhi, and Zhang Changsheng, the respective owners of the Nhân Sơn, Tống 
Tinh, and Vụ Nông mines. They were arrested in the same year by officials of the 
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Nguyễn court and confessed that they had surrendered to the bandits out of fear. These 
bandits had plundered their mines and ordered them to transport rice.119
玹
 For the bandits, 
weapons and guns were indispensable if they were to  confront the government of 
Nguyễn successfully. Apparently, mines could solve a lot of their problems: saltpetre 
mines, which were rich in elements used to make gunpowder, were vital to the bandits. 
The bandits also used the saltpetre mine owners and miners to smuggle weapons and 
guns into Bảo Lạc in northern Vietnam as well as rice with the ‘help’ of the Chinese 
merchants. However, by 1834, Nông Hồng Nhân and his brothers, Nông Hồng Cẩn (农
洪瑾) and Nông Hồng Huyền (农洪 ), failed in their conflict with Nguyễn Vietnam 
due to shortages of rice and weapons.120
The smugglers, which comprised assorted individuals such as Chinese pirates, bandits, 
merchants, and so on in northern Vietnam, were not only contributors to the 
Sino-Vietnamese commercial contacts, but also benefactors of the bustling Asian 
commerce in the nineteenth century. In one respect, Chinese pirates, bandits, and their 
accomplices were economic pioneers who fostered new opportunities and facilities in 
some regions not easily reached by ‘legitimate’ Sino-Vietnamese trade networks. To a 
certain degree, they expanded the scale of commercial exchange in northern Vietnam. In 
other respects, these Chinese smugglers were closely interconnected with Vietnam’s 
   
 
6. Conclusion  
                                                 
119 KĐTBBKNPCB. Vhv.2701/11, Vol. 39, p. 25. ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 120, p. 33. 
120 KĐTBBKNPCB.  Vhv.2701/13a, Vol. 47, p.  6. 
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government and society. These contrabandists became indispensable in 
Sino-Vietnamese commercial relations. Sino-Vietnamese trade relations became 
vigorous due to illicit traders. 
The smugglers, who obtained huge profits illegally, experienced a swift, clandestine 
accumulation of wealth that did not provide any economic profit for the Huế rulers, but 
also ran the risk of turmoil, caused by the illegal business, breaking out at any time. 
Correspondingly, the Nguyễn Court moved towards holistically annihilating illicit trade, 
such as smuggling, fraud and so on. In accordance with this attitude, rhetoric on the 
eradication of smugglers by the Nguyễn authorities occurred more frequently than it did 
in actual policy. By the same token, measures to curtail and eradicate illegal trade were 
put in place. One measure was a contraband policy to enhance the regulation on 
domestic resources in Vietnam; the other was a defence system to step into the frontier 
to pacify smuggling and rebellions. However, the Huế court’s annihilation of illegal 
Sino-Vietnamese trade activities engendered a serious of changes in Sino-Vietnamese 







































































































































The legislation controlling them ranged from different periods of Huế history, and 
altered greatly during the Nguyễn era. As for prohibited items, these were not 
contraband in a strict sense. National demands determined when or to what degree 
certain goods became forbidden items. In general, some goods were prohibited from 
either export or import. Some goods were exchanged for other vital merchandise from 
 and prohibited items   
 
1. Introduction  
Contraband and smuggling were interlinked in non-government-sanctioned trade 
activities. The smuggling reflected the fluctuations of the Sino-Vietnamese trade in 
northern Vietnam. The contraband policy reflected how the Huế court responded to the 
entwining ties among smuggling, trade contacts, domestic demand and the like. To 
discover these rationales focused on power, revenue, and morality from a state 
perspective on contrabands policy is the first step towards analysing how smuggling and 
Vietnam’s contraband policy influenced the evolution of Sino-Vietnamese relations. 
Among the items banned by the Nguyễn government, some, like opium, were 
completely prohibited; while others like rice or human beings were prohibited for 
export. The others were contraband of all sorts smuggled in by merchants, such as 
copper or fake coins.  
                                                 
1 As for contraband, few items that Nguyễn issued were prohibited from both import and export. 
Generally, most items were banned from either import or export. Please see the part on ‘terms’ in the 
introduction. 
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foreign merchants. Others were neither allowed to be imported nor exported. 
Concurrently, some goods were not prohibited goods during certain periods. However, 
they became prohibited goods in another time period. They also evolved according to 
Huế commercial policy and demands. 
The prohibited items policy was part of a strategy to protect Vietnam’s security and 
economic interests in view of its status as a peripheral country in Asia. The breadth of 
banned items, the social and historical context of the emergence of banned items in 
Nguyễn, the relationship between licit and illicit trade and prohibited items, and the 
reasons why the Huế court imposed bans on these items are explored in this chapter.  
 
2. Main prohibited items 
2.1. Opium 
Judging purely by the number of cases in historical records, no commodity can compare 
with opium, which has been smuggled so often and with such high returns in China and 
Southeast Asia during the nineteenth century. For sheer volume and intensity, opium 
was, without doubt, by far the most important smuggled item that crossed the 
Sino-Vietnamese maritime and land borders. The overflow in Vietnam was the coming 
together of factors in the opium trade in Asia. The first was the opium trade in China, 
and the other was that in Southeast Asia.  
 
Opium trade in China  
 170 
In the early stages of history in Asia, including regions in Southeast Asia, opium, along 
with other commodities, was transported by the Portuguese.2 Opium in China can be 
traced back to the seventeenth century, when Arab merchants brought it to China as a 
commodity. Shortly after that, Chinese imperial edicts against smoking opium were 
imposed. On the heels of the first ban on opium, other restrictions ensued.3
Opium brought in by British ships flooded the markets in China on a large scale at 
the close of the eighteenth century. The British dumped opium in China in order to 
change its trade position. The opium was circulated in different local markets by the 
huge, complicated, and stratified distribution system once the opium was brought ashore. 
Around the 1840s, almost every vessel going up the coast carried opium from a single 
mercantile house in Canton.
  
4 The rapid import of opium in China boosted smuggling 
along the southeast coast of China. Concurrently, rampant smuggling sabotaged the 
Canton system, which confined European deals to one port.5
The collapse of the Canton system typified the decline of the central government’s 
supervisory role of and monopoly over foreign trade in China, which had brought about 
the previous chaos in the social order economically, commercially, and politically. 
Opium not only created more social problems in China, but also became intertwined 
  
                                                 
2 Genevieve Bouchon, “Notes on the Opium Trade in Southeast Asia during the Pre-Colonial Period” in 
Roderich Ptak and Dietmar Rothermund, ed., Emporia, Commodities and Entrepreneurs in Asian 
Maritime Trade, C.1400–1750 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1991), p. 105. 
3 John S. Gregory, The West and China since 1500 (New York: Palgrave, 2002), p. 79. 
4 Allen, Nathan, The opium trade: including a sketch of its history, extent, effects, etc. as carried on in 
India and China (Lowell: JP Walker, 1853), p. 15. 
5 John S. Gregory, The West and China, p. 81. 
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with the central revenue of China in the second half of the nineteenth century. Opium 
was an indispensable economic element that functioned in late imperial China, 
influencing all areas, from central to local administration, and from the bureaucratic to 
the civilian. Opium served as a substitute for cash, but was also used by local officials 
to meet taxation quotas. Furthermore, opium also benefited the Qing coffers in terms of 
prompting reforms and alleviating deficits caused by the suppression of rebellions in the 
late nineteenth century.6
The mass consumption of opium came about in Java when the Dutch controlled Java’s 
import trade by conquering Banten in 1682. The trade in opium offered dealers low 
transport costs and extraordinary profit margins. The VOC (Vereenigde Oostindische 
Compagnie) monopolised the opium import trade from Bengal to Batavia, and the 
Chinese distributed it to local markets in Java. As a large-scale import item, opium, 




Opium trade in Southeast Asia 
7
The salient feature of the opium trade in Southeast Asia was the Chinese, who were 
engaged in opium distribution. Chinese merchants, coolies, and other settlers provided 
  
                                                 
6 Jonathan Spence, “Opium Smoking in Ch’ing China” in Frederic Wakeman Jr. and Carolyn Grant, ed., 
Conflict and Control in Late Imperial China (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1975), pp. 
167–173.  
7 Nicholas Tarling, ed., The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia (Cambridge, UK, Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), p. 499; A. Reid, “A new Phase of Commercial Expansion” in A. Reid, ed., The 
Last Stand of Asian Autonomies (New York : St. Martin's Press, 1997), p. 63. 
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consumer markets and products for export. The circulation of opium by Chinese 
merchants via junk trade occurred all over Southeast Asia. The trade pattern in 
Southeast Asia evolved into the exchange of opium for other items such as silver, 
copper, tin and the like.8 By the middle and late nineteenth century, Singapore, along 
with other emerging free ports such as Labuan, boosted the penetration of opium into 
Southeast Asia. The heavy involvement of the Chinese in the opium trade was striking, 
whether they were individuals, Chinese syndicates, or small-time operators.9
                                                 
8 Carl A. Trocki, Opium, Empire and the Global Political Economy, A study of the Asian opium trade 
1750-1950 (New York, Routledge 1999), p. 56. 
9 Eric Tagliacozzo, Secret Trade of the Straits, pp. 154–168. 
 
These Chinese involved in opium deals spread their business to southern Vietnam 
through inter-regional trade in southern Vietnam, Singapore, and other regions in 
Southeast Asia. Generally, other regular goods as well as opium flowed everywhere in 
Southeast Asia in prosperous trade exchanges. Like Chinese merchants in other regions 
in Southeast Asia, they established an indisputable stronghold for the opium trade in 
Vietnam, either by licit or illicit methods.  
 
Opium in Vietnam 
Opium from commercial and other exchanges with China flowed into Vietnam along 
the overland and maritime routes, from Yunnan, Guangxi and Guangdong to northern 
Vietnam. 
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Due to its proximity to China, opium entered Vietnam easily, in particular northern 
Vietnam, via overland and maritime routes, together with merchants and smugglers. 
Overland opium was smuggled chiefly from Yunnan and Guangxi. Merchants sold 
opium in exchange for cotton and other local commodities from Yunnan to northern 
Vietnam and other overland regions in Southeast Asia. Also, rebels used the money 
from opium sales for military materials such as weapons, which they bought from the 
French.10
On the other hand, opium as a medicine was traded between China and Vietnam 
during the seventeenth century. As early as the seventeenth century, Ming China 
imported opium from northern Vietnam for medicinal purposes.
 Insofar as maritime merchants were involved, merchants in China as well as 
Chinese merchants in Cochin-China and Siam shipped quantities of opium to Vietnam. 
In addition, the pirates who flourished along the littoral Sino-Vietnamese borders and in 
the Gulf of Siam also freighted opium to Vietnam. 
11 In turn, the trade in 
Đàng Ngoài (Tonkin) was dominated by Chinese merchants during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century. The merchandise between China and Tonkin commercial contacts 
were mainly aromatics, and medical products that Tonkin exported to China. On the 
other hand, the Tonkinese imported an array of Chinese drugs in medical concoctions.12
                                                 
10 Ella S. Laffey, "Relations between Chinese provincial officials and the Black Flag Army, 1883–1885" 
(PhD thesis, Cornell University, 1971), Chapter 2. 
11 Stephen Tseng-his Chang, “Commodities imported to the Chang-chou region of Fukien during the late 
Ming period. A primary analysis of the tax list” in Emporia, commodities and entrepreneurs, pp. 164–165, 
Table I, medicinal material. 
  
12 Khoo Kay Yong, "Responses to Restrictions: Maritime Commerce in seventeenth Century Tonkin" 
(Honours thesis, Dept. of History, Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences, National University of Singapore, 
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Opium as tobacco was smoked no earlier than the beginning of the eighteenth 
century in Asia. The Dutch were the earliest people to prepare a mixture of opium with 
tobacco by diluting opium in water. Opium as tobacco was consumed in this manner in 
Java. Soon afterwards, Chinese settlers on Formosa imitated this method.13 It was 
during this period that Indo-China also began chewing opium as tobacco.14
In the earlier period of Emperor Gia Long’s rule, opium was not contraband but 
tax-exempted merchandise. The common paulswort, opium, and cuttlefish began to be 
taxed in Hà Tiên, a place in the Mekong Delta, and governed by Mạc Tử Thiêm (莫子
添), who was an ethnic Chinese of the Mạc family under Nguyễn overlordship. In 1810, 
Emperor Gia Long expressed his sympathy towards the local people in Hà Tiên, and 
 Therefore, 
it is reasonable to say that opium was consumed in Vietnam, not as medicine but as 
tobacco, no earlier than the eighteenth century. 
 
Smuggling and policy 
Opium was considered an important item, and so was restricted in Nguyễn Vietnam. 
The policies on opium were considerably revised during the Nguyễn dynasty. The ban 
on opium had two aspects. Firstly, the import of opium was forbidden. Secondly, 
smoking or extracting opium was outlawed.  
                                                                                                                                               
1995), pp. 37–38. 
13 Laufer Berthold, Tobacco and its use in Asia (Chicago: Field Museum of Natural History, 1924), pp. 
23–24. 
14 Ibid., p. 31. 
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exempted the common paulswort, opium, and cuttlefish from tax.15 However, in 1818, 
a ban on opium in Gia Định was imposed by the Huế court.16
By the Minh Mạng period, the Nguyễn rulers clearly understood the harmful effects 
of opium consumption, and imposed bans. Furthermore, the government issued many 
regulations on the punishment meted out to those guilty of smuggling, smoking, or 
engaging in other activities associated with opium. In 1820, opium was banned, 
including the smoking, storing, extracting, refining, and trading of the drug. People 
could not escape from being punished if they harboured offenders, or covered up their 
illegal activities. In the eyes of the Nguyễn court, opium was highly toxic, because 
foreigners such as the Chinese had spread the smoking habit to Vietnam, and smoking 
opium was harmful to one’s health and caused people to neglect their duties.
 
17
The Nguyễn court had different punishments for those who smoked or smuggled 
opium. Generally, the punishments for smoking opium were not as strict as those for the 
import of opium, but this was only up till 1832, when relatives of the emperor and 
officials, such as Tôn Thất Huyên (尊室
   
諠) and Hoàng Công Tài (黄公才), were also 
smoking opium. The government issued another ban on opium in the same year.18
                                                 
15 ĐNTL, Chính Biên I, Vol. 40, pp. 26–27. 
16 Ibid. Chính Biên I, Vol. 57, p. 4. 
17 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 4, p. 6.  
18 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 86, p. 4; Vol. 87, pp. 37–38. 
 In 
1835, the Nguyễn court issued regulations on reporting and denouncing, as well as 
checking and catching, people involved in smuggling or smoking opium. Those who 
reported people who smoked or smuggled opium were rewarded with more than 20 taels 
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of silver, based on the number of opium smugglers or people who stored it. At the same 
time, strict measures were also taken against foreign merchants who shipped opium to 
Vietnam.19
Many merchants still continued to berth in Vietnam with opium on board, despite 
the many bans on opium issued by the court. The opium in Tonkin came mostly from 
Chinese merchants by overland and maritime routes. Due to the geographical proximity 
to southern China, opium flowed into northern Vietnam from southern China during the 
boom of the opium trade in China. Yunnan was distinctive in the Sino-Vietnamese 
opium trade overland networks. Native chiefs (土司) set up operations in unmonitored 
places for the production and sale of opium to ethnic Han traffickers. Furthermore, the 
inter-regional flow of opium, which was provided by native chieftainships, engendered 
a marked division in opium traffic, in which indigenous minorities planted opium and 
sold opium to Chinese smugglers, who then distributed them to local consumer markets 
within or beyond the national boundaries.
  
20
Opium smuggling was so dominant in northern Vietnam that the endeavours of 
French colonial authorities to tax the opium trade and establish opium restrictions were 
sabotaged in the late nineteenth century.
   
21
                                                 
19 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 162, pp. 12–13. 
20 David Bello, “The Venomous Course of Southwestern Opium: Qing Prohibition in Yunnan, Sichuan, 
and Guizhou in the Early nineteenth Century” in Journal of Asian studies. 62, No. 4 (Nov. 2003): 1116. 
21 Hakiem Nankoe, Jean-Claude Gerlus and Martin J. Murray, “The Origins of the Opium Trade and the 
Opium Regime in Colonial Indochina” in John Butcher and Howard Dick, eds., The Rise and Fall of 
Revenue Farming, business elites and the emergence of the modern state in Southeast Asia (New York, 
N.Y. : St. Martin's Press ,1993), p. 195. 
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Most opium in Tonkin was smuggled by Chinese merchants, even though Chinese 
leaseholders had established 17 warehouses, and had 681 sanctioned retail locations. 
Aside from private Chinese merchants, bandits and rebels were engaged in opium 
smuggling from Yunnan to northern Vietnam. Muslim rebellions facilitated opium 
smuggling to Shan areas and Burma in exchange for weapons and other military 
equipment. 22  Bandits cannot be ignored either, since they also participated in 
smuggling opium. By the second half of the nineteenth century, the Black Flag and the 
Yellow Flag, which were organised rebellious groups in Guangxi that operated from the 
1860s onwards, used the money from smuggling opium in Tonkin to exchange for 
military equipment, such as weapons from the French.23
Seafaring smugglers from China shared the profits from the opium trade with 
overland smugglers. Chinese merchants were the main people involved. In 1831, one 
ship loaded with opium and owned by Wu Daru (吴大如), a Chinese merchant, arrived 
in a seaport in northern Vietnam. An official in Bắc Thành (Hà Nội) reported this to 
Emperor Minh Mạng, and the emperor then dealt out punishments for the Chinese 
merchant and his accomplices. The culprits, Ye Xuan (叶旋) and Chen Si (陈四), were 
exiled, while Wu Yinghong (吴应洪), Wu Daru’s younger brother, and Li Beng (李  ) 
faced life imprisonment. The sailors and girder workers were flogged with a stick, and 
  
                                                 
22 Chiranan Prasertkul, Yunnan Trade in the nineteenth century: Southwest China’s cross-boundaries 
Functional System (Bangkok: Institute of Asian Studies, Chualalongkorn University, 1989), p. 61. 
23 Ibid.; Ella S. Laffey, "Relations between Chinese provincial officials and the Black Flag Army, 
1883–1885"; and GW Clark, Kweichow and Yunnan Province (London, 1894). 
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the cargo was confiscated.24  In 1836, Chinese junks that had smuggled 65 jin of raw 
opium and 25 taels of boiled opium from Guangdong were discovered in Quảng Nghệ.25 
In 1857, a British sailor, Edward Brown, helped pirates capture a larger Fujian trading 
junk on its way from Qinzhou (Chin-Chew) to Vietnam. This Fujian junk carried opium, 
gold bars, and other valuable goods. Furthermore, Brown also ferried half a chest of 
opium, worth 210 silver dollars in trade, for his own profit, along the Vietnamese coast 
after he had resigned from the Hong Kong police.26 Some opium was taken back by 
Chinese pirates. In 1837, a Chinese corsair was seized by Vietnamese officials, and the 
opium, sand, and bamboo poles they carried were confiscated.27 Furthermore, some 
Nguyễn officials smuggled opium from Southeast Asian regions in the process of 
conducting official business. In 1836, Trần Hưng Hòa ( 陈兴和) and other officials 
smuggled opium and books on Catholicism, after they had completed their official 
business and returned from Hạ Châu (present-day Malaysia and western Indonesia).28
In the eyes of the Nguyễn rulers, the effective measures put in place to ban and wipe 
out opium from China could cause foreign smugglers to transfer their opium business to 
  
The burning of opium in Guangdong, led by Lin Zexu, had an impact on the Nguyễn 
court, and the government took more stringent precautions against the smuggling of 
opium to Vietnam.   
                                                 
24 Minh Mệnh Ngữ Trị Văn. A118/3, Vol. 1, p. 30b. 
25 ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 170, p. 13. 
26 Hunt Janin, The India-China Opium Trad., pp. 134–144. 
27 ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 178, p. 4. 
28 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 170, p. 10. 
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Hạ Châu. Additionally, the administration had to take very firm measures to stop the 
opium trade from flourishing.29 In 1839, the Nguyễn court issued another ban on opium, 
and restrictions were placed on the smoking, storage, extraction, and distribution of 
opium.30 In the same year, some Chinese merchants were beheaded for smuggling 
opium or suspicious books and suspicious passengers.31 Later, Emperor Minh Mạng 
instructed officials to be careful of foreign merchants, especially Chinese merchants.32 
After the first Opium War in China, the Nguyễn court had maintained a sharp vigilance 
on the opium situation. In 1843, officials in Hà Tiên reported that six European ships 
carrying opium were anchored in a coastal province in Siam. The Siamese confiscated 
the opium and other cargo, and closed the seaports so as to narrow the entry points into 
Siam. This event aroused alarm in the Huế court.33
Of opium the consumption of the kingdom, estimating the wholesale price 
at 3,500 Spanish dollars a chest, is stated to be about 150 chest[s] a year, 
two thirds of this being estimated for Tonquin and one third for Cochin 
China and Kamboja.
   
With respect to the opium supply in Vietnam, Crawfurd noted that  
 
34
                                                 
29 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 201, p. 24–25. 
30 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 207, p. 4–5. 
31 KĐĐNHĐSL, Vol. 48, p. 41. 
32 Thường Hành Điển Lệ  常行典例 [The regular statutes of Imperial Vietnam] Viện Hán Nôm . 
A.2102, p. 50. 
33 ĐNTL, Chính Biên III, Vol. 27, p. 27. 
34 “Crawfurd’s report on the state of the Annamese Empire” in Alistair Lamb, The Mandarin Road to Old 




As for the channel for the entry of opium into Vietnam, small amounts of opium 
came in on junks, but larger quantities came in overland.35 Furthermore, Chinese 
smugglers played a crucial role in opium smuggling from China to Vietnam. From the 
Jia Qing and Dao Guang period onward, the Triads (San he hui, 三合会) held the lion’s 
share of the opium smuggling business in seaports in Huangpu, Macao, and Zhujiang, 
and the water systems in Guangdong province. Moreover, smoke gangs (Yan bang, 烟
帮) in Sichuan and Yunnan co-operated with Ge lao hui (哥老会, brotherhood) to 
smuggle opium.36
In the early years of the Tự Đức period, the smoking of opium had spread to most 
places, even the capital. Smokers included local people, as well as royal officials and 
relatives. Some merchants hired local fishermen to bring opium into Vietnam for them, 
and other merchants used passengers on ships to carry opium. This kind of smuggling in 
Vietnam made it difficult to capture the offenders.
 
37
During the Tự Đức period, opium was banned many times. However, the ban did 
not effectively quell the spread of opium. In 1862, many officials reported to Emperor 
Tự Đức that the smoking of opium was still widespread in Vietnam. Large consumer 
markets stimulated merchants to smuggle opium. Officials presented a memorandum to 
Emperor Tự Đức stating that heavy taxation should replace the prohibition of opium, in 
  
                                                 
35 Ibid. 
36 Cai shaoqing, Zhong guo jin dai hui dang shi yan jiu.  p. 23–24. 
37 Tự Đức Chiếu Dụ 嗣德诏谕 [Edict and proclamation in the Tự Đức period]. Viện Hán Nôm. A.58, p. 
121. 
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order to choke its widespread and pernicious influence. For every 40 jin of opium found 
on Chinese merchants, the value of one jin was levied in tax. In 1863, a heavy tax on 
opium was ratified by the Huế administration for trial instead of the previous complete 
prohibition of opium. The total tax on opium per year was 382,200 string of copper.38 
However, it seems that this heavy taxation did not solve the problem. In the same year, 
officials reported to Emperor Tự Đức that annulling the prohibition on the opium had 
caused it to become a more serious, pernicious, and widespread influence in Vietnam 
than ever before.39
The Nguyễn court had to tax opium to supplement the central fiscal income in the 
last years of the pre-colonial period in Vietnam. The Vietnamese monarchy chartered an 
opium concession to Chinese merchants until the establishment of formal protectorate 
status in Annam. Shortly after the French began their conquest of the south, the French 
administration in Cochin China attempted to squeeze out the Chinese influence from the 
opium trade by various endeavours. Thus, the efforts that the French administration 
took, whether it was a ‘bidding war’ for the sake of disintegrating the formation of 
Chinese groups, or raising prices for refined opium, actually further encouraged the 
illicit opium trade to flourish, and there were negotiations between the colonial 
administration and Chinese merchants in order to seize the lion’s share.
 
40
                                                 
38 ĐNTL, Chính Biên IV, Vol. 31, pp. 5–6. 
39 Ibid. Chính Biên IV, Vol. 33, p. 34. 
40 Nankoe, Gerlus and Murray, The Origins of the Opium Trade, pp. 183–189. 
 In addition, 
the French were still not entirely in control of the opium markets in Tonkin in the last 
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decades of the nineteenth century. By 1890, most Chinese leaseholders were still 
engaged in the illicit opium trade and smuggling. In Vietnam, nearly as much as 60 per 
cent of the opium trade was conducted by illicit traders.41
The Nguyễn court imprisoned foreigners who immigrated to Vietnam without 
registering and paying poll tax. Broadly speaking, the attitude of the Nguyễn 
government toward Chinese immigrants was obviously lenient, and Huế encouraged 
them to immigrate. At the same time, Vietnamese were strictly prevented from 
emigrating. Illegal human movement occurred frequently, whether it was among crews, 
passengers, merchants, or labourers’ surreptitiously entering, following by Chinese 
junks plying between China and Vietnam or transiting through Vietnam. We will focus 
 
 
2.2. Human movement 
Opium smuggling occurred in northern Vietnam across the borders and over the entire 
period examined. Opium was light in weight and easy to hide, and was thus stored or 
freighted by passengers, crew, merchants and the like. However, not all forbidden items 
were so easy to conceal. The movement of human beings was not allowed by the 
Nguyễn administration along the overland or maritime Sino-Vietnamese borders, but it 
proliferated with the growth and expansion of migration and commercial exchange. 
 
Passengers and human trafficking in Vietnam  
                                                 
41 Ibid., p. 195. 
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on the movements of two main groups: Chinese and Vietnamese. Concurrently, the 
Chinese can be categorised into some sub-categories. Taken together, the movements of 
these two different ‘categories’ of human beings demonstrate the wide pictures that 




Populations in countries such as Vietnam and Siam in Southeast Asia were slowly 
increasing in size during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, even though the 
population of China exceeded that of Southeast Asia in terms of the speed of growth.42 
Overpopulation caused great pressure for survival. Furthermore, the Qing court had a 
series of policies on abrogating maritime bans and return migration during the 
eighteenth century. Emperors Qian Long and Yong Zheng implemented flexible 
policies and regulations that dealt with matters relating to maritime trade, as long as 
seafarers did not threaten the internal security of China. Loosening the previously strong 
grip on trafficking benefited the Qing rulers with a large revenue from maritime trade. 
Because of this, the Qing did not completely re-impose the ban on maritime activities, 
despite the example of the Batavia tragedy of 1740.43
                                                 
42 Anthony Reid, “Low Population Growth and Its Causes in Pre-Colonial Southeast Asia” in Norman G. 
Owen, ed., Death and Disease in Southeast Asia: explorations in Social, Medical and Demographic 
History (Singapore : Oxford University Press,  1987), p. 34. 
 In 1754, the Qing Emperor 
43 The large waves of Chinese migration since the sixteenth century made a great contribution to the 
economy in colonial Batavia. Soon afterwards, the continuous migration of coolies caused the growth of 
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declared that overseas seafarers would be allowed to return home, and their property 
would be protected.44
Besides opportunities for making a fortune in the Nanyang (South Seas) and the 
Qing’s flexible policies, war and calamity were also factors that forced large numbers of 
Chinese to go abroad. The Opium Wars stimulated Chinese emigration. The signing of 
treaties and the cession of treaty ports and improvements brought about by foreign trade 
during the Opium Wars were important incentives for Chinese emigration. The treaty 
system brought about greater opportunities for Chinese venturing overseas. At the same 
time, the British administration enticed more and more Chinese to go to Southeast Asia 
after the cession of Hong Kong. Hong Kong became a new departure point for Chinese 
emigrating to Southeast Asia alongside the growth of British power in Southeast Asia.
 Many traders, miners, planters, shipbuilders and the like, who 
were living and working overseas, flocked back to China due to this policy. The 
loosening of policies on maritime activities encouraged more Chinese to venture to 
make their fortunes, and then return home wealthy to China.  
45
                                                                                                                                               
the economy in the VOC-ruled area of Batavia. The Dutch suggested transporting unemployed Chinese to 
other Dutch colonies in Ceylon and South Africa in order to solve the problem of bankrupts from the 
sugar business in Batavia, which had been caused by saturation in European markets and sharp 
competition from cheaper 
 
Brazilian sugar. A rumour that the Chinese coolies would all be thrown 
overboard en route created riots in the countryside. The Dutch authorities were afraid that the Chinese 
within Batavia were collaborating with the insurrection and, on 9 and 10 October 1740, brutal searches 
and killings of Chinese were carried out in Chinese areas. This massacre lasted three days, and between 
5,000–10,000 Chinese were killed.   
44 Ng Chin Keong, “The Case of Chen I’lao: Maritime trade and overseas Chinese in Ch’ing policies, 
1717–1754” in Ptak and Rothermund, ed., Emporia, commodities and entrepreneurs in Asian maritime 
trade, pp. 373–400.  
45 Wang Gungwu, The Nanhai trade: early Chinese trade in the South China Sea (Singapore: Eastern 
Universities Press, 2003), p. 229. 
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Furthermore, successive droughts, floods, famines, and diseases as a result of the 
Taiping Rebellion, and other small rebel groups in Liang Guang and Yunnan from 
1848–1865, created disruptions in the social order, and aggravated misery and hardship. 
In terms of policy, in 1860, the Qing finally declared that Chinese emigration was not 
‘illicit,’ but that it would begin to be legalised. This declaration ended the final 
curtailment of Chinese emigration.46
On the other hand, the demand for labour in Southeast Asia had been the pull factor 
for Chinese emigration since the seventeenth century. Rapid commercial expansion, low 
population growth, and a relatively disparate and pluralistic political system since the 
sixteenth century in the Southeast Asian world made labour important.
 
47 The region’s 
chronic labour shortage was complemented by China’s growing population. In relation 
to this point, the Chinese economy in Southeast Asia began to predominate in the 
eighteenth century, and the kinship or pseudo-kinship ties that accompanied Chinese 
migration formed and influenced the key local organisational structure, known as the 
kongsi or shareholding partnerships, which typified the Chinese business enterprise.48
                                                 
46 Wong Lin Ken, "The trade of Singapore, 1819–69", The Journal of Malaysian Branch of the Royal 
Asiatic Society 33, Part 4, No. 192 (Dec. 1960): 112. 
47 Anthony, Reid, “‘Closed’ and ‘Open’ Slave Systems in Pre-Colonial Southeast Asia” in A. Reid, ed., 
Slavery, Bandage and Dependency in Southeast Asia (New York : St. Martin's Press, 1983), p. 157. 
 
In addition, the exploitation of metals, especially tin mining in the Malay Archipelago, 
caused more Chinese to flock to Malaya to find their fortune during the nineteenth 
48 Carl A. Trocki, “Boundaries and Transgressions: Chinese Enterprise in eighteenth and nineteenth 
Century Southeast Asia” in Aihwa Ong and Donald M. Nonini, ed., Ungrounded Empires: the cultural 
politics of modern Chinese trans-nationalism (New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 63. 
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century. Penang and Singapore were populated after they were founded by the British 
administration. It was during this period that Chinese coolie migration reached its high 
point.49
Chinese migration occurred sporadically under Chinese rule and continued after 
Vietnamese independence. Chinese migrating to Vietnam attributed this to many 
reasons. In general, insofar as migration was concerned, these Chinese either voluntarily 
migrated to Vietnam, or were forced to do so. Chinese migration can be categorised into 
various types. The first was human trafficking. Based on Chinese archives, after the Jia 
You period in the Song dynasty in the eleventh century, some southern Chinese duped 
people into becoming servants, and they were then transferred to and sold in Vietnam. 
The amount of human trafficking ranged from some hundreds to thousands annually.
 
50
The second type were Chinese who were forced into Vietnam or soldiers stationed 
in Vietnam. A great many Chinese were preyed upon and fled to Vietnam during the 
Sino-Vietnamese wars that raged from the eleventh to the seventeenth century. Military 
generals in northern Vietnam obtained 300 Chinese soldiers when Zhu Yuanzhang 
fought with Chen Youliang in Longzhou of Guangxi in the 14th century.
  
51
Apart from these examples, there were also some soldiers stationed in Vietnam who 
did not completely retreat to China when the Ming Emperor decided to withdraw from 
 
                                                 
49 Wong Lin Ken, "The trade of Singapore", p. 112. 
50 Ma Duanlin 马端临, Wen xian tong kao 文献通考 [Encyclopedia of history and biography] (Hang 
zhou, zhe jiang gu ji chu ban she 杭州: 浙江古籍出版社, 2000), Vol. 330, p. 2594. 
51 ĐVSKTT, Vol. 7, p. 431. 
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Vietnam in between 1427 and 1428. Innumerable Chinese had to stay in Vietnam for 
numerous reasons.52
The third group was made up of refugees. Their role is well recorded in the overseas 
Chinese history in Vietnam. This type of Chinese migration occurred in the period of 
Chinese dynastic changes, such as the change from the Song to the Yuan dynasty, or the 
Ming to the Qing dynasty. In 1274, a great number of Chinese, together with their wives 
and belongings, arrived on as many as 30 junks in Vietnam. Soon afterwards, they were 
permitted to remain in Vietnam by the Vietnamese government.
  
53 Mo Jiu (Mạc Cửu) 
led many Chinese to settle down and live in southern Vietnam. In 1679, Yang Yandi 
and Chen Shangchuan, who were governors during the Ming dynasty with more than 
5,000 followers and 50 junks, arrived in southern Vietnam.54
The last group was made up of Chinese merchants and miners. It is not surprising 
that a large number of Chinese merchants settled in Vietnam during the commercial 
boom in the South China Sea, from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. The rise of 
Hội An, a famous commercial town in Vietnam, was connected with Chinese 
merchants.
  
55  The Chinese made great contributions to the rise of southern Vietnam.56
                                                 
52 Zhang tingyu 张廷玉, Ming shi 明史 [The history of the Ming Dynasty] (Beijing, zhong hua shu ju 
北京: 中华书局, 1974), p. 8324. 
53 ĐVSKTT, Vol. 5, pp. 348–349. 
54 ĐNTL, Thiền Biên, Vol. 5, p. 22. 
55 Chen Chingho, Shiqi-ba shiji Hui'an Tangrenjie ji qi shangye, Xinya xuebao 3.1 (1957), pp. 273–332. 
56 Li Tana, CochinChina. 
 
The Vietnamese authorities arranged for Chinese of all kinds to settle properly in 
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Vietnam.  In 1663, the Vietnamese court separated the Chinese living in Vietnam from 
local Vietnamese habitants. The Chinese did not live together with the Vietnamese, but 
instead in special settlements, in order to distinguish their different customs.57 By 1698, 
Vietnam had set up the Gia Định Prefecture. Soon afterwards, Vietnam also established 
the Thanh Hà Xã and Minh Hương Xã villages for Chinese who traded and settled in 
southern Vietnam.58
The Chinese presence was indispensable by the nineteenth century. With regards to 
commercial aspects, Chapters 1 and 2 provided information on how Chinese trade junks 
brought wealth to Nguyễn Vietnam, but also how the Nguyễn court indirectly controlled 
Chinese commerce. Concurrently, the Nguyễn rulers of Huế also strictly limited the 
increasing Chinese influence in Sino-Vietnamese border areas. By virtue of 
geographical proximity and the expansion of trade, Chinese junks plied between 
southern China and Vietnam. The Nguyễn government encouraged itinerant Chinese 
merchants to trade in Vietnam, but these merchants had to leave once they had finished 
their dealings in Vietnam. Generally, they were not allowed to live in Vietnam 
permanently, although in many cases, Huế also recruited Chinese merchants to develop 
commerce on the frontier. During the Thiệu Trị period, the Nguyễn recruited Chinese 
merchants to develop border villages in Ninh Biên in Hưng Hóa province.
 
59
                                                 
57 VSTGCM, Chính Biên Vol. 33, p. 5. 
58 ĐNTL, Thiền Biên, Vol. 7, p. 14. 
59 Ibid. Chính Biên III, Vol. 8, p. 22–23. 
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Besides, many Chinese migrated to Vietnam across the Sino-Vietnamese border. 
There were no discrete laws or regulations to prevent Chinese from entering Vietnam 
during the Nguyễn dynasty. Some Chinese migrated from border provinces in China, 
such as Guangxi and Yunnan, by land or sea. Registering and paying the annual poll tax 
or serving the corvee were compulsory if they intended to remain in Vietnam.60
Lạng Sơn
 During 
the Minh Mạng period, more and more Chinese came to Vietnam for a variety of 
purposes. Some of them came for trade, and some came simply to make a living. The 
increase in Chinese immigrants prompted the Vietnamese authorities to revise their 
regulations on the Chinese in 1838. The new policy stated that it was compulsory for 
Chinese transient traders to register and pay tax in . They had to pay three 
strings of coins if they came in March and returned in June or July, and five strings of 
coins if they stayed longer until August, September or the end of the year.61 Whether 
they came by land or sea, if they intended to settle down, these Chinese registered under 
the guarantee of the leaders of the local Minh Hương. Otherwise, they were immediately 
evicted.62
                                                 
60 KĐĐNHĐSL, Vol. 44, p. 65. 
61 Ibid. Vol. 44, p. 64. 
62 Ibid. Vol. 44, p. 65. 
 The Chinese played an important role in the economy of Vietnam such as 
planting, fishing, and mining. The Nguyễn lured the Chinese to help them to develop 
frontier areas through exemption from tax. In 1844, the government recruited Chinese 
and native people to establish villages in Điện Biên Phủ, and rewarded them with land 
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to farm.63 Nonetheless, these Chinese who remained in Vietnam were forbidden to 
engage in trade.64
The Nguyễn government endeavoured to attract merchants and the common Chinese 
to service Vietnam by registering or paying the assorted taxes. However, the Huế court 
issued regulations with regards to some of the Chinese who were potential 
troublemakers. Some Chinese passengers who arrived on junks with no relevant 
certifications became a serious problem in Vietnam. Usually, Chinese who entered 
Vietnam by sea were called passengers (搭客). This term was still used for Hóa Kiều in 
the mid-twentieth century. Frequently, these Chinese passengers came to Vietnam by 
Chinese junks for business or related purposes. Huế did not entirely prevent illicit 
passengers from landing, even though Chinese passengers were restricted to 
disembarking and staying without registering. Illegal human migration was prevalent by 
the middle of the Minh Mạng period. The Nguyễn rulers noticed the underground 
increase in the number of Chinese in the country. In the Minh Mạng period, Chinese 
immigration by junk far exceeded the regulations set by the Vietnamese authorities. The 
number of ‘surreptitiously entering’ passengers was in the thousands, and they lived in 
villages close to one another. It was possible that Chinese migration around the 1830s 
also brought with it illegal passengers from China. Furthermore, these illegal migrants 
created social unrest, such as inviting Vietnamese people to smoke opium, and stirring 
  
                                                 
63 ĐNTL, Chính Biên III, Vol. 44, p. 7. 
64 Lục Bộ Điều Lệ  六部条例 [The regulations of Six Boards] Viện Hán Nôm A.62. Released in the 
17th year of Gia Long (1818). 
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up conflicts. Hence, the Vietnamese administration was incensed by the number and 
activities of unregistered Chinese passengers.65 Huế had to issue restrictions on the 
numbers of Chinese entering the country due to the social disarray they created, which 
endangered the internal security of Vietnam, even though the Vietnamese authorities 
were lenient towards Chinese immigration. In 1829, the Nguyễn government released a 
new policy on Chinese people entering the country. This new policy stated that Chinese 
newcomers before 1829 were allowed to settle and pay tax. For those entering around 
and after 1829, a guarantee backed by the head or chief of the local Minh Hương was 
compulsory for those who intended to remain in Vietnam. Chinese from Chaozhou 
needed the head of a local Chaozhou Minh Hương as their guarantor, Chinese from 
Guangzhou needed the head of a local Guangzhou Minh Hương as their guarantor, and 
the obligations of the rest of the Chinese immigrants can be deduced from the previous 
examples. Overall, registering and paying tax were compulsory obligations for these 
newcomers, or else the heads of the local Minh Hương would be punished.66
Considering that the control of human resources was compatible with dominating 
territory and consolidating the power of the throne, the Huế court unified people in 




                                                 
65 ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 61, p. 6; and Vol. 82, p. 28. 
66 Minh Mệnh Tấu Nghị 明命奏议 [Memorials and public papers in Minh Mệnh period]. Viện Hán 
Nôm. Vhv.96/2, p. 16. 
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policies to curtail Vietnamese emigration, especially those of Vietnamese women, to 
avoid losing valuable members of the population. In general, Vietnamese workers or 
women were smuggled to China or regions in Southeast Asia. Some Vietnamese women 
who married Chinese men went to China illegally with their husbands, and this was 
defined as illegal human movement by the Vietnamese authorities. Other women were 
smuggled to Southeast Asia for sex purposes to serve the needs of the local Chinese or 
others. 
In 1809, Vietnamese emigration was declared illegal, and Siamese ships were not 
allowed to ferry returning Vietnamese.67 Furthermore, Vietnamese officials scrutinised 
passengers in vessels from Siam that berthed in Hà Tiên. If found guilty, junk owners 
would be punished by three strokes of the bamboo rod and three years’ banishment, and 
convicts would be castigated by 100 strokes of the bamboo rod. Cargo and money 
freighted by illegal passengers would be impounded by officials.68 The Huế court 
imposed a ban on the trafficking of Vietnamese women during the Minh Mạng period. 
Around the 1830s, Deng Fuxing (邓福兴), a Chinese merchant in Quảng Nam, married 
a Vietnamese woman in Hội An, and took her back to China. Eventually, he was 
arrested by Vietnamese officials, because he illegally carried Vietnamese women 
abroad. Finally, Deng was punished by the Board of Punishment under the charge of 
trafficking in human beings and was banished, and his Vietnamese wife was enslaved.69
                                                 
67 ĐNTL, Chính Biên I, Vol. 39, p. 4. 
68 KĐĐNHĐSL, A54, Vol. 48. p. 38. 
69 ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 62, pp. 11–12. 
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In 1839, Emperor Minh Mạng issued a prohibition on marriage between Chinese men 
and Vietnamese women, even though sources on the link between the Deng Fuxing 
event and Minh Mạng’s restriction were ambiguous. In addition, any children who were 
born from such unions were not allowed to go abroad at will.70
Throughout the Nguyễn dynasty, human movement abroad was continually declared 
illicit. In 1871, the Board of Punishment was given orders to take strict precautions in 
every seaport against women going abroad via Chinese vessels.
  
71 At the same time, 
Vietnam was deeply implicated in human trafficking in Southeast Asia. By virtue of the 
skewed sex ratios, such as the expansion of coolie labour in the Straits Settlements, 
smuggling women for sex purposes was common. Both Siam and Vietnam were source 
countries for smuggled women who served Arabs and Chinese in Singapore.72
Opium was not the only illicit commodity that clandestinely crossed over the 
Sino-Vietnamese borderlands, as well as in whole northern Vietnam. Many other goods 
 Chinese 
sampan owners reported to the Dutch that the workers were from Vietnam even though 
no passengers had been mentioned on the vessels’ manifest. Accordingly, Vietnam was 
involved in the illegal Sino-Southeast Asian movement of human beings, even though 
the Vietnamese administration endeavoured to prevent Vietnamese from emigrating. 
 
2.3. Copper and other precious metals 
                                                 
70 Ibid. 
71 Lại Bộ Hình Danh Tấc Lệ Tục Biên 吏部刑名则例续编 [The regulations of the Personal Board]. 
Viện Hán Nôm.  A1301, p. 64. 
72 Tagliacozzo, Secret trades of the Straits, p. 197. 
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also made the trip across the maritime or overland borders. Counterfeit currency and 
especially minted coins were other highly profitable forbidden items.  
The original copper coin can be traced back to the Dinh dynasty in Vietnam, which 
cast Thái Bình Hưng Bảo (太平兴宝).73 During the Mạc Đăng Doanh (莫登瀛) period, 
Vietnam also issued and circulated some metal currency, such as Đại Chính Thông Bảo 
(大正通宝).74
Copper in Vietnam also flowed into China, due to the continually ebullient foreign 
trade. Up to the eighteenth century, a large amount of foreign copper flowed into 
southern China, such as the Jiang Zhe regions.
  
75 A variety of copper, such as Cảnh 
Hưng Thông Bảo (景兴通宝), was issued by the Vietnamese authorities and circulated 
in the later Lê dynasty in Vietnam. In total, 37 types of copper were issued and 
circulated from the middle to the end of the eighteenth century.76
During the Trịnh-Nguyễn confrontation and civil war, commerce boomed in the 
South China Sea to Southeast Asia routes, increasing the demand for metal currency in 
southern Vietnam. Imported Chinese metal currencies, to some degree, met this demand. 
  
                                                 
73 Ni Mo 倪模, Gu jin qian lue 古今钱略 [The metal currency],  (Shang hai gu ji chu ban she 上海古
籍出版社, 1992), Vol. 17, pp. 1516–1517. 
74 Weng Shupei 翁树培, Gu quan hui kao 古泉汇考 [The study of ancient metal currency] (Beijing, 
Zhong hua quan guo tu shu guan wen xian suo wei fu zhi zhong xin 北京: 中华全国图书馆文献缩微复
制中心, 1994), pp. 1530–1536, p. 1540. 
75 Yang Yunping 杨云萍, “Yue nan qian bi yu zhong guo 越南钱币与中国” [Vietnamese metal 
currency and China] in Guo Tingyi 郭廷以, ed. zhong yue wen hua lun ji, 中越文化论集 [Studies on 
Vietnam and China] (Zhong hua wen hua chu ben she wei yuan hui中华文委会, 1956), p. 291. 
76 Ni Mo, Gu jin qian lue, Vol. 17, pp. 1609–1634. 
 195 
Nonetheless, by the early eighteenth century, this shortage was exacerbated, along with 
the implementation of the Japanese policy of sakoku that limited the export of precious 
metals. In addition, the war with the Khmer by Nguyễn Phúc Khoát, the growth of the 
population and the Ming prohibition on copper exports triggered the casting of zinc 
coins in Cochin China, thus causing inflation in southern Vietnam.77 The Nguyễn cast a 
zinc coin in southern Vietnam in 1746. Soon afterwards, the Thiên Minh Thông Bảo (天
明通宝) was circulated.78
Tây Sơn also released metal currency such as Quang Trung Thông Bảo (光中通宝), 
and Quang Trung Đại Bảo (光中大宝), and others in northern Vietnam to meet the 
demand for metal currency.
 
79
Cash became the basis of Nguyễn finances by the mid-nineteenth century, by virtue 
of the growth of a money economy that forced cash into the system of taxation in 
Vietnam. Furthermore, a severe shortage of copper cash, which Vietnamese hungered 
for, occurred during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. New mines, local mints, or 
imported copper from China and Japan, the issuance of paper currency, and even zinc 
 
                                                 
77 Li Tana, Nguỹên Cochinchina, pp. 94–96; John K. Whitmore, “Vietnam and the monetary flow of 
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coins did not entirely solve this problem for the Vietnamese court.80
The circulation of counterfeit coins in Vietnam can be attributed to several factors. 
Firstly, a diverse and complex currency system existed in the extensive 
Sino-Vietnamese borderlands. The co-existence of a variety of coins in the border 
regions provided more profit-making opportunities for counterfeiters on both sides of 
the border. Due to the flourishing Sino-Vietnamese commerce along the 
Sino-Vietnamese borderlands, Vietnamese and as well as Chinese metal coins were the 
dominant currencies. Furthermore, few western dollars circulated in the frontier on 
account of exchange and commerce with Europeans. During the Ming dynasty in China, 
a large number of counterfeit Chinese coins, which were not produced by the Ming 
administration in China but were counterfeited by Vietnamese, circulated along the 
 The Vietnamese 
administration restricted the export of valuable metals for coins during the Nguyễn 
dynasty. The Huế court issued bans on copper, gold, silver and tin, which were the 
crucial metals for producing metal currency and were directly related with the national 
economy. Thus, the Vietnamese court controlled the major coinage casting programmes, 
and imposed various bans on precious metals in order to prevent them from flowing out 
of the country. However, a prohibition on copper and other valuable metals did not 
curtail the growth of a counterfeit currency in Nguyễn. A large number of counterfeit 
coins circulated in Vietnam during the Nguyễn dynasty, even though coinage was 
supervised and manned by the government of Nguyễn.  
                                                 
80 Victor Lieberman, “Local Integration and Eurasian Analogies: Structuring Southeast Asian History, 
c1350–c.1830” in Modern Asian Studies 27, No. 3, July (1993): 502, 504. 
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Sino-Vietnamese borderlands. More Chinese metal currency flowed to markets in 
Vietnam with the growth of Sino-Vietnamese commercial exchanges in northern 
Vietnam after the Jia Jing period of Ming. Shortly after the end of the Ming dynasty and 
from thence onward, more and more Chinese metal coins were taken to Vietnam by 
itinerant Chinese merchants and were circulated during the Sino-Vietnamese 
commercial expansion in the Qing dynasty. The main kind of Chinese metal currency 
that circulated in northern Vietnam during the 1740s was ‘circulating currency in Kang 
Xi, Qian Long and Yong Zheng reign’ (Kang Xi tong bao, Qian Long tong bao and 
Yong Zheng tong bao; 康熙通宝,雍正通宝,乾隆通宝).81 Prior to 1830, the Nguyễn 
court collected circulating metal coins during the Dao Guang reign of the Qing from 
local people as taxes in Cao Bằng. However, most Chinese metal coins collected by the 
Nguyễn administration in Cao Bằng were counterfeited by the Chinese. 82 
Archaeological evidence excavated in the Sino-Vietnamese borderlands indicate that 
Chinese metal coins circulated after the Jia Qing period, along with other counterfeit 
Vietnamese metal currency.83 Additionally, by the Minh Mạng period, Huế was issuing 
paper currency (Giao Tử) in northern Vietnam due to commercial expansion and a 
shortage of valuable metals.84
                                                 
81 Tang Guoyan 汤国彦, Yue nan li shi huo bi 越南历史货币 [The Vietnamese currency in history] 
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84 Paper currency issued by Minh Mạng in Cao Bằng was similar to the circulating valuables payment 
certification. Giao Tử was not paper currency in the modern sense. As recorded in Nguyễn dynasty 
chronicles, itinerant merchants and officials who did not like to carry too many coins could submit 
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Secondly, the issue of diverse coins in Vietnam and the circulation of currency as 
opposed to the various governments that had co-existed during the Tây Sơn wars, 
created more opportunities for fabricating coins to make profit. The policy on metal 
currency in Huế had certain traits. The issue of diverse coins, the co-existence of new 
and old coins, and the inferior quality of existing coins, particularly lead or zinc coins, 
always encouraged the growth of counterfeit currency.   
Various metal coins circulated in Huế Vietnam were not of superior quality. There is 
direct evidence on the proportion of metals of all sorts in coins to prove this point. The 
first is the copper coin. Virtually all copper coins were melted with certain proportions 
of copper, white lead (zinc), and tin. In 1814, Huế cast Gia Long Thông Bảo using the 
coinage casting methods of the Qing, which had a proportion of 50 per cent copper, 
41.5 per cent white lead (zinc), 6.5 per cent black lead, and two per cent tin. Therefore, 
copper coins in Nguyễn were a type of alloy since the Gia Long era.85
In 1820, Emperor Minh Mạng changed the proportion for casting copper coins. The 
new proportion was 49 per cent copper, 45 per cent white lead (zinc), and six per cent 
black lead. In fact, the new copper coins decreased the amount of copper and removed 
tin from copper coins. The innovation of coins in the Minh Mạng period was the casting 
of bigger copper coins called Mĩ Hi ệu Đại Đồng Tiền. These larger coins served not as 
  
                                                                                                                                               
amounts of money above five strings to the local government in exchange for certification on which was 
recorded their name, address, amount of money, and so on. Itinerant merchants or officials could 
exchange money by this certification in places endorsed by the central government once they arrived at 
their destination. ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 174, pp. 8–9. 
85 ĐNTL, Chính Biên I, Vol. 48, p. 7. 
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currency but as a reward to relatives of royalty or civil ministers.86 Aside from larger 
copper coins, gold or silver ingots and coins of all kinds were produced, such as refined 
silver (Tinh Ngân, 精银), official silver ingots (Quan Ngân, 官银), and silver made in 
the Imperial Household Department, and solely for use by royalty (Nội Thảng Ngân, 内
帑银).87 With regards to counterfeit silver ingots, certain officials in the Huế court 
engaged in the forgery of silver ingots, such as Nguyễn Văn Tường (阮文祥) and 
Nguyễn Văn Khê (阮文溪) in 1832.88 In addition, counterfeiters usually melted copper 
or lead into silver coins.89  In terms of bullion in the Nguyễn dynasty, few documents 
record detailed information on bullion or gold ingots in Vietnam. These gold and silver 
coins served as a reward as well as metal coinage, and were forced to circulate with a 
fixed price by Emperor Minh Mạng.90 Besides coins issued by the government, rebels 
also produced some types of copper coins such as Trị Nguyên Thông Bảo (治元通宝), 
and Trị Nguyên Thánh Bảo (治元圣宝) made by Lê Văn Khôi in southern Vietnam, and 
Nguyên Long Thông Bảo (元隆通宝) made by Nông Văn Vân in northern Vietnam.91
Compared with copper coins, the Nguyễn administration regarded white lead or zinc 
coins as better metal coins than copper ones in Vietnam. Emperor Minh Mạng proposed 
that the easily breakable white lead coins should be used for trade, because merchants 
would not hoard such coins or export them to foreign countries. Lead coins also 
 
                                                 
86 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 186, p. 19. 
87 Tang Guoyan, Yuen an li shi huo bi, pp. 55-57; ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 16, p. 20. 
88 ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 81, p. 3. 
89 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 181, pp. 9–10.  
90 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol 81, p. 3. 
91 Tang Guoyan, Yuen an li shi huo bi, p. 50. 
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benefited people in Vietnam.92
The Nguyễn approved the circulation of zinc coins in Vietnam, and lead was a 
fundamental element for zinc coins. Thus, the administration issued bans on lead export 
and hoarding. Around 1830, counterfeit metal coins that circulated in 
 However, the white lead coins that the Vietnamese 
rulers preferred to use could easily be counterfeited. One hundred jin of white lead 
worth 22 strings was cast into more than 40 strings of white lead coins. In this way, coin 
forgery flourished during the Nguyễn dynasty, especially in white lead coins due to the 
attractive profits, inferior quality, and lower cost. 
Lạng Sơn 
generated rocketing prices and drove out real coins from the market. This event alerted 
the emperor to re-impose a ban on illicit minting in 1830. Those who engaged in 
forgery were to be executed as soon as they had been arrested, and the counterfeit coins 
would be confiscated. Concurrently, illicit hoards of metal coins had to be handed over 
after a certain time.93 Tuyên Quang and Thái Nguyên in northern Vietnam were rich in 
lead, and as such, the Emperor Minh Mạng decreed that officials should investigate 
northern Vietnam thoroughly to impede the smuggling of lead.94 Soon afterwards, a 
ban on illicit minting was imposed on account of the boom in illicit coinage casting in 
the Sino-Vietnamese borderlands. Zinc coins were not only forged in Vietnam but also 
in China, and the flow of counterfeit currency caused the Nguyễn court to curb lead 
export and illicit hoarding in 1829.95
                                                 
92 ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 84, pp. 12–13. 
93 ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 61, pp. 3-4. 
94 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 61, p. 4. 
  
95 Minh Mệnh Ngữ Trị Văn. A57/7, Vol. 17. 
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Huế did not change its method of casting copper or white lead coins during the 
Thiệu Trị period, and continued to cast copper coins such as Thiệu Trị Thông Bảo (绍
治通宝) and other white lead coins.96 Following the example of Emperor Minh Mạng, 
Emperor Thiệu Trị produced copper coins and white lead coins. In addition, Thiệu Trị 
cast Mĩ Hiệu Đại Đồng Tiền (美号大铜钱) as awards. Furthermore, he issued 41 kinds 
of gold and silver coins.97
   Besides coins issued by the Huế government, old metal coins from former 
dynasties as well as ancient coins were circulating in Vietnam. Population size and the 
number of transactions were presumably factors that the Vietnamese government took 
into account when endeavouring to maintain a sufficient supply of coins. Vietnam kept 
old coins in circulation, and the circulation of diverse coins provided greater 
opportunities for counterfeit currency in Nguyễn Vietnam.
 Unlike the method used for melting copper coins in the Minh 
Mạng period, Emperor Tự Đức increased the amount of copper in copper coins up to 60 
per cent, decreased the amount of white lead to 40 per cent, and removed tin and black 
lead. 
98
                                                 
96 ĐNTL, Chính Biên III, Vol. 5, p. 1. 
97 Ibid. Chính Biên III, Vol. 13, p. 8; Vol. 55, p. 24. 
98 John K. Whitmore, “Vietnam and the monetary flow of eastern Asia” in Precious Metals in the Later 
Medieval and Early Modern Worlds, p. 369. 
 Copper coins of all kinds, 
as well as lead coins issued by the Nguyễn, had been circulating in Vietnam since the 
Gia Long period, but copper coins remained predominant in northern Vietnam. . By the 
first year of Emperor Minh Mạng’s rule, lead coins were widely employed in Vietnam. 
Nevertheless, counterfeit white lead coins put the Huế court on alert, as most of the 
 202 
white lead mines were situated in northern Vietnam.99 In 1817, the Huế court declared 
that existing coins, whether from former dynasties or ancient coins, could still circulate 
in Vietnam in the following five years. After five years, the government would take 
back all non-Nguyễn-issued metal coins.100 However, many coins issued by the Tây 
Sơn administration circulated in Vietnam during the Minh Mạng period even though the 
Huế court had imposed a ban on former coins.101
A third reason for the long-term practice of counterfeiting was the shortage of 
precious metals such as copper, gold, and silver that remained throughout Vietnamese 
history until it became a French colony. The coinage supply was not sufficient to meet 
the demand for economic and social development in Vietnamese history in almost every 
period.
  
102 By the nineteenth century, silver began to flow out of China, owing to the 
introduction of opium by the British in order to shift the trade balance with China. 
Indisputably, Vietnam was deeply implicated in the trade between China and Southeast 
Asia and even the world. Vietnamese gold and silver were exchanged for other goods 
from Southeast Asia, such as spices, along the international trade route. Occasionally a 
lack of copper in Vietnam meant that gold had to go to China in exchange for copper 
cash.103
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100 Châu Bản..Library of Australia national university.  Reel 3. 
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 Silver flowed out of Vietnam with the shift in global trade trends at the turn of 
 203 
the eighteenth century. 104  Interestingly, Yunnan, where opium was planted and 
transferred with the growth of commercial exchanges along the Sino-Southeast Asian 
frontiers, absorbed more and more silver, including silver from Vietnam, by the 
nineteenth century.105 Besides the outflow of silver in Vietnam that accompanied 
commercial exchanges along the southwest route of Sino-Southeast Asia, in the middle 
of the eighteenth century, many Chinese miners from the Tống Tinh mine in northern 
Vienam freighted silver by making the silver into bangles and wearing them back to 
China. A large amount of silver and gold flowed into China with the Chinese miners in 
northern Vietnam.106 These Chinese miners surreptitiously transported large numbers 
of valuable metals. ‘Of both metals a large quantity was smuggled into the neighboring 
provinces of China.’107
Apart from the smuggling of metals by miners, merchants carried silver from 
Vietnam to China with their frequent commercial exchanges in Vietnam. Silver and 
gold could be used directly without casting them into coins for use as metal currency. 
Controlling the outflow of silver and gold was crucial for Nguyễn Vietnam to increase 
its gold and silver reserves and stabilise the economy. Vietnam imposed consecutive 
  
                                                 
104 John K. Whitmore, “Vietnam and the monetary flow of eastern Asia” in Precious Metals in the Later 
Medieval and Early Modern Worlds, p. 375. 
105 Chiranan Prasertkul, Yunnan Trade in the nineteenth Century: Southwest China’s Cross-boundaries 
Functional System (Bangkok: Institute of Asian Studies, Chualalongkorn University, 1989), pp. 60–61. 
106 Zhao Yi赵翼. Yan pu za ji檐暴杂记 [Miscellaneous notes]. Vol 4. tai bei xin xing shu ju ying yin台
北新兴书局影印. 1983, p. 73. 
107 “Crawfurd Report on the State of the Annamese Empire” in  Alistair Lamb, The mandarin road to 
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bans on the hoarding and export of silver and gold  during the Nguyễn dynasty. 
Vietnamese and officials were not allowed to export gold and silver, or to illegally 
hoard them. Foreign merchants could deal in gold and silver as currency only in 
Vietnam. They would be flogged with a stick 100 times if they clandestinely took gold 
and silver out.108 However, the Vietnamese government failed to curb the illegal export 
of gold and silver, as many merchants freighted out local silver (Thổ Ngân, 土银) 
around 1836. Compared with copper, silver served directly as a currency for 
commercial exchanges in the early part of the Nguyễn dynasty. Thổ Ngân was in effect 
approved as the main currency for the payment of tax or commercial exchanges by the 
Huế court during the Nguyễn dynasty.109 The Thổ Ngân circulated in Vietnam was not 
cast by the government but by local people in China. These Chinese regularly faked 
these Thổ Ngân on which had Vietnamese reign titles. Thổ Ngân was introduced to 
northern Vietnam by itinerant merchants from China in the Sino-Vietnamese 
borderlands. Furthermore, Thổ Ngân circulated for a long time in Vietnam during the 
Nguyễn dynasty. Thổ Ngân was popular as a currency until the Thiệu Trị period. The 
Nguyễn court continued to levy tax by Thổ Ngân in Cao Bằng in 1847.110 Furthermore, 
Thổ Ngân was usually produced by melting all kinds of silver ingots together.111
                                                 
108 Lục Bộ Điều Lệ. A62. 
109 KĐĐNHĐSL, Vol. 44. 
110 ĐNTL, Chính Biên III, Vol. 70, p. 20. 
111 Tang Guoyan, Yue nan li shi huo bi, 1993, p. 45. 
 
Because silver was portable for trading, local silver exports created rocketing silver 
prices and a shortage of cash. The market price of silver in the Gia Long period was 
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probably lower than the officially fixed price. Nevertheless, the market price of silver 
rocketed dramatically. Similarly, the price of silver and gold also rose quickly in the 
Minh Mạng period.112 In 1836, the government had to issue Giao Tử in Cao Bằng in 
order to stem the outflow of gold and silver.113 However, the measures taken by the 
Nguyễn court were not effective and did not do much to quell the situation. In the 1830s, 
the Huế court imposed consecutive bans on silver and gold owing to the fact that the 
quantities of silver and gold had been greatly reduced in recent times, and as such 
people neither hoarded silver nor gold, nor used them to pay foreign traders.114
Huế permitted foreign merchants to import copper or lead to Vietnam with less or 
even no tax imposed. In 1811, Emperor Gia Long followed instructions from his 
ministers that merchants be exempted from the import tax if they harboured copper or 
lead and sold them to the Nguyễn court. However, deals involving these metals among 
  
Copper and lead had been the main elements for casting metal coins since the early 
part of the Nguyễn dynasty. Copper and lead were generally restricted from export and 
hoarding in Vietnam. However, the restriction did not solve the problem of the shortage 
of precious metals in Vietnam. In one respect, the central government had allocated the 
quota of copper and lead in local administrations since the Gia Long period. In other 
respects, the Nguyễn court attempted to import them in order to strengthen the supply to 
meet the demand for copper and lead.  
                                                 
112 Woodside, Chinese and Vietnamese model, p. 277. 
113 ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 174, pp. 8–9. 
114 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 193, pp. 12–13. 
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private merchants were still officially declared to be illicit trade.115 In 1812, Emperor 
Gia Long issued a ban on the hoarding of copper and lead.116 By the Minh Mạng period, 
the bans on copper and lead were still not revoked. In 1822, Huế re-declared restrictions 
on copper and lead.117 Concurrently, deals on copper and lead were still controlled by 
the Nguyễn rulers. In 1838, the Nguyễn government bought whole pieces of copper 
imported by Chinese merchants. Huế paid them 50 string of copper per 100 jin, and 
stressed that trading without the government’s approval was illicit.118 In addition, as 
early as the 1820s, the Nguyễn authorities had to import a large amount of copper from 
Yunnan to supplement the urgent dearth of copper cash.119
The Huế imported quantities of white lead from foreign merchants, since white lead 
was a crucial element in the casting of zinc coins, which were the most common metal 
coins in Nguyễn.  In general, they waived the tax on lead deals with foreign merchants. 
In 1804, the emperor’s edicts stated that ships from Macao would be exempted from tax 
if they brought white lead ranging from 100,000 to 300,000 jin, and sold them to the 
Nguyễn government at a moderate price. However, the ships not only returned with 
white lead, but also paid tax if the amount of white lead was less than 100,000 jin.
 
120
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Furthermore, the Vietnamese administration tightened its grip on the control of lead 
deals. Merchants who wished to sell white lead to the government had to procure 
certification from the Huế court that recorded the date of the transaction and the amount 
of lead. Those who transported lead without certification were illicit traders. In addition, 
the amount of lead that merchants carried had to tally with the information recorded on 
the certification. Otherwise, either the merchant or the certification could be declared 
illegal, and the merchant would be punished for smuggling lead.121
Finally, the Nguyễn administration allowed private merchants to charter coinage and 
mint to produce coins under the supervision of the government. Before the middle of the 
eighteenth century, Vietnam had to endorse private merchants to cast coins and even 
upheld forging to keep the economy functioning and keep up with monetary demand.
  
122
The Nguyễn administration firmly controlled coinage cast programmes. In 1803, the 
Nguyễn administration opened the coinage mint Bảo Hóa Cục in Bắc Thành (Hà Nội). 
It is interesting that Bảo Hoa Cục was in charge of taxing according to the amount of 
cast coins submitted by coiners, and that was sanctioned by the Vietnamese government. 
The government purchased copper themselves. The regular sale and purchase of lead for 
casting could result in rapid price inflation. Gia Long issued a ban on lead, and 
governmental coinage casts required a large amount of lead for casting. Consequently, 
the government managed and supervised coinage casting programmes chartered by 
 
                                                 
121 Minh Mệnh Công Văn明命公文[The official documents in Minh Mệnh period] Viện Hán Nôm 
A.2528, p. 29. 
122 John K. Whitmore, “Vietnam and the monetary flow of eastern Asia” in Precious Metals in the Later 
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private merchants in the Gia Long period. By the Minh Mạng period, Huế stopped the 
casting of coinage by private merchants. Hence, coinage casting was safely controlled 
by the Nguyễn government by the Minh Mạng period. Furthermore, the Minh Mạng 
placed coinage casting within the armoury, which made coin samples. Huế issued 
examining regulations on coinage casting. During the Minh Mạng period, the quality of 
copper coins was better than that of the Gia Long period by virtue of firm supervision 
by the government and a change in the method for casting coins. Accordingly, there was 
less counterfeit currency in Vietnam in the Minh Mạng period than before. However, 
during the Thiệu Trị period, illegal minting began to flourish, even though the 
government issued bans on it in 1845 and 1846. Moreover, Huế changed the shape and 
metal proportion of silver ingot, in order to foil counterfeiters. However, the 
government did not completely curb clandestine minting. In 1846, Lê Văn Tiễn (黎文践) 
in Hà Tiên (河仙) melted copper to forge official silver ingots.123
                                                 
123 ĐNTL, Chính Biên III, Vol. 60, p. 20. 
 In the second year of 
Tự Đức’s reign, civil ministers reported to Tự Đức that the Huế court should put 
counterfeit currency on the agenda. The Nguyễn court approved the opening of more 
local mints by merchants under governmental management. The government provided 
metals for the coinage and the merchants paid taxes. In addition to this, Huế declared 
that people could procure metals such as copper or lead and cast coins themselves as 
long as they reported it to the local government and were registered. Hence, the Huế 
government loosened its grip on official coinage and by the Tự Đức period, endorsed 
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private merchants, including Chinese merchants, to cast coins. In 1858, Guan Hengji 
(关衡记) and Li Daji (黎达记) were licensed to open lead mines in Thái Nguyên in 
northern Vietnam, and permitted to cast white lead coins.124
The rice supply was interconnected with agricultural harvests, which had been hit by 
several disasters. The two crucial rice supply bases were the Red River Delta and the 
Mekong River Delta. A poor harvest concurring with disasters or bad weather forced the 
Huế court to transfer rice from the south to the capital or northern Vietnam, or vice 
versa, by way of the grain transport system, in order to meet the demand for rice. 
 However, some merchants 
continued to cast counterfeit currency while others minted coins with the permission of 
the government. 
2.4. Rice  
Apart from opium, precious metals and humans, rice was a significant contraband item 
at the time, even though there was also indisputable evidence of staple rice transactions, 
especially in southern Vietnam, as mentioned in Chapter 2. Compared with precious 
metals, rice was a significant item in the national economy and a source of livelihood 
for people during the Nguyễn dynasty. Large scale smuggling of rice could result in 
local shortages of rice, which could create rice riots, which in turn endangered the royal 
throne and created social unrest. Thus, Huế not only tightly controlled rice deals, but 
also issued a ban on the export of rice. Even so, the restrictions on rice in different 
periods of the Nguyễn dynasty were distinctive. 
                                                 
124 Ibid. Chính Biên IV, Vol. 19, p. 16. 
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Furthermore, the shortage of rice in Vietnam caused the court to encourage rice imports 
and impose restrictions on rice exports. In turn, a good harvest offered a surplus rice 
supply to balance the demands of the whole country. At the same time, the Nguyễn 
rulers sanctioned the use of rice in exchange for other vital articles from foreign traders, 
such as military equipment. Nonetheless, merchants frequently smuggled rice for huge 
profits when disasters and poor harvests caused a shortage of rice and skyrocketing 
prices. Veritable Nguyễn records states that good harvests only occurred in 1824, 1830 
(Bắc Thành), 1835, 1838 (Bắc Ninh), 1840 (Bắc Thành), 1841, 1844, and 1849.125 
However, high rice prices occurred frequently during these years due to bad weather or 
a disaster and a poor harvest, in particular, in 1833, 1835, and 1836.126
Rice from Vietnam was usually exported or transferred to two places. One was 
China, in particular southern China, and the other was regions in Southeast Asia. In 
Emperor Minh Mạng’s mind, rice was more important than gold or other valuables. 
However, the revenue during his reign had greatly increased, but the quantity of rice 
was less than that of the Gia Long period.
  
127 The rice produced in the Mekong Delta, 
particularly in Gia Định Thành, was consistently better than that in northern Vietnam. 
On some occasions, rice from Gia Định Thành supplemented the needs of regions lying 
north of Bình Định.128
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 Therefore, the court had to control the rice trade in southern 
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Vietnam in order to meet the country’s needs. However, the smuggling of rice in 
southern Vietnam was not effectively quelled since smuggling rice to China and 
Southeast Asian countries afforded illegal traders great profits.  
Generally, rice imports rather than exports were promoted during the Nguyễn 
dynasty. However, whether rice was exported or imported was determined by the 
demand of the court and the country as a whole. Prior to the establishment of Nguyễn 
Vietnam, in 1789, in the south, Nguyễn Phúc Ánh exchanged rice for military 
equipment supplied by Chinese vessels, in order to succeed ultimately in defeating the 
Tây Sơn brothers. Chinese junks were allowed to export 300,000 jin of rice to China if 
they freighted 100,000 jin of steel, iron, black lead and sulphur to Vietnam; or 220,000 
jin of rice for 60,000 jin of steel, iron, black lead and sulphur; or 150,000 jin of rice for 
40,000 jin of steel, iron, black lead and sulphur. Three hundred jin of rice was 
permissible for export if they carried less than 40,000 jin of steel, iron, black lead and 
sulphur, and the tax on junks was not waived.129
Apart from exchanging rice for military equipment, the Nguyễn had formulated 
prohibitions on rice exports since the Gia Long period. People were banned from selling 
rice to foreign merchants. The buyers or sellers would be flogged 100 times with a stick 
and banished.
   
130
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 Rice smuggling reached its height in the Minh Mạng period, even 
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though a restriction on rice was again issued in 1824.131
The great demand for Vietnamese rice in neighbouring countries due to the 
population growth, especially in southern China, stimulated the outflow of Vietnamese 
rice and created a boom in rice smuggling during the Nguyễn dynasty. The Huế court 
issued a series of policies to promote the import of rice. In 1825, the exemption of tax 
chiefly depended on the amount of rice on board the foreign ships harboured in Vietnam, 
especially junks from Siam and Hạ Châu.
 Many factors, such as severe 
smuggling, a shortage of rice caused by famine or plague or a poor harvest were the 
cause of these restrictions on export, as well as the encouragement of the import of rice 
into Vietnam.  
132 The more rice carried by a foreign ship, 
the greater the tax exemption.133 Domestic rice trading was driven by the Vietnamese 
authorities in order to meet the needs of the country. Free duty was generally offered to 
urge traders to deal rice in domestic regions. Taxes were waived if junks anchored with 
a cargo of only rice.134 However, junks could not obtain a full waiver of duty once they 
moored with rice as well as other goods.135 In 1865, a Chinese merchant named Wan 
Shun (万顺) carried Siamese rice and was permitted to trade in Bình Thuận with a tax 
waiver.136
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The illicit rice trade was not rigorously impeded by the Huế court, even though Huế 
issued consecutive restrictions on rice during the Nguyễn dynasty. Often, merchants 
succeeded in practicing a ‘surreptitious rice trade’ by some means. On one hand, 
Chinese junks were specially altered in design to export rice to China in order to escape 
tax or tax fraud once they returned to Vietnam.137 On the other hand, some Chinese 
merchants smuggled rice under the pretext of shipbuilding or the trading of other goods. 
Rice smuggling occurred frequently, and some Vietnamese merchants disguised 
themselves as Chinese merchants so as to smuggle rice. It was the increasing number of 
such activities that prompted the Vietnamese administration to impose a restriction on 
local merchant ships disguised as Chinese junks.138
In 1828, Huế prohibited Vietnamese junks from going to Hạ Châu for rice deals, 
owing to an excess of vessels exporting rice to Hạ Châu.
  
139 Two main places supplied 
Hạ Châu and other regions in Southeast Asia with rice: one was Siam, and the other was 
Gia Định Thành in Vietnam. In 1832, more and more merchants laden with rice from 
Vietnam travelled to Southeast Asian ports due to a poor harvest and rice yield in Siam 
caused by flooding in the previous year. Consequently a great amount of Vietnamese 
rice was shipped to Hạ Châu. Furthermore, an official named Mạc Hầu Hy conducted 
illicit rice deals in Southeast Asia under the pretext of seeking out Siamese pirates.140
                                                 
137 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 88, p. 8. 
138 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 177, pp. 27–28; Vol. 78, p. 8. 
139 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 52, p. 27. 
140 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 79, p. 27. 
 
In 1836, Huế assigned many officials to Hạ Châu on official business, and these 
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officials reported that they had found many junks and merchants from Vietnam trading 
rice with local people in Hạ Châu and buying opium in return. This report caused the 
Nguyễn government to reinstate a prohibition, so that local Vietnamese were not 
allowed to sell rice to Chinese merchants or foreign traders.141 Many Đại Dịch Thuyền 
in Vĩnh Long in southern Vietnam sailed out to deal in rice, but few of these deals 
occurred in domestic rice markets. It is possible that some of them went to China to sell 
rice in distant waters to dealers such as Cantonese or Hainanese merchants, as well as to 
Hạ Châu.142
By virtue of their geographical proximity to China, especially at 
  
Hải Dương and 
Quảng Yên where many isolated islands and inlets were situated, illicit rice transactions 
occurred frequently in these areas. Overpopulation in China since the eighteenth century 
spurred the import of rice in Qing China, and great profit for clandestine rice deals 
engendered the undercover flow of Vietnamese rice to southern China.    
In 1824, people suffered from a great famine in Qinzhou and Lianzhou in China, 
and the price of rice rose dramatically, amounting to four and even five taels per dan.143 
Many Vietnamese illegally traded rice to Qinzhou and Lianzhou. Concerned by the 
outflow of rice, Emperor Minh Mạng ordered officials to take strict measures against 
the smuggling of rice to China. 144
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 Vietnamese as well as Chinese merchants 
clandestinely transferred rice to China, even though the Nguyễn court restricted the 
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Chinese in Vietnam from trade.145
Hải Dương
 In 1836, Nguyễn Công Trứ, the General Governor in 
 and Quảng Yên, instructed the Huế court to license merchant certifications 
strictly because there were some Vietnamese who built junks in Hải Dương and Quảng 
Yên for the ‘stealthy transfer’ of rice to Chinese merchants. 146  Accordingly, 
Vietnamese authorities implemented a system so that each merchant obtained a certain 
quota for rice under the supervision and assignment of the Nguyễn court in Vân Đồn 
and Vạn Ninh.147
By the Thiệu Trị period, the illicit outflow of rice in two districts was severe. Some 
small local vessels practised rice smuggling, plying in Quảng Yên and its vicinity. 
Around 1845, many Chinese ships for catching pirates joined in the ‘clandestine rice 
deals’ with local Vietnamese. Considering that underground rice transactions were 
egregious, Huế had to re-impose a ban on rice in 1845.
  
148 The Vietnamese authorities 
took firm steps to subjugate illicit rice dealing or illegal exports to China or Hạ Châu by 
the Tự Đức period.149 Nonetheless, Vietnamese restrictions on rice did not completely 
succeed in curtailing the underground rice trade. In 1858, a large number of Chinese 
ships anchored outside Phan Thiết Waters (潘切汛) in Bình Thuận (平顺), and were 
deeply implicated in the illicit rice trade with Vietnamese.150
                                                 
145Minh Mệnh Tấu Nghị. Vhv. 96/6, pp. 10–28. 
146 ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 167, p. 20. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid. Chính Biên III, Vol. 53, p. 12. 
149 Ibid. Chính Biên IV, Vol. 5, p. 13. 
150 Ibid. Chính Biên IV, Vol. 20, p. 43. 
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In summary, the illegal rice trade was severe during the Nguyễn dynasty, even 
though Huế declared rice a forbidden item, and attempted to curtail stealthy rice 
transactions and keep rice transactions firmly in royal hands. 
The export of rice was theoretically illegal during the Nguyễn dynasty. However, 
the government regularly sanctioned rice export in exchange for other important goods 
such as copper and military resources. The merchants illegally traded rice for copper or 
military resources before selling them to the government. ‘Illegal rice export’ in the Huế 
Court was a necessary and important supplement for its political economy.151  A dearth 
of copper caused Nguyễn to use Chinese merchants to freight rice for exchange.152 In 
1814, one vessel loaded with saltpetre from Macao sold its cargo in Vietnam at the price 
of 100 jin for 10 Portuguese dollars. As a reward, this junk was granted freedom from 
duty and was allowed to take rice and other forbidden items on the return voyage. In the 
meantime, other cargoes were approved for sale in Vietnam.153 However, the purchase 
of rice from private merchants without Nguyễn approval was still not allowed.154 Apart 
from the exemption from duty, Chinese ships were allowed to carry rice to China.155
                                                 
151 Li Tana, “The eighteenth-century Mekong Delta and its world of water frontier” in Anthony Reid and 
Nhung Tuyet Tran, ed., Viet Nam Borderless Histories (Madison : University of Wisconsin Press , 2006), 
p. 159. 
152 On this point, please refer to the last section on 'copper and other precious metals'. 
153 KĐĐNHĐSL,  A54, Vol. 48, p. 35. 
154 Ibid., p. 36. 
155 ĐNTL, Chính Biên I, Vol. 4, p. 12. 
 
Generally, every person on the ship was allotted one fang of rice when they sailed back. 
However, in this instance, every person was authorised to freight back 100 jin of rice. 
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Apparently, Huế took advantage of Chinese merchants to supplement their military 
provisions. During the Qing period, the Nguyễn administration swapped military 
materials for rice in view of China's rising demand due to the population boom from the 
late eighteenth century, even though as a forbidden item, rice was prohibited for export. 
Apart from Chinese merchants, itinerant merchants from other regions in Southeast 
Asia were also implicated in the exchange of military materials for Vietnamese rice, and 
other beneficial goods. Siamese merchants could purchase forbidden items such as silk 
cloth and textiles and other local goods in Vietnam as long as they sold saltpetre to the 
Nguyễn government.156
Silk and china were vital goods in Oriental-Occidental commercial exchanges. China as 
well as silk and tea were imported by Occidental regions from the Orient. Apart from 
China as the predominant silk exporting country in Asia, Vietnam was another 
important place for the export of silk in exchange for other goods such as spices and 
copper. Most cloth such as crepe, satins, and silks for use in southern Vietnam were not 
manufactured locally, but came from Tongkin or China.
 
 
2.5. Silk and fabric 
157
                                                 
156 Ibid. Chính Biên I, Vol. 9, p. 31. 
157 George Finlayson, The Mission to Siam and Huế, 1821–1822 (Singapore and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, in association with the Siam Society, 1988), p. 311. 
 Prior to the middle of the 
sixteenth century, the Japanese made contact with Vietnam, and exchanged Japanese 
and Spanish silver for Chinese and Vietnamese silk. The Chinese and Japanese began to 
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arrive in Vietnam with the growth of Hội An as a booming emporium during the 
seventeenth century, and exchanged their large quantities of mainly silver and copper 
cash for silk, sugar, and other items.158
Cloth and silk textiles were indigenous products from Vietnam and necessities for 
the local people. Trading them in domestic regions met the needs of local people, but 
exporting them to earn greater profits would create rocketing prices, which would mean 
that the poor would not be able to afford clothing, and so the disadvantages of export 
outweighed the advantages. Therefore, cloth and silk textiles, raw silk, boiled-off silk, 
and silkworm cocoons were forbidden items for export during the Nguyễn dynasty. 
However, it is noteworthy that restrictions on cloth and silk textiles export had a certain 
quota. The first ban on cloth and silk textiles was released in 1795. This ban stated that 
Chinese merchants were prevented from buying over five jin of raw silk and over five 
rolls of cloth and silk textiles.
 
In accordance with global commercial exchanges, the Vietnamese rulers had to 
restrict illicit silk exports to keep the trade of silk and other fabrics in Nguyễn hands. A 
ban on silk and all other kinds of cloth was a direct way for the Nguyễn to control the 
silk trade tightly. The Nguyễn court issued different bans on silk and other sorts of 
fabrics to meet domestic demand in Vietnam. 
159 In 1819, both raw and boiled-off silk were not allow 
for export by Chinese or Western ships.160
                                                 
158 John K. Whitmore, “Vietnam and the monetary flow” in Precious Metals, pp. 379–380. 
159 ĐNTL, Chính Biên I, Vol. 8, p. 5. 
160 Lục Bộ Điều Lệ.  A62. 
 In 1826, silk was again restricted from 
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export.161 However, silkworm cocoons were not forbidden goods. Because of this, an 
increasing number of foreign ships came to Vietnam to buy silkworm cocoons and this 
caused silk prices to rocket. Soon afterwards, the Huế court observed this phenomenon 
and made new regulations on silkworm cocoons. The regulations indicated that without 
the approval of the Nguyễn administration, the trading of silkworm cocoons by foreign 
merchants was illicit. Offenders were flogged 100 times with a stick, and the silkworm 
cocoons would be confiscated by the Vietnamese authorities. 162  However, many 
Chinese merchants, driven by the huge profits, still took silk to China clandestinely. In 
1837, Nguyễn officials were sent to China to purchase items there, including silk. 
Ironically, the silk that the Vietnamese officials brought back was made in Vietnam, and 
had been disguised with dyes by Chinese merchants, before being stealthily transported 
into China.163
Chinese traders played an important role in the illegal trade between Vietnam, China 
and even other regions in Asia, smuggling crucial goods such as opium, copper and rice 
into or out of Vietnam.In the course of their illicit activities, Chinese merchants became 
the vital bridge in trade contacts between Vietnam and China, and elsewhere in Asia.’ 
Moreover, Chinese smugglers became a driving force to the opium deals that Vietnam 
     
 
3. Conclusion 
                                                 
161 ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 40, p. 21. 
162 KĐĐNHĐSL, A54, Vol. 48, p. 40. 
163 ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 178, p. 15. 
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engulfed, the shift in trade trends, as well as the outflow and dearth of precious metals, 
especially Vietnam’s silver and copper. Concurrently, as far as the Nguyễn government 
was concerned, Chinese merchants also became a kind of tool to accomplish its political 
and economic goals of obtaining other important items such as military resources or 
copper. Be it the Chinese merchants or the contraband policy, both completed the profit 
monopolisation of the Nguyễn rulers. However, they could neither mitigate the impact 
that Euro-Asian commercial exchanges exerted on Vietnam nor facilitate the Huế court 














Chapter 6: Defence and Security 
 
1. Introduction 
The Sino-Vietnamese frontier comprised dynamic transnational indigenous inhabitants, 
migrants, and multi-cultural confederations. Additionally, the two central governments 
(China and Vietnam) that shared a common border continued to impose their own 
political, economic, and cultural values on the frontiers. Endogenous forces in the 
frontiers were swamped by exogenous influences from seemingly remote central 
authorities, which inevitably sparked off instability and rebellions. Decisions on how to 
control the northern frontier were influenced by its complexity and the sheer size of 
China, and became a critical factor in northward expansion for the Nguyễn 
administration. Therefore, frontier policy in Huế had to develop around complex local 
conditions as well as Qing China’s frontier policy and practices.  
The main purpose of this chapter is to address how commercial activity on land and 
at sea placed much emphasis on security strategies and defence. We also explore how 
the indigenous people in northern Vietnam were integrated into the frontier defence 
strategy under Huế authority, and how the Nguyễn court attempted to realise its 
conquest of territories under the Sino-Vietnamese tributary system, keeping in mind the 
Qing’s aggressive frontier practices. How the frontier policy of Qing China influenced 
the direction of the evolution of the Vietnamese frontier, and how socio-cultural factors 
in Vietnam affected government decisions in terms of frontier strategy and defence are 
 222 
also examined. Lastly, an alternative perspective is used to reassess the Nguyễn dynasty, 
and its military and economic security will also be discussed.  
 
2. Ideas about frontier defence  
In Qing China’s frontier defence, the overland frontiers, rather than ocean territories, 
were the predominant concerns of imperial security, even though a great debate on 
defence policy had occurred in the Qing court during the 1870s.1
In 1808, Emperor Gia Long introduced the concept of Tráng Phong Thủ (壮封守, 
consolidating defence). By the Minh Mạng period, he proposed to employ Tu Đức (修
德, cultivating Vietnam through Confucianism) and Thiết Hiểm (设险, setting up 
barriers) to fortify the sovereignty of the Nguyễn court. To fulfil this aim, he ordered the 
 Vietnam enjoyed the 
benefits of seafaring trade in its long maritime history. Thereafter, until the Nguyễn era, 
maritime trade became prominent with regards to national security. Between the 
defence of overland frontiers and ocean territories, Huế Vietnam had in fact been 
pragmatically responding to coastal conditions, even with the dominance of 
Confucianism in Vietnam, which stressed agrarian development as a primary priority. 
However, Vietnam did not neglect its overland frontier defence, since it had to handle 
cautiously the potential threat from northern China and affirm its dominance in the 
highlands.  
                                                 
1 Immanuel CY Hsu, “The Great Policy Debate in China, 1874: Maritime Defence Vs. Frontier Defence” 
in Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 25 (1964–1965): 212–228. 
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construction of enormous walls, set up emplacements for cannons, and armed coastal 
areas with guns and other military equipment.2
By the nineteenth century, China was more concerned about its other frontiers, such 
as the Sino-Russian frontier; the southern frontier was neither a pertinent issue nor a 
threat. Therefore, compared to other eras, the threat from China was reduced for 
Nguyễn Vietnam. Thus, the key focus of security issues shifted from military to 
economic issues. By the Nguyễn era, Vietnam’s security regime targeted mainly 
Westerners, merchants, bandits, and pirates. In Vietnam, the Tourane (Đà Nẵng) seaport 
was the only port specially established for Westerners; they were only allowed to enter 
Vietnam via Đà Nẵng until the Minh Mạng period.
 
3 However, the Nguyễn court’s 
policies regarding Westerners were not homogenous. The Huế government had various 
policies on different categories of Western vessels, while the Nguyễn court only 
allowed Western vessels to land in order to obtain provisions such as fresh water and 
firewood without going further inland. The number of Westerners who were allowed to 
land for trade could not exceed 10 at a time, and their weapons were tightly restricted. 
Western merchants could trade near the port after they registered the details of their 
cargo in the official records, but they were still prohibited from entering the local 
villages.4
                                                 
2 ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 53, p. 17. 
3 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 160, p. 2. 
4 KĐĐNHĐSL, Vol. 158, p. 17. 
 Vietnam continually regarded Westerners as a potential source of coastal 
disorder, whether they were merchants or simply shipwrecked crews. Apart from the 
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concerns about Westerners, the concerns of the Nguyễn rulers included retaining the 
predominance of Confucianism in Vietnam, as it had been since the Minh Mạng period, 
and suppressing unorthodox beliefs. Westerners introduced Catholicism, which 
conflicted with Confucianism. Christianity had been established in Vietnam for more 
than two centuries. Prior to the Nguyễn dynasty, Christianity had been abolished in 
Vietnam. Therefore, Western missionaries were sharply scrutinized by the Huế, as they 
were the primary mode of the dissemination of alternative theological views in Vietnam. 
Furthermore, the active persecution of Christianity was used as one of the reasons for 
French colonisation.  
From the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, this potential theological threat 
from Westerners was not eradicated from the worries of the Huế rulers, even though 
Minh Mạng decreed a prohibition on Catholicism. It is thus understandable that the 
Nguyễn court still kept a wary eye on Westerners even during the reign of Tự Đức.  
Smugglers and merchants involved in unauthorised transactions were a major 
security issue. Cheating, tax evasion, and smuggling carried out by merchants alarmed 
the court, as opium and other contraband could threaten national security and the rulers’ 
income. The key to frontier defence was to restrain people, as well as to control them in 
certain areas in order to manage them easily. The regulation of travelling merchants was 
the first agenda. It was previously mentioned that the Chinese in Vietnam were not 
allowed to engage in maritime trade. Thus, Chinese merchants had to make regular trips 
to Vietnam even if they were authorised traders, and were not allowed to linger in 
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Vietnam for a long period of time. Moreover, local Vietnamese were also banned from 
maritime trade, although in 1817, Emperor Gia Long abolished the ban on maritime 
trade in Hạ Châu.5 Furthermore, empty junks were not allowed to anchor in Vietnam. 
During the Gia Long period, the certifications of merchants had to be accurately 
distributed by officials. The government had to take precautions against unscrupulous 
merchants for the sake of frontier security.6
Bandits and pirates were the main parties that engendered disorder in the maritime and 
inland frontiers. From one perspective, bandits and pirates were a group who operated 
and obtained material wealth by force. From another viewpoint, violence, plundering, 
and other destructive activities occurred in tandem with illicit trade, which was usually 
the catalyst for disorder along the frontier territories, both overland and maritime. 
Therefore, Nguyễn frontier defence polices were targeted at preventing disorder caused 
by bandits and pirates. Establishing enormous ports and stations were essential for this, 
enabling the court to swiftly and extensively control and police entire regions. Vietnam 
established 143 sea ports and 141 inland stations throughout the country.
  Apart from issuing bans to restrict 
people’s mobility, the Nguyễn court also established military stations to guard the land 
and offshore ports to protect the coastal waters.   
7
                                                 
5 Ibid., p. 11. 
6 ĐNTL, Chính Biên I, Vol. 36, p. 2. 
7 Thông Quốc Duyên Hải Chư. A.79. 
 These ports 
and stations had emplacements and military equipment to facilitate effective attacks 
once they found suspicious ships and individuals. In addition, the government also 
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stationed troops at plenty of strategic overland passes and sea ports for instant 
deployment.  
 
3. Coastal Defence 
3.1. Garrisoning the frontiers 
During the Gia Long period, Vietnam started to garrison its maritime frontiers. In 1803, 
Gia Long requested that the officials in seaports keep a vigilant lookout for pirates and 
report relevant information in a timely manner. In 1806, he designated vessels from 
Nghệ An, Thanh Hóa, and Huế to garrison the waters around the Biện Sơn (汴山), Bạng 
(蚌) and Úc sea ports.8
Essential military activities, which comprised building fortresses and barracks, 
stationing troops at strategic areas, and arming fortresses with cannons, occurred during 
the Minh Mạng period. In 1827, a total of 11 new fortresses were built in the 






 and Quảng Yên were strategic places to patrol the oceans and curtail 
pirate activity, so the government consolidated defence forces in these locations. In 
1839, the Nguyễn court built several new fortresses in Hải Dương and Quảng Yên. By 
1834, Hải Dương was one of the provinces with the most fortresses. At Đồ Sơn (涂山) 
                                                 
8 KĐĐNHĐSL,Vol. 159, p. 28. 
9  ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 49, p. 7. 
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in Hải Dương, the government deployed numerous junks to patrol the area. Additionally, 
barracks and ready troops were also established there.10
Apart from 
  
Hải Dương and Quảng Yên, Hà Nội was equipped with 69 
emplacements, and there were a total of 484 emplacements in Bắc Kỳ.11
Hải Dương
 As for 
fortresses, in 1834, the number of fortresses in Bắc Kỳ amounted to 55. It had 14 
fortresses, some of which were located in sea ports and strategic spots such as Đồ Sơn 
and Trực Cát (直葛). Bắc Ninh was second only to , with 11 fortresses, 
while Sơn Tây had eight fortresses.12 Hải Dương Sơn Tây, Bắc Ninh, and  were the 
most important areas even though they were not coastal provinces. These provinces 
connected the inland river zones with the coastal zones and the sea in northern Vietnam. 
This huge interlinked water system made it easy for Vietnam to control and conduct 
surveillance from overland to sea.    
The government also prescribed the number of soldiers to be stationed in fortresses 
in certain districts. Hưng Hóa is a good example. After a discussion with the Board of 
War, Minh Mạng authorised the stationing of 50 soldiers at each major fortress, and not 
more than 20 soldiers at common fortresses.13
                                                 
10 Minh Mệnh Chính Yếu, A.57/10, Vol. 23. 
11 ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 125, p. 12. 
12 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 141, p. 19. 
13 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 190, p. 18. 
     
     
3.2. Patrols at sea  
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Northern Vietnam was dotted with various inlets, rocky reefs, estuaries, bays, lagoons, 
and coves, which were natural hideouts and bases for pirate and perfect for launching 
attacks on passing junks or government forces. Prompt and precise surveillance of the 
pirates was critical for the Nguyễn court to win the battle against piracy, and patrolling 
was the first step towards this goal.    
The government usually drew up detailed patrol schedules to maintain order at sea. 
Frequent patrols placed several remote coastal islands firmly under official surveillance. 
Warships were dispatched twice annually from March to July to patrol the sea north of 
Quảng Bình. The aim of patrolling was to maintain control of security in maritime 
territory, and to identify pirates and suspicious-looking Chinese vessels. 14  Thus, 
patrolling was directly related to the apprehension of pirates. The court also conducted 
intensive patrols and raids on pirates in particular areas such as Thanh Hóa, which 
pirates were known to frequent.15 Vietnam in the Minh Mạng period perceived the 
crucial role that the coastline played in national security. In the eighteenth year of Minh 
Mạng’s reign, more warships were allotted to arrest Javanese pirates in May, the time 
when Javanese pirates frequently plundered merchants in the waters of southern 
Vietnam.16
                                                 
14 KĐĐNHĐSL, Vol. 159, p. 3. 
15 Ibid. Vol. 59, p. 1. 
16 Ibid. Vol. 59, p. 11. 
 Furthermore, the government allocated more naval troops to patrol the 
bustling maritime trade routes. In 1839, Vietnam intensified patrols from the south of 
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Quảng Yên en route to the north of Bình Thuận on account of the route’s strategic 
importance.17
The exchange of information between the central and local governments regarding 
ocean territories was an effective way for the court to formulate operational defence 
plans. Timely information reports on maritime territories gave the central and local 
governments the latest and most accurate information available. Vietnam issued 
regulations on reporting procedures regarding coastal defence, thus ensuring that the 
government would be given precise and detailed information. In 1840, the government 
in Quảng Yên assigned warships to patrol the ocean near Tràng Sơn from January to 
July. These warships would then give detailed monthly reports to the local government. 
Besides this, the local government was also required to submit regular reports to the 
court about the local people and newly established villages. These reports even included 
the Chinese fishermen living there, taking into account the fact that Tràng Sơn was a 
strategically important coastal area in northern Vietnam. Officials were assigned to 
Tràng Sơn once or twice every month to scrutinise the situation.
   
18
The mutually dependent nature and role-playing versatility of pirates, fishermen, 
and merchants in coastal areas complicated the geopolitical perspectives of the imperial 
rulers. To indigenes on the coast such as fishermen, pirates, and smugglers dwelling 
along the Sino-Vietnamese frontiers, the geographical (but not the political) concept of 
boundaries did not exist. To other inhabitants such as inland inhabitants or governments, 
 
                                                 
17 Ibid. Vol. 159, p. 19. 
18 Ibid. Vol. 159, p. 20. 
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geographical juxtaposition became simply an advantage in collusion and frequent 
communications. From the perspective of the Nguyễn rulers, cutting off contact 
between the Chinese and Vietnamese in frontier areas was an effective way to check the 
growth of pirates, impede collaboration between bandits, pirates and even fishermen 
along the coast, and eventually, annihilate the pirates. Therefore, apart from patrols at 
sea and timely, accurate reports on the maritime world, Huế made a point of evicting 
Chinese fishermen who were operating illegally in Vietnamese maritime territories, and 
even requested China’s authorisation to pursue and capture pirates across the frontiers in 
order to curb criminal alliances between the Vietnamese and Chinese. 
In 1833, 60 Chinese fished illegally in Vietnamese waters in Quảng Yên. On the one 
hand, Nguyễn sent diplomatic documents to the Chinese authorities. On the other hand, 
Minh Mạng decided to increase the number of warships defending the coast. 19 
Nevertheless, in the following year, many Chinese fishermen entered the marine frontier 
in Quảng Yên, prompting Minh Mạng to use naval force to expel the Chinese fishing 
boats once again.20
The Nguyễn court remained watchful for fear of unrest in the frontier regions. In 
1832, China asked the Nguyễn authorities to authorise Chen Jifa, a Chinese merchant, 
to pursue and arrest pirates at will in Sino-Vietnamese waters since the Chinese 
merchant used his own money, weapons and other equipment. However, Minh Mạng 
 
                                                 
19 ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 112, p. 21; xuan zong shi lu宣宗实录. Vol. 226, pp. 25–30 in qing shi lu 
shi liao zhai chao, 1985, p. 301. 
20 KĐĐNHĐSL, Vol. 131, p. 7. 
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refused this request, on the pretext that Vietnam and China both had clearly demarcated 
political borders. Minh Mạng believed that Vietnam would end up having to deploy its 
own military forces to assist Qing in apprehending the pirates, instead of the Chinese 
merely crossing the Vietnamese frontiers at will.21 The Nguyễn court cooperated with 
the Qing government in the pursuit of pirates, but still kept close tabs on the situation. 
In 1843, Chinese warships berthing in Tràng Sơn requested entry to Vietnam in order to 
arrest pirates. Thiệu Trị refused this petition and instead increased the number of 
warships deployed in Thanh Hóa, Nam Định, and Quảng Yên to intercept pirates.22
Garrisons and patrols in the frontier regions were insufficient for Nguyễn Vietnam. In 
view of the fact that Huế did not abandon maritime activities, it appears that the 
expansion of power and conquests in the maritime world contained commercial benefits. 
Ensuring total control and remote governance on offshore islands emerged as a 
substantial issue for Hải Phòng. How was the government to defend the offshore islands 
for Vietnam? Assembling and controlling human resources on these offshore islands 
was crucial to this task. To the indigenes living in the Sino-Vietnamese maritime 
frontiers, the Chinese fishermen, merchants and even some government fleets were 




3.3 The offshore islands: the expansion and evolution of Hải Phòng (sea defence) 
                                                 
21 ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 83, p. 16. 
22 Ibid. Chính Biên III, Vol. 33, p. 26. 
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Piracy was rampant around various remote islands situated far from the coast where 
they could not be patrolled easily or thoroughly. To the government, Hải Dương and 
Quảng Yên were crucial locations in quelling unrest caused by bandits, pirates and 
smugglers. Furthermore, these two areas were located in strategic nodes along the busy 
commercial route that linked the South China Sea, central Vietnam, and Southeast Asia. 
There were two agendas behind the wish to control these two areas, including the 
remote islands. One was to secure Nguyễn Vietnam’s ability to ensure its future 
dominance and keep these border territories out of Chinese hands. The second motive 
was the court’s wish to control the commercial route, which would enable them to 
receive lucrative profits.  
Apart from patrolling and garrisoning the frontiers, the organisation and regulation 
of the populace in the borderlands were effective measures used by the Nguyễn court to 
fortify their frontiers, both on land and at sea.  
Pirates were generally the most difficult targets for the Vietnamese court to 
apprehend. Smuggling and plundering allowed them to thrive at sea, particularly during 
trade booms. This maritime menace was not as easily eradicated as when they were on 
land. It was not easy for civilians dwelling near the coast to tell pirates from honest 
fishermen and vice versa. The methods used to minimise the unrest created by these 
criminals and to arrest them determined the strength of frontier security. Vietnam 
endeavoured to separate land-dwellers from riparian people and encouraged 
 233 
sea-dwellers to live on land by enforcing registration in official rolls and levying taxes 
on sea-dwellers.  
Fishermen living at sea or residing offshore, and even captured pirates had to 
register in the official roll and pay taxes. In 1839, Nguyễn Công Trứ, the General 
Governor in Hải Dương and Quảng Yên, caught pirates, including 180 accomplices, and 
succeeded in making them accept amnesty and eventually serve the rulers of the 
Nguyễn court. Shortly after, Nguyễn Công Trứ divided them into four groups, called the 
four Tứ Giáp (四甲), based on the regions they came from. Each Giáp (甲) had a Giáp 
Trưởng (甲长) and Lí Trưởng (里长) who were in charge of the whole Giáp. These 
Giáp belonged to the sub-administrative unit of Vân Đồn. Here, Giáp functioned 
similarly to China’s bao jia (保甲) system. However, the Huế authorities did not 
regulate Chinese offspring in Giáp as strictly as in other Chinese communities in 
Vietnam. Taxes were paid to the government according to the number of junks and 
persons in the Khai Vĩ (开尾) and Hà Cổ (虾罟) communities. Khai Vĩ and Hà Cổ were 
a group of people named Kai Wei and Xia Gu in Chinese. They were two Chinese 
fishermen communities floating near Vietnam and on the South China Sea.  
Moreover, Chinese and Vietnamese fishermen were also organised into different 
groups in order to obtain licenses and ship certifications from the court. Each group had 
one principal who oversaw the whole group. One or two of them were selected to stay 
on the land for effective administration.23
                                                 
23 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 201, pp. 3–4. 
 Difficulties in distinguishing fishermen from 
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pirates forced the court to revise these regulations for two Chinese fishing communities. 
One or two of these Chinese fishermen were required to reside on land, but all the 
fishermen and their ships were registered in the official roll. Additionally, all Chinese, 
whether they were land-dwellers or water-dwellers, were levied taxes based on the 
standard tax regulations for Chinese in Vietnam. Each principal had a privilege: tax 
would be waived for one year. Furthermore, these vessels were inscribed with the words 
‘ships in Quảng Yên’ on one side and the name of the owner on the other, both painted 
in green. Chinese fishermen were obliged to make regular reports to the local 
government of Quảng Yên and had to apply for official approval if they wanted to 
return to China.24
In the Gia Long period, Chinese land-dwellers and fishermen who lived within 
Vietnamese territories or along the Sino-Vietnamese water frontiers made up the 
auxiliary forces that assisted the government in the defence of the sea and coast. In 1811, 
Xu Dakui (徐达魁) rounded up some fishermen and captured seven pirates and a ship.
 
25 
In 1828, Chen Gui (陈贵), a Chinese living in Tràng Sơn, apprehended Lý Công Đồng 
(李公仝), a Vietnamese pirate.26
In terms of maintaining order at sea and suppressing pirates, two groups merit 
mention: the Khai Vĩ and Hà C ổ communities. These two Chinese communities along 
the Sino-Vietnamese coastlands comprised fishermen and merchants. In 1839, Lý Công 
 
                                                 
24 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 208, pp. 14–16. 
25 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 43, p. 39. 
26 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 51, p. 34. 
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Tống and about 50 of his followers, notorious pirates in the northern ocean, were 
arrested by Khai Vĩ and Hà C ổ and handed to the local authorities of Hải Dương and 
Quảng Yên.27 In 1842, Mạc Mậu Sơn (莫茂山) and other pirates escaped into the 
waters of Quảng Yên and launched attacks on official ships. The Khai Vĩ and Hà C ổ 
communities assisted Trần Bảo Thư (陈宝书) in annihilating the pirates.28
By the late Thiệu Trị period, the Khai Vĩ and Hà C ổ communities had evolved into 
an independent force, and Vietnam directly appointed them to get rid of pirates and 
maintain order in Vietnamese waters. Guo Youfu (郭有幅) and five other pirates in 
1846, along with another five Chinese pirates in 1847, were all trounced by Hà Cổ.
 
29
It is noteworthy that Minh Mạng was reluctant to employ Chinese to quell pirates 
and maintain order at sea. In 1829, Chen Gui, a Chinese who had captured and 
submitted a Chinese pirate to the Vietnamese government in 1828, volunteered to gather 
Chinese fishermen to subdue pirates. Unfortunately, Minh Mạng refused his petition for 
fear that they would stir up trouble or incite revolts on the pretext of co-operating to 
suppress the pirates.
 
By the middle of the nineteenth century, these two Chinese fishermen communities 
made great contributions to security in the northern maritime territory of Vietnam.  
30
                                                 
27 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 200, p. 10. 
28 Ibid. Chính Biên III, Vol. 24, p. 19. 
29 Ibid. Chính Biên III, Vol. 58, 17; Vol. 65, p. 20. 
30 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 57, p. 28. 
 Obviously, Minh Mạng feared that the Chinese government 
wanted to expand its influence by suppressing the pirates on its own. During the late 
Minh Mạng period, the practice of employing Chinese to defeat pirates was abandoned. 
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In 1839, Nguyễn Công Trứ suggested using Chinese forces to exterminate pirates, but 
his suggestion was rejected by Minh Mạng. Coastal defence was a top priority for the 
Nguyễn dynasty; military and not civil force should constitute the bulk of coastal 
defence. It would be tantamount to losing the fundamental defence if Huế used Chinese 
fishermen and civilians to defend far-flung coastal areas.31
The policy towards the Chinese in the context of the aim to eradicate piracy changed 
increasingly towards the end of the Minh Mạng period. Under Minh Mạng, Vietnam did 
not use the Chinese much. After him, Vietnam began to use the Chinese such as during 
the Thiệu Trị and Tự Đức periods. By the Tự Đức period, the Chinese had become a 
substantial force in quelling pirates in Vietnamese waters, regardless of whether the 
pirates were Chinese or not. By this time, Chinese merchants who destroyed pirates 
could obtain tax exemptions as an award.
 Thus, this practice did not 
last long in Nguyễn Vietnam. 
32
In 1859, Nguyễn Công Quyền transferred three Chinese ships to get rid of pirates in 
Bình Thuận. Except for one official patrolling ship, the other two were Chinese 
shipwrecked crews in Vietnam.
 
33 In 1864, Peng Tingxiu (彭廷秀), a Chinese in Thanh 
Hóa, hired Chinese ships to patrol the sea, and captured two pirate ships.34
                                                 
31 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 201, p. 20. 
32 Ibid. Chính Biên IV, Vol. 35, p. 38. 
33 Ibid. Chính Biên IV, Vol. 20, p. 40. 
34 Ibid. Chính Biên IV, Vol. 29, p. 39. 
 In 1865, Tự 
Đức told the Board of War that Huế would hire Chinese vessels to help the central 
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government to annihilate the pirates.35 In the same year, Peng Tingxiu and three 
Chinese ships were again recruited to assist Vietnam in the eradication of pirates.36 In 
1863, Vietnam rewarded Huang Tingguang (黄廷光) with rice, wine, and money, as he 
had suffered in shipwrecks due to the aid he had given in the eradication of pirates in 
Bình Định.37
Chinese fleets, including official and private junks, also joined the drive to 
exterminate pirates. In 1865, Chinese fleets fought alongside Vietnamese naval troops 
in the waters of Quảng Yên, eventually eradicating 41 pirates. These Chinese fleets also 
received 1,000 liang of silver as a reward.
 
38 In 1865, Chinese fleets under the direction 
of Nguyễn Tri Phương (阮知方) also helped to annihilate pirates in Hải Ninh.39 In the 
same year, Chinese ships were once again recruited for sea patrols.40 In 1865, Chinese 
fleets formed the bulk of the forces that worked with Nguyễn to subdue pirates in Hải 
Ninh.41 Furthermore, Chinese fleets intercepted pirates in the waters off Hải Ninh and 
Quảng Bình, and publicly captured Lương Văn Dũng ( 梁文勇) and other nefarious 
pirates.42
                                                 
35 Ibid. Chính Biên IV, Vol. 31, p. 31. 
36 Ibid. Chính Biên IV, Vol. 33, p. 9. 
37 Ibid. Chính Biên IV, Vol. 32, p. 7, 20. 
38 Ibid. Chính Biên IV, Vol. 32, p. 4. 
39 Ibid. Chính Biên IV, Vol. 32, p. 23. 
40 Ibid. Chính Biên IV, Vol. 32, p. 31. 
41 Ibid. Chính Biên IV, Vol. 32, p. 37. 
42 Ibid. Chính Biên IV, Vol. 33, p. 5. 
 However, the co-operation in the annihilation of pirates generated some 
conflict between Vietnam and Qing. On one hand, Vietnam needed Sino-Vietnamese 
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cross-border co-operation to police the water frontier; on the other hand, co-operation 
could introduce Qing intervention. Qing officials regularly cruised in Vietnamese 
waters once they needed co-operation to capture pirates. On some occasions, the 
Chinese officials did not need any official certification when they crossed 
Sino-Vietnamese sea borders. The crossing of borders at will, and without the 
permission of the Vietnamese government, by the Chinese officials generated conflict. 
Therefore, during the early period of the Nguyễn dynasty, conflicts happened between 
China and Vietnam due to co-operation in frontier areas.   
It is clear that the defence policy with regards to the Chinese catalysed crucial 
changes during the early period of the Nguyễn dynasty. A striking feature was the 
change of attitude toward cooperation in annihilating pirates with Chinese in the Minh 
Mạng period, which originated from the primary concern that the expansion of Chinese 
influence could impede and limit the control of Nguyễn Vietnam’s central power on the 
Sino-Vietnamese frontier. Minh Mạng’s choices demonstrated the consolidation of 
central power in the Huế court. In the Minh Mạng period, the consolidation of central 
power caused conflict, which originated from the occurrence of frequent power clashes 
between the two states in the Sino-Vietnamese overland regions and even the maritime 
frontiers. The following segment explores confrontation in the overland frontiers. The 
various attitudes from Minh Mạng which inspired the move to involve the Chinese in 
national defence reflected the evolution of Sino-Vietnamese relations. 
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3.4. Conquest on strategic islands43
Prior to the Nguyễn dynasty, some archipelagos not far from shore appeared on the 
map of Vietnam as transit places that supplemented essential stops used by plying junks, 
or as rescue spots for shipwrecks. Furthermore, some exploitation such as mining, 
fishing, and so on had already been undertaken in these areas.
  
The integration of offshore islands into defence stations was closely linked to the 
concern over coastal defence. The Nguyễn government paid great attention to the role of 
these strategic islands, and they demarcated islands in order to oversee jurisdiction on 
these islets as much as possible in security matters. 
44
                                                 
43 Political and diplomatic disputes on the Paracel or Spratly Islands between China and Vietnam are not 
of concern in this section. Chinese scholars have testified that ‘Hoàng Sa’ ‘Trương Sa’ in Vietnamese 
archives did not mean ‘Paracel or Spratly Islands’. On this point, most archives and documents and even 
research by scholars illustrate who had jurisdiction of these archipelagos, and the disputes have been 
settled. Therefore, no disputes will be discussed or re-evaluated. Only phenomena on occupied islets in 
Vietnamese waters are analysed herein. Some significant documents on disputes are listed here for 
reference. Huang Shengzhang, nan hai zhu dao li lai shi zhong guo ling tu de zhang ju. Dong Nan Wen 
Hua, 4, 1996. Huang Shengzhang 黄盛璋, nan hai zhu dao li lai shi zhong guo ling tu de zhang ju 南海
诸岛历来是中国领土的历史证据 [The historical proof and documents that islands in South China Sea 
belong to China]. Dong Nan Wen Hua 东南文化.4, 1996. Li Jinming 李金明, yue nan huang sha chang 
sha fei zhong guo xi nan sha kao 越南黄沙长沙非中国西南沙考 [A study that Huang Sa and Truong 
Sa in Vietnam were not Paracel or Spratly Islands of China] .中国边疆史地研究. Zhong guo bian jiang 
shi di yanjiu, 2,1997. Han zhenhua 韩振华, Nan hai zhu dao shi di kao zheng lun ji 南海诸岛史地考证
论集 [The collection on study on islands in South China Sea]. Zhong hua shu ju 中华书局. 1981. Dai 
Kelai and Tong Li 戴可来，童力, ed., Yue nan guan yu xi nan sha qun dao zhu quan gui shu wen ti wen 
jian zi liao hui bian 越南关于西南沙群岛主权归属问题文件资料汇编 [The study on the 
Sino-Vietnamese tributary relationship in ancient time.] He nan ren min chu ban she 河南人民出版社. 
1991. 
44 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, White Paper on the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa Islands (Saigon 1975), p. 16. 
 Furthermore, during 
the eighteenth century, the French also recorded that Vietnamese naval units operated 
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patrols between Hoàng Sa (Paracel) and the coast of Vietnam.45
In 1832, the Board of Works reported to Minh Mạng that Hoàng Sa was a natural 
barrier in Vietnam’s waters. Former dynasties had commissioned precise graphs before, 
but this graph did not chart the whole area, only a part of it; the exact geographical 
location of Hoàng Sa was still undefined. Minh Mạng dispatched officials to this area 
every year in order to make an accurate map. The official junk Ô Thuyền set off for 
Quảng Ngoãi at the end of January. The government took over four private ships for 
official use in Quảng Ngãi and Bình Đ ịnh in early February and sailed to Hoàng Sa in 
order to get detailed geographical information about it, such as its length, width, height 
depth, and surroundings. They also aimed to find out if there were hidden shoals and 
submerged reefs in the waters. In addition, they also drafted specific and detailed 
navigation routes and journey durations from different sea ports to Hoàng Sa. Minh 
Mạng dispatched Phạm Hữu Nhật (范有日), a navy general, to lead naval vessels to 
Hoàng Sa with ten inscribed wooden tablets, even though Vietnam had already planted 
the Vietnamese flag there in the Gia Long period. These wooden tablets were placed on 
some islands as markers en route to Hoàng Sa. The length of these wooden tablets was 
five chi, the width was five cun, and the thickness was one cun. Incribed on the tablets 
were these words: ‘Phạm Hữu Nhật, who was the principal of naval troops, was 
 By the Nguyễn 
dynasty, the occupation of islands, reclaiming sovereignty over them, and proceeding 
with administration was common in Vietnam. 
                                                 
45 Note Sur l’asie Demandee par M. de la Borde a M. d’Estaing, White Paper on the Hoang Sa and 
Truong Sa Islands, p. 24. 
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dispatched to Hoàng Sa to reconnoitre in the 17th year of Emperor Minh Mạng’s 
reign.’ 46
Apart from planting the flag, exploration, making maps, and some exploitation of 
natural resources, another striking decision of the Vietnamese administration in 
connection with Hoàng Sa was that of the regular conduct of official rescues for foreign 
shipwrecks. In the early seventeenth century, three Dutch ships sailed for Formosa. One 
of them, the Grootebroek, lost contact with the others and capsized near Hoàng Sa. The 
Vietnamese administration rescued this ship.
 
47 In 1833, Minh Mạng planted trees in 
Hoàng Sa with the main purpose of allowing navigators to recognise their surroundings 
and avoid getting shipwrecked.48
                                                 
46 ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 165, p. 25. 
47 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, White Paper on the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa Islands, p. 19. 
48 ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 104, p. 16. 
 
From the above, it is clear that the attitudes towards the jurisdiction of maritime 
territories had evolved. The Huế court knew that controlling and meticulously 
regulating these separated islets, harbours, shoals, and half-tide rocks into different 
jurisdictions under the respective prefectures, sub-prefectures, departments or districts 
meant further expansion of the rulers’ power. Cross-border administration provided a 
good example of the preoccupation with coastal defence, and the Nguyễn court’s 
motives for colonisation and territorial expansion.  
 
3.5. Naval fleet  
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Vietnam established its naval force for security purposes, particularly along the coast. 
The Nguyễn court dispatched the naval fleet not only to strategic areas, but also at 
frontline maritime positions. In emergencies, Huế equipped coast-dwelling civilians 
with official boats for patrolling the sea. Furthermore, the Vietnamese court not only 
built assorted junks in order to repel pirates and other potential maritime threats 
effectively, but also purchased advanced ships from Western countries to upgrade its 
military equipment by the Tự Đức period. 
The Nguyễn court stationed the naval fleet in capital and offshore areas as well. The 
Huế court had enhanced its naval forces by the Minh Mạng period. In 1829, the Nguyễn 
court reviewed the number of ships in each local administrative unit. The number of 
ships in Nghệ An, Bắc Thành, and Hải Dương were increased to a total of 10, 22, and 
15 respectively. The ships in Nam Định were reduced from 15 to 11.49
The Nguyễn also built various sampans that were manned by local civilians to 
defend the maritime frontiers in an emergency and meet the diverse demands of coastal 
defence. During the Minh Mạng period, the Huế court adjusted naval fleets effectively 
and flexibly in order to defend the frontiers. In the first year of Minh Mạng’s reign, 
Vietnam mobilised local forces in Phú Quốc off the Cambodian coast to build big 
vessels, along with two smaller ships, all armed with guns and cannons in order to carry 
out patrols and apprehend pirates at sea.
  
50
                                                 
49 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 60, p. 25 
50 KĐĐNHĐSL, Vol. 159, p. 1. 
 In 1834, Minh Mạng ordered sampans to be 
built in areas along the coast. These sampans were flexible and convenient in 
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emergencies. Around two or three sampans were built in each offshore district. The 
government designated around 20 people from each local district as coxswains and 
sailors. Their responsibilities included patrolling, reconnaissance, delivering items, and 
drawing up regular reports.51 In 1835, Huế again ordered another two or three sampans 
to be built in every district along the coast to apprehend pirates. Vietnam also equipped 
local fishermen’s boats with weapons and cannons to attack pirates and patrol the sea 
from time to time.52 In 1836, the government once again took the ships of local 
fishermen for official use and armed them with weapons and other military equipment 
for reconnaissance along the coastlands.53 The Nguyễn court deployed more naval 
forces on the islands, as Vietnamese authorities regarded these islands as strategic 
locations. In 1847, the Nguyễn court had to establish new naval forces to handle routine 
security matters in the cities of Đà Nẵng, Điện Hải (奠海) and Yên Hải (安海) in Quảng 
Nam, at a time when Đà Nẵng was becoming increasingly importantand increasing 
numbers of Westerners were berthing in Vietnam.54
Huế’s naval forces comprised not only vessels and sampans of various sizes, but 
also included small steamships from Western countries that were introduced by Minh 
Mạng. However, going by records in the chronicles of the Nguyễn, Western steamboats 
were not applied to military use but given to those who had been bestowed titles by 
Minh Mạng. In 1864, pirates were again thriving in Quảng Yên, and were impeding 
  
                                                 
51 ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 124, p. 1. 
52 KĐĐNHĐSL, Vol. 159, p. 5. 
53 Ibid. 
54 ĐNTL, Chính Biên III, Vol. 66, p. 29. 
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regular trade along busy commercial maritime routes. By now, Tự Đức felt that 
steamboats would be more effective in restoring maritime order than other kinds of 
vessels. Thus, Tự Đức assigned Hoàng Văn Sưởng (黄文昶) to Hạ Châu to manufacture 
steamboats to police the maritime frontier, while Huế hired more coxswains and sailors 
to man two cupreous steamboats.55 In the following year, the Vietnamese authorities 
spent 130,000 yuan to purchase another large steamboat made of copper from Hong 
Kong.56
During the Nguyễn dynasty, plans for coastal defence did not stay at a certain level, 
such as only outfitting fleets or junks with firearms and cannons, but instead, shifted 
towards more fundamental improvements, such as naval training, which was highly 
valued in Nguyễn Vietnam. Accordingly, Huế trained its naval forces regularly. In 1847, 
the Nguyễn court required naval forces to patrol Quảng Nam once or twice a month.
   
57 
In 1853, Tôn Thất Thường (尊室常) reported to Tự Đức on seven topics that had been 
approved by Tự Đức. One of them stated that vessels whose duty was to transport cargo 
should also be adept at naval warfare. 58
                                                 
55 Ibid. Chính Biên IV, Vol. 32, p. 40. 
56 ĐNTL, Chính Biên IV, Vol. 34, p. 30. 
57 Ibid. Chính Biên III, Vol. 64, p. 24. 
58 Ibid. Chính Biên IV, Vol. 9, p. 9. 
 It is noteworthy that the Vietnamese 
authorities’ navigation to Southeast Asian regions for trade and official business 
concealed an ulterior motive: nautical training. It was partly due to military equipment 
from other Southeast Asian regions that Nguyễn Phúc Ánh was able to defeat Nguyễn 
Quang Toản and eventually unify Vietnam. Thereafter, to the Nguyễn dynasty, military 
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equipment from Southeast Asian regions, as well as nautical training, were 
indispensable. Navigation and other military activities were the best way for Nguyễn 
Vietnam to train its naval fleets en route to Southeast Asia for trade.  
Apart from scheduled training and combating pirates at sea, naval fleets were also 
engaged in the transportation of military materials and convoying vessels containing 
rice and metal currency. In 1817, Vietnam dispatched naval fleets and allocated around 
773 officials from Bắc Thành to transport newly issued metal currency and other goods 
to the capital.59 Besides metal currency, naval fleets also transported important military 
equipment. In 1834, Vietnam dispatched Phan Văn Cửu (潘文玖) and Lê Văn Luận (黎
文论), officials in the naval fleet, to convoy junks that were headed to Gia Định Thanh 
and loaded with three cannons, 40,000 jin of gunpowder, and other military 
equipment.60 In many cases, naval forces assisted boats in shipping grain to the capital, 
such as in 1838, when the central government’s naval fleets in Huế were assigned to 
escort boats transporting grain to the capital.61
Hạ Châu Công Vụ in the Nguyễn dynasty concentrated on two aspects. The first was 
commercial contact with regions in Southeast Asia, and the other was for military 
purposes. It was because of military resources from Southeast Asia that Nguyễn Phúc 
  
 
3.6. Navigation and maritime transportation: Hạ Châu Công Vụ 
                                                 
59 Châu Bản, Australia National Uiversity, Reel 3. 
60 ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 136, p. 25. 
61 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 192, p. 17. 
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Ánh defeated Tây Sơn Nguyễn's brother. By the Nguyễn dyansty, the Huế court did not 
cede these commercial contacts with regions in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the 
Nguyễn court awarded the officials who were sent to regions in Southeast Asia based on 
how much they fulfilled the quota for trade in Southeast Asia.62
With regards to military aspects, the accumulation of information related to 
Southeast Asia was the motive for the trips to Southeast Asia. In 1823, Emperor Minh 
Mạng assigned Ngô Văn Trung (吴文忠) and Hoàng Trung Đồng (黄忠仝) to navigate 
for Hạ Châu in the name of official business. One of their assignments was to collect 
information on local situations and customs, and even the marine route to Hạ Châu 
itself.
 
63 Even during the war between Vietnam and Siam, the court made great efforts 
to seek more information on the situation in Southeast Asia.64 Moreover, rescuing the 
Westerners’ shipwrecks and escorting them back to Southeast Asia to explore had been 
the choice of Nguyễn Vietnam.65
Another objective of visiting Southeast Asia was to accomplish military 
undertakings, mainly to train naval forces and practice nautical sailing. Nguyễn 
Vietnam took more military equipment to go to Southeast Asia not only to annihilate 
pirates, but also to train naval forces and practice navigating to Southeast Asia. In the 
opinion of the Huế authority, it was necessary to train naval forces and become familiar 
  
                                                 
62 Ibid. Chính Biên, Vol. 207, pp. 6–9. 
63 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 19, p. 14. 
64 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 117, p. 14. 
65. Tấu Biểu Danh Tập. 奏表名集[The collection on Memorials]. Viện Hán Nôm A2824, p. 25a; ĐNTL, 
Chính Biên II, Vol.118, p. 7; Vol. 176, p. 1; KĐĐNHĐSL, Vol.  48, p. 1. 
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with the nautical route to Southeast Asia. However, the Nguyễn did not proceed with 
public military training, but carried it out under the guise of commercial exchange. 
Accordingly, in 1832, Emperor Minh Mạng used commercial certification instead of the 
formal official document to Singapore since Vietnam’s naval trainings were normal in 
Minh Mạng’s opinion.66 In 1836, Nguyễn Tri Phương and other officials took ships 
that were equipped with 52 cannons and a large stock of cannonballs, and set off for 
various Southeast Asian countries including Singapore, Penang, and Dutch Batavia.67 
Without a doubt, training naval forces and practising navigation to Southeast Asia were 
still on the agenda.68 Learning Western techniques was also a motivation for the 
voyage through Southeast Asia.69
Overland frontier defence was as crucial as maritime defence for the Huế court. Nguyễn 
Vietnam had to fortify frontier defences, keeping in mind the long coastline and rugged 
mountainous terrains so that there were fewer opportunities for invasion. With regards 
to overland frontier defence, the solution to the northern frontier issues directly 
influenced the Sino-Vietnamese political relationship. The northern overland frontier 
had been a crucial national barrier for Vietnam since its separation from China. The 
concept and practice of the northern frontier in Vietnam was fostered in negotiation and 
  
 
4. Overland frontier defence  
                                                 
66 ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 85, p. 26. 
67 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 175, p. 13. 
68 KĐĐNHĐSL, Vol. 295, p.12. 
69 ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 187, p. 2. 
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compromise with its northern neighbour, which regarded forced conquest and indirect 
control—namely, using ‘barbarians to control barbarians’ (yi yi zhi yi 以夷治夷) under 
the tributary system—to be a gauge of frontier management. Consequently, China’s 
frontier management greatly influenced the evolving frontier of Vietnam and the 
historical perspectives of Vietnam’s authorities. From border wars in the Song Dynasty 
to strife in Qing China, the solutions to frontier issues reflected the pragmatic and 
dynamic strategy of Vietnam when it confronted an aggressive and ambitious 
superpower. It was not until Nguyễn Vietnamthat the orientation and attitude towards 
frontier affairs became clear cut, accompanied by China’s changing frontier policy and 
the centralisation of the Huế administration in the northern borderlands. 
 
4.1. The frontier policy of China from a historical perspective 
The two primary concepts of China’s frontier ideology are fushi guan (服事观, 
submission) and huayi guan (华夷观, central culture and barbarians). The former 
stresses the frontier’s role in servicing the centre, whose rhetorical expression was wu fu 
(五服) or jiu fu (九服). The ruler viewed his empire through the context of the Five 
Domains or Nine Domains, which was emulated even in his personal residence and as 
the ideal version of imperial administration. The ruler awarded land to all his 
subordinates according to their hierarchical rankings. Whatever wu fu or jiu fu, this 
meant two things. Firstly, the political centre in the capital applied to governed frontiers, 
from nearby to faraway regions. Secondly, marginal regions were composed of different 
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and independent political elements; the further a marginal region was situated, the 
weaker their obligation to the central government. Hua yi was not simple, but meshed 
with complicated nationalities, intricate frontiers, and colonies.70
Jiao zhi was an internal part in China since the Qin authorities established the Nan Hai, 
Gui Lin and Xiang districts. The successive dynasties did not make great alterations to 
the administrative management of the southwest frontier. The An Nam protectorate (an 
nan du hu fu 安南都护府) was established in the southern frontier, and included 
 
The frontier policy in China was mainly composed of en wei bing shi (恩威并施, 
kindness as well as force were used in frontier management) and yi yi zhi yi (以夷治夷, 
using barbarians to control barbarians). The tributary system, which had evolved from 
this normative and unique ideology that influenced the relations between the centre and 
periphery, was employed by China’s rulers in relations with neighbouring countries. 
Therefore, the relations between China and frontier neighbours regularly overlapped 
with tributary relations; tribute trade was a means of kindness in frontier defence 
perspectives, military conquest was the use of force, and administrative management, 
among others. 
 
4.2. ‘War and peace’: the evolution of the frontier in Sino-Vietnamese frontier 
history 
                                                 
70 Ma Dazheng ed. 马大正, zhong guo bian jiang jing lue shi 中国边疆经略史 [The history of frontiers 
in China]. zhong zhou gu ji chu ban she中州古籍出版社. 2000, pp. 436–443. 
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present-day northern Vietnam in Tang China. Around the tenth century, Jiao zhi was 
separated from the centre and became one state near China.  
The Song dynasty was a crucial period in Sino-Vietnamese relations. While the 
Song confronted the Liao and the Jin in the north, the southern territories acted as 
provision bases, and were vital to the Songs’ reign in China. They expanded their 
borders to the southern frontier by direct military stationing as well as Wang Anshi’s 
economic reforms. The Song induced considerable Han migration to the southern 
frontiers and levied taxes though new economic reforms in order to supplement the 
shortages caused by the wars with northern foes. The forced expansion and diluted 
political administration in the southern frontier indisputably gave rise to tension 
between local forces and the northern Vietnamese authorities. Furthermore, the Lý court 
implemented a frontier expansion policy after negotiating a period of autonomy up to 
the eleventh century. The Lý endeavoured to establish stable, lasting ties with local 
leaders along Vietnam’s northern frontier, in order to increase its influence on the 
northern frontier. The presence of frontier chieftains on both sides (Vietnam and China) 
escalated frontier tensions rather than decreasing them, and these ultimately led to the 
Sino-Vietnam frontier war around 1075.71
Sino-Vietnamese frontier conflicts were intermittent. Vietnam invaded Qiuwen, 
Qingyuan, and five counties in the Siming prefecture at the end of the Yuan dynasty.
 
72
                                                 
71 James Anderson, The rebel den of Nung Tri Cao, loyal and identity along the Sino-Vietnamese frontier 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007), Chapters 3 and 4. 
72 Zhang Tingyu, Mingshi, wai guo (Beijing: zhong hua shu ju, 1974), p. 3812. 
 
 251 
In 1426, 1436, and 1465, Vietnamese chieftains invaded and occupied many villages in 
Guangxi and Yunnan.73
The Qing rulers, as a minority of China to manage the whole kingdom and the 
frontier, favoured pragmatic frontier policies. The Qing resorted to military force to 
subdue frontier unrest, such as in the northern and western frontiers, particularly Wu 
Sangui in southwest China and Zheng Chenggong in Taiwan. In other respects, China 
employed yin su er zhi (因俗而治, control according to local customs and culture) in 
minority regions. Whether it was direct military conquest or flexible control, it served a 
principal purpose, which was to increase the degree of governance of the empire as a 
whole. The Qian Long period culminated in strict and effective frontier management. 
However, China’s frontier concerns centred not on the southern frontier but on Xin 
jiang (新疆) and Tibet (西藏), even during the nineteenth century. Up to the Jia Qing 
and Dao Guang periods, frontier management slackened due to stable administration 
and fiscal sufficiency.
 In short, Vietnamese authorities endeavoured to expand the 
Vietnamese northern frontier further. The Sino-Vietnamese border conflicts as internal 
conflicts between different ethnic groups did not cease even during the colonial era 
under the Ming dynasty. It is noteworthy that the northern frontier was a crucial key for 
Vietnam to expand its authority further. To some degree, Sino-Vietnamese frontier 
relations determined how much further Vietnam could expand its overland territory. 
74
                                                 
73 Ibid., pp. 8322, 8326, 8328. 
74 Ma Ruheng 马汝珩 and Ma Dazheng 马大正， ed., Qing Dai de bian jiang zheng ce 清代的边疆政
策 (zhong guo she hui ke xue chu ban she中国社会科学出版社, 1994), pp. 57–69. 
 In general, the issues and ideologies of the Qing’s frontier 
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policy did not concern the southern frontier; nor was Vietnam considered a lost 
province to be regained even though the Qing invaded northern Vietnam in 1787.75
Establishing customs and fortresses 
 
However, Sino-Vietnamese disputes about frontier demarcation occurred intermittently 
in the nineteenth century. This fitful strife was attributed to the mildness of frontier 
policy in Qing and the persistent expansion of Vietnamese authority. Interestingly, the 
local chieftains in the Sino-Vietnamese overland frontier played major roles in these 
conflicts.  
 
4.3. Boundary defence and conflicts  
Due to its geographical juxtaposition with China, Vietnam had to manage 
Sino-Vietnamese border affairs carefully, especially if they involved rebellions, revolts, 
and other unrest in the Sino-Vietnamese borders. Compared with other eras in 
Vietnamese history, the Nguyễn were not only watchful of the potential menace from 
the northern giant, but also consolidated and expanded jurisdiction on new western and 
southern territories that had been obtained. 
Consequently, the Huế authorities had to make some effort to fortify frontier 
defence, such as the establishment of ports at significant junctions, military deployment, 
the recruitment and allocation of officials, and the suppression of illicit activities. 
 
                                                 
75 Brantly Womack, China and Vietnam: the politics of asymmetry (Imprint Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 119. 
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Nguyễn Vietnam knew that a key tactic in boundary defence was to rigidly control 
isolated locations that made governmental surveillance difficult. Establishing customs 
or military fortresses in strategic spots such as bustling trade routes was also applied to 
defence policy. Some fortresses were located on the borders, which were covered in 
jungles and mountains, and others in detours, where merchants or smugglers held 
unauthorised commercial exchanges. In 1831, Minh Mạng approved a proposal, brought 
forth by Hoàng Văn Quyền (黄文权) regarding the affairs on Lang Son and Cao Bang, 
to establish fortresses and deploy troops in Đông Quan (东关) of Yên Bác (安博) 
prefecture, which was adjacent to Bắc Ninh and Quảng Yên and were filled with bumpy 
roads, jungles, and mountains.76 Apart from security concerns, the establishment of 
ports contributed to the increase in the fiscal income of the central government, through 
the registration of locals, and the collection of poll taxes and other taxes. In 1840, 
Nguyễn established custom offices in Trung Thảng (中傥), Na Lan (那烂), Lệnh Cấm 
(令禁) in Bôn Hà (贲河), and three fortresses in Cao Bằng, where Chinese merchants 
itinerated and avoided paying tax. Taking this into account, Vietnamese authority 
revised the taxes and certification for Chinese merchants.77
Civilians, bandits and even merchants travelling along the Sino-Vietnamese overland 
borders were carefully watched by the Nguyễn court. To the Vietnamese authorities, all 
  
 
Restraining alien comers and ‘illicit’ activities 
                                                 
76 ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 77, p. 27. 
77 Ibid. Chính Biên III, Vol. 5, p. 22. 
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of them were potential sources of unrest in the borderlands. Restricting their entry into 
Vietnam became an objective of overland frontier defence. In 1831, the Huế court 
captured six Chinese, including Xiao Sixin (萧思信), who had entered Vietnam 
illegally.78 In 1836, 50 armed Chinese pillaged the inhabitants of Hưng Hóa. Minh 
Mạng stated that the authorities should remain watchful with regard to frontier defence, 
and avoid instigating border conflicts with the Qing court after the 50 Chinese were 
evicted by local Vietnamese authority.79
In addition to the inhabitants, indigenes, and bandits, there were also arrogant 
Chinese officials who journeyed along the Sino-Vietnamese boundaries at will, and this 
compelled the Huế authorities to fortify frontier defence. In 1810, Chinese officials 
from the Kaihua prefecture (开化府 ) in Guangxi crossed the Sino-Vietnamese 
borderlines to pursue bandits without any official communication or diplomatic 
document. Vietnamese authorities assailed China over this event. Moreover, the Nguyễn 
issued a local decree that any Chinese crossing the Sino-Vietnamese borders without 
any documents would be punished by Vietnamese authorities.
 
80
Frequently, interlopers, usually Chinese officials, infuriated Minh Mạng, but he 




                                                 
78 KĐĐNHĐSL, Vol. 131, p. 3. 
79 ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 170, p. 5. 
80 KĐĐNHĐSL, Vol. 131, p. 1. 
81 ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 53, pp. 4–5. 
 In 1851, a Chinese soldier, Tian Wenzao (田文藻), crossed the 
Sino-Vietnamese border to capture bandits and was killed by the bandits in Vietnam. In 
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the eyes of the Nguyễn authorities, Tian Wenzao’s crossing the border to pursue bandits 
without an official document was no different from taking the road to his own doom.82
Chinese inhabitants in the borderlands affected Huế’s frontier defence. They were 
generally mining labourers, Chinese merchants, and even Chinese refugees. Chinese 
inhabitants in the Sino-Vietnamese overland borders contributed to the smoothing over 
of the insurgency in northern Vietnam. As spies or guides, they regularly gave crucial 
clues to the central authority that could be used for exterminating bandits such as Liang 
An’he (梁安和), Lu Gong’an (庐贡安), Huang Fuma (黄付马), Ma Jiji (麻几吉), and 
Ban Guangrun (班光润) during the quelling of the Nong Van Van rebellions.
 
83 Some 
Chinese, such as Wei Zhongxiu (韦忠秀), who led an official army to capture Li Khai 
Ba (李开巴), supported the bandits in northern Vietnam.84
The frontier demarcations between traditional Vietnam and its neighbours relied on 
natural barriers. Waterways, hills or mountains, and islands often formed the natural and 
visible boundaries of geographical units. When there were no natural features for this 
purpose, the authority established boundary units by actual governance. Humans 
naturally became a crucial element in accomplishing the actual governance. An 
  
 
Recruiting soldiers, reclaiming and cultivating wastelands, and reforming the 
ways and manners of the people   
                                                 
82 Ibid. Chính Biên IV, Vol. 7, p. 14. 
83 KĐTBBKNPCB, Vhv.2701/19. Vol. 71, 26, 29; ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 136, p. 13. 
84 ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 19, p. 9. 
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effective method of controlling human resources and then carrying out the actual 
governance was to recruit soldiers, reclaim and cultivate wastelands, and reform the 
ways and manners of the citizens.   
Recruiting soldiers, reclaiming and cultivating wasteland, and reforming the ways 
and manners of the people were regular methods the government utilised in exploiting 
and defending frontiers. The government recruited Chinese, inhabitants, and merchants 
to exploit the border territories. Furthermore, the government also recruited soldiers to 
consolidate and develop the frontier.  
Quảng Yên, a Sino-Vietnamese border region and a hotspot for smugglers such as 
pirates, was a significant place in northern Vietnam in terms of security. The 
government endeavoured to bring this region under its complete surveillance. 
Recruiting soldiers, and reclaiming and cultivating wasteland were important ways to 
attract Chinese merchants or fishermen to Nguyễn Vietnam. In 1838, Chinese fishermen 
and Chinese junks sparked unrest in the waters near Quảng Yên, and they gathered in 
Tràng Sơn. Nguyễn Vietnam assumed complete jurisdiction over Tràng Sơn. As there 
was a great number of immigrants living there, it was strange that so few of these were 
Vietnamese. Consequently, Nguyễn Công Trứ went to this place and conducted 
reconnaissance there. Soon afterwards, the court deployed troops, built fortresses, and 
emplacements for cannons there. Concurrently, they also organised Vietnamese to 
establish villages or towns that could look after one another.85
                                                 
85 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 193, p. 15. 
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To Vietnam, recruiting soldiers, reclaiming and cultivating wasteland, and 
reforming the customs of the people were the most effective methods to develop and 
consolidate the frontier. The court consistently and thoroughly carried out these policies 
during the Nguyễn dynasty. In 1840, Điện Biên (奠边), which was inhabited by White 
and Black Thái and other upland groups, was set up as an administrative unit in 
northwest Vietnam by Huế in Nịnh Biên. Prior to the Lê dynasty, the Điện Biên 
prefecture (奠边府) did not exist in Vietnamese administration. Hưng Hóa was 
composed of three prefectures: Gia Hưng (嘉兴), Yên Tây (安西), and Quy Hóa (归化). 
By the Cảnh Hưng period, due to China's invasion and occupation of frontier territories, 
the territories of Yên Tây were left with only Chiêu Tấn (昭晋), Lai (莱), Quỳnh Nhai 
(琼崖), and Luân (伦).86 In the first year of Thiệu Trị’s rule, Vietnam designated the 
Điện Biên prefecture as an administrative unit based on the previous Yên Tây prefecture, 
which covered Ninh Viễn (宁远), Tuần Giáo (巡教) and Lai Châu (莱州). In 1850, the 
Huế court integrated Quỳnh Nhai and Luân into Điện Biên Prefecture. Ultimately, the 
Điện Biên prefecture was made up of five sub-administrative units and became an 
essential administrative unit on the frontier. 87
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87 ĐNNTC, Vol. Hưng Hóa, p. 27. 
 Establishing Điện Biên prefecture 
involved three fundamental issues. First, this area was surrounded by thirteen 
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prefectures in Da Bac. Second, the land was fertile but the population was sparse, 
making it susceptible to invasion on the northwest flank of the frontier. Third, local 
people impeded the move to station troops there. One factor was the prevalence of 
malaria in the local mountainous terrain. The other factor was the area’s geographical 
characteristics, which hampered the transport of military materials. Therefore, the 
recruitment of soldiers and local people to reclaim and cultivate wastelands there 
brought about official management of the region. Moreover, the government also 
recruited Chinese merchants to develop markets for trade there.88 In 1840, motivated 
by a desire to fortify border defence and protect the Chinese living in the borderlands, 
the government stationed troops there, and instituted a policy of reclaiming and 
cultivating wasteland in northern Vietnam.89
Conflicts and tensions in the overland frontiers during the early nineteenth 
century (Điêu Doãn An (刁允安) event, and similar events)
   
 
90
In 1805, the officials in Hưng Hóa in Vietnam circulated leaflets which claimed that 
Mengla (勐剌) and other places, namely the Yên Tây and Quảng Lăng areas in the 
 
                                                 
88 ĐNTL, Chính Biên III, Vol. 8, pp. 22–23. 
89 Ibid. Chính Biên III, Vol. 8, p. 23. 
90 Here, the surname of the local official (tusi) in Mengsuo is Dao in Chinese archives but Điêu in 
Vietnamese archives. Whether Dao or Điêu, two characters were similar in both written Chinese and 
pronunciation. Therefore, Vietnamese and Chinese names will be noted in the following. 
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Lin’an Prefecture, belonged to Vietnam, and requested these chieftains to submit to the 
authority of Vietnam again. This event astonished the Qing authorities.91
In 1829, the Vietnamese authorities claimed that Điêu Quốc Lân, who was in charge 
of areas near Phong Thu Village in Chiêu Tấn prefecture in Hung Hoa, was captured 
illegally by Chinese officials across the Sino-Vietnamese border.
  
Less than 20 years later, the Điêu Quốc Lân (刁国麟) and Điêu Doãn Yên incidents 
occurred in the Sino-Vietnamese borderlands. The key issue of the Điêu Doãn Yê n 
incident was the jurisdiction over Phong Thu Village (丰收屯). Phong Thu Village 
(Fengshou, 丰收) was a sub-administrative division of Mengsuo (勐梭), or Chiêu Tấn 
(昭晋), as it was known in Vietnam. Phong Thu Village was a place in Mengsuo, which 
was in the Jianshui (建水) County of China. 
92 After Điêu Quốc 
Lân was captured illegally by Chinese officials across the Sino-Vietnamese border, the 
Huế authority claimed that Chinese officials also arrested Điêu Chính Định (刁政定) 
and Điêu Vĩnh Đi ển (刁永典) illegally.93
Shortly afterwards, Điêu Doãn An deployed Chinese troops to lay siege to Điêu 
Vĩnh Điển near the Sino-Vietnamese border. The presence of Chinese officials in 
Vietnam led to Vietnamese taking hostile action against China, which escalated into 
 However, Chinese authorities defied the 
statement made by the Vietnamese authorities, and vowed that Điêu Vĩnh Đi ển and 
Điêu Chính Định were not Vietnamese but Chinese.  
                                                 
91 Qing dai wai jiao shi liao jia qing chao (1968), pp. 92–93. 
92 KĐĐNHĐSL, Vol. 131, p. 4. 
93 Xuan zong shi lu 宣宗实录. Vol. 178, p. 16-17 in qing shi lu shi liao zhai chao, 1985, p. 297. ; 
KĐĐNHĐSL, Vol. 131, p. 5. 
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violence. Soon afterward, Chinese officials in Yunnan province forced Điêu Vĩnh Đi ển 
to give the position in charge of taxation in Phong Thu (Fengshou) and Bình Lư (Pinglu, 
平庐) villages to Điêu Doãn An.94 The son of Dao Yunliang (刀允亮) was Dao Yun’an 
(刀允安, Điêu Doãn An). Dao Yun’an was supposed to succeed his father as brigand 
chef in Mengsuo. However, Dao Yun’an was too young when his father died. 
Consequently, another branch of the Dao family, Dao Yongdian (刀永典, Điêu Vĩnh 
Điển) took charge of business in Mengsuo. Điêu Chính Định, who was from Lai Châu, 
guarded Phong Thu (Fengshou) village.95 Nevertheless, Dao Yun’an (Điêu Doãn An) 
intended to seize the position of chieftain in Mengsuo after he grew up. He claimed to 
the Qing government that Dao Yongdian (Điêu Vĩnh Đi ển) had forcibly occupied his 
position as brigand chef in Mengsuo. Thereafter, Dao Yun’an (Điêu Doãn An) turned to 
his sister, who was an official in the Yunnan province of China, for help and allied with 
Dao Yunjian (刀允坚) and Dao Yunwu (刀允武) to lay siege to Dao Yongdian (Điêu 
Vĩnh Điển).96
                                                 
94 The chieftain in Mengsuo was Dao Yunliang, who succeeded Dao Shiying. As recorded in local 
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Yunnan. Then he turned to Qing for help. Aftermath, Qing deployed troops … 
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However, Điêu Doãn An did not withdraw the troops and continued to be stationed 
in Mengsuo.97 Around 600 Chinese troops were stationed in Phong Thu (Fengshou) 
village and claimed that Phong Thu Village was a part of Mengsuo in Qing and 
therefore the troops of Huế should retreat. The Huế court dispatched Nguyễn Đình Phổ 
(阮廷普) and Đặng Văn Thiêm (邓文添) to gather around 2,000 soldiers and 10 
elephants to march on the border.98
With regards to Phong Thu and Bình Lư Villages, the Vietnamese government had 
different records in official archives. Based on Nguyễn Văn Thành's (阮文诚) report in 
1806, Vietnam confirmed precisely that Mengsuo was Mang Thu (芒收) of Chieu Tan 
Prefecture and Menglai was Mang Lạt (芒剌) in Lai Châu. Mang Thu (that is, Mengsuo) 
and Mang Lạt (Menglai) were far from the central areas of Chiêu Tấn and Lai Châu. 
Moreover, ethnic groups of all sorts lived together in Mang Thu (Mengsuo) and Mang 
Lạt (Menglai). Furthermore, Phong Thu (Fengshou) and Bình Lư (Pinglu) in Chiêu T ấn 
and Hoài Lai (怀来) in Lai Châu cooperated with Chinese officials to levy tax, 220 
 Here, both Nguyễn and Qing found themselves at 
sword-point. Ultimately, the Chinese troops had to retreat due to the local climate and 
malaria at the Sino-Vietnamese frontiers.    
It is worth examining why the Điêu Doãn An incident took place. There are two key 
questions that should be useful to explain this event. First, who owned Phong Thu 
Village, Qing or Nguyễn? Second, were Điêu Chính Định and Điêu Vĩnh Điển Chinese 
or Vietnamese?  
                                                 
97 ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 74, p. 11 
98 KĐĐNHĐSL, Vol. 131, p.5; ĐNTL, Chính Biên II, Vol. 74, p.11–12. 
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liang silver every year.99 As chronicled by the Nguyễn, Phong Thu and Bình Lư 
villages in Chiêu Tấn Prefecture in Vietnam, which annexed Menglai in the Qing period, 
were previously Vietnamese territories, but were occupied by Qing since Le Vietnam. 
Phong Thu and Bình Lư villages were called Mengsuo in Jianshui County in Qing since 
the Qing possessed both places.100
As recorded in the official compendium of institutions and usages of Imperial 
Vietnam, Phong Thu and Bình Lư Villages pertained to Qing. However, in the same 
Volume, Phong Thu Village was a part of Hưng Hóa Town. When the Điêu Doãn An 
incident provoked the Sino-Vietnamese border clash, Minh Mạng sent formal official 
communications to Qing and claimed that ‘Phong Thu Village was Vietnamese territory; 
the Sino-Vietnamese borderlines were clear; the areas called Mengsuo by you are 
possibly another place of which we have never heard…’.
  
101
As for the second question, it is rooted in the delimiting of the borderlines in 1540, 
as a result of which the territories that came under the charge of the brigand chefs in 
Mengsuo and Menglai fell in both China and Vietnam. Furthermore, whether it was 
Điêu Vĩnh Điển or Điêu Chính Định, they were both from another branch of the Điêu 




                                                 
99 ĐNTL, Chính Biên I, Vol. 29, pp. 5–7. 
100 Ibid. Chính Biên II, Vol. 67, p. 6. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Hưng Hóa,兴化[The gazetteer of Hưng Hóa]. Viện Hán Nôm A610. 
 Furthermore, their predecessor, Điêu Quốc Tuyền, as the brigand 
chef in Mengsuo in China, accepted the title of headman of the local aboriginal office 
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not only from the Qing court, but also from the Nguyễn court. In 1821, the headmen of 
the local aboriginal office along the Sino-Vietnamese borderlands had an audience with 
Minh Mạng, including Điêu Quốc Tuyền (that is, Điêu Thế Yên), who was an official in 
Hung Hoa. They were bestowed official robes and silver by Minh Mạng. Điêu Doãn 
Lượng was the son of Điêu Thế An (Điêu Quốc Tuyền), and Điêu Doãn Yên (Diao 
Wan’an in Chinese archives) was the son of Điêu Doãn Lư ợng. Here, Điêu Quốc Tuyền 
accepted his appointment as an aboriginal officer by the Vietnamese court . Moreover, 
he also accepted his appointment by the Qing court as the brigand chief in order to 
collect taxes from both sides, which was 50 liang silver per year.103 Accordingly, 
whether Điêu Vĩnh Điển and Điêu Chính Định were Chinese or Vietnamese is not clear 
but the fact is that the demarcation of the borderlines in 1540 fuelled the duplicate taxes 
collected by the brigand chef in Mengsuo and created Điêu clan’s jurisdiction in two 
states.104
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104 The Liu Meng 六勐 problem can be traced back to the Ming dynasty in China. As Khâm Định Việt 
Sử Thông Giám Cương Mục, Chính Biên recorded: 'In the fifth year of Cheng Hua Emperor in China, 
1496, Lê Vietnam established twelve sub-administrative divisions in the whole Vietnam. Hưng Hóa 
separated from three parts, Qui Thuận, Gia Hưng 嘉兴 and An Tây 安西. Furthermore, An Tây 
prefecture included ten subordinates, Lai Châu 莱州, Luân Châu 伦州, Quỳnh Nhai 琼崖, Chiệu Tấn 
昭晋, Hợp Phì 合肥, Khiêm Châu 谦州, Tuy Phụ 绥阜, Hoàng Nham 黄山严, Lễ Tuyền 澧泉 and 
Quảng Lăng 广陵. In 1758, Chiệu Tấn, Lai Châu, Quỳnh Nhai and Nịnh Biên 宁边 were territories in 
Hưng Hóa in Vietnam. Quảng Lăng and Hoàng Nham belonged to Yunnan. These ten prefectures were 
adjacent to Yunnan Province in China, now in the northern area of Điện Biên Phủ in Vietnam. VSTGCM, 
Chính Biên, Vol. 21, Vol. 43, p. 16; p. 45. Liu Meng was located in the southeast of Lin’an Prefecture in 
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In 1540, Mạc Đăng Dung (莫登庸) usurped the throne of the Lê Dynasty. The Ming 
dynasty intended to resort to military force and crusade against Mạc’s usurpation. Mạc 
ended the tension with Ming by ceding Quảng Lăng (广陵) and six other prefectures to 
Ming.105
In terms of the delineation of borders in 1540, the areas on the northern bank of the 
Black River were under China’s governance, while the areas on the southern bank of the 
Black River were under Vietnamese jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the minority hereditary 
headmen in Menglai managed both sides of the Black River before the demarcation. 
The headman in Menglai was reluctant to let go of his power on either side. Therefore, 
the minority hereditary headman in Menglai submitted the tax to central governments 
and accepted appointments or assignments from both sides even though the areas they 
managed were territories of two independent states. Concurrently, the Mengle River 
 Consequently, this cession became the root of Sino-Vietnamese territorial 
conflicts in the frontiers .  
                                                                                                                                               
Yunnan. The main minorities such as the Bai 白 minority (A Bo 阿僰 in Meng zi County and Jianshui 
County), Yi 彝, Ha Ni 哈尼, and Dai 傣 were composed of inhabitants in Liu Meng. You Zhong尤中 
(Zhong guo xi nan de gu dai min zu 中国西南的古代民族). Yun nan ren min chu ban she 云南人民出
版社. 1979, p. 226, p. 245 ；da qing yi tong zhi, Vol. 479, pp. 3–4. The southwest frontier was regularly 
controlled by local minorities and even consecutive foreign forces such as Burma, Laos and Vietnam due 
to their same phylum and geographical juxtaposition even though they were a part of the Qing 
administration system. The Dao (Điêu) clan was a Dai minority located on the Sino-Vietnamese frontier. 
You Zhong 尤中 (Zhong guo xi nan de gu dai min zu 中国西南的古代民族，. 1979), p. 342. 
105 Yan Congjian 严从简, Shu yu zhou zi lu 殊域周咨录 [Record of extensive inquiries on distant 
territories] (Bei jing: zhong hua shu ju北京, 中华书局 1993), Vol. 3, Annan. 
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was regarded as a natural barrier to separate the vested interests of Mengsuo’s brigand 
chief into two parts belonging to separate states. 
The principals of the local aboriginal system in Quảng Lăng and six other 
prefectures submitted to the authority of the Qing court, and together with the Qing 
verified its jurisdiction over Yunnan in the early period of the Qing dynasty. Mengding 
(勐丁), Mengla (勐剌), Mengsuo (勐梭) and Menglai (勐莱) covered Quảng Lăng and 
six other prefectures. Apart from these four Meng areas, the southern areas of Lin’an 
prefecture were also composed of two other Meng regions, and as a whole, these 
regions were called Liu Meng (six Meng places) since their names included the same 
Chinese character, Meng. (This word also represents the Tai word Muang, which was a 
small polity.) Among Liu Meng, Mengla and Mengding were located in Jinping (金平) 
county in present-day Yunnan, Mengnong (勐弄) in the southern areas of Yuanyang (元
阳) county, and Mengbeng (勐蚌) on the north-western side of the Black River in 
present-day Lai Châu in Vietnam. Menglai, Mengding, Mengnong and Mengbeng did 
not annex to Vietnam indirectly, geographically, during the nineteenth century. Only 
Mengsuo and Menglai were adjacent to Vietnam.106
Prior to the Tây Sơn period in Vietnam, Vietnamese authority requested China to 
re-demarcate their mutual frontiers, intending to take back territories that had been lost 
since 1540. Lê Duy Kì (黎维祁) requested re-demarcation again in 1781 and 1792.
 
107
                                                 
106 You zhong 尤中. Zhong guo xi nan bian jing bian qian shi 中国西南边疆变迁史 [The history of 
southwest frontier of China]. Yun nan jiao yu chu ban she 云南教育出版社 1987, p. 211. 
 
107 jun ji chu lu fu zou zhe 军机处录副奏折 in Zhong guo she hui ke xue yuan li shi yan jiu suo 中国
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However, civil disorder and the instability of rule in Vietnam hampered these requests 
and the achievements of border re-demarcation at the turn of the eighteenth to 
nineteenth century. The Điêu Doãn An incidents culminated in Sino-Vietnamese border 
conflicts along with the growth of the Nguyễn dynasty in Vietnam.  
In summary, incorporating local regimes or indigenous forces in frontier, overland 
or offshore territories was crucial for Nguyễn’s northward territorial extension. 
Intensive frontier defence and tension in frontier affairs originated from efforts to 
expand central authority to peripheral regions, coupled with the gaining of strength 
during the Nguyễn era.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The Nguyễn consolidated its control of the whole of Vietnam by national security 
defence. This defence extended from sea to land. Specifically, Huế undertook sea 
defence from coast regions to the sea. The establishment of naval fleets, regular patrols 
at sea and the occupation of islands located at sea enhanced the surveillance and control 
of Nguyễn Vietnam. Besides, the central government used seafaring communities such 
as Chinese fishermen, to help them to defend the Sino-Vietnamese borders. Furthermore, 
the Chinese merchants, fishermen and even government vessels became the force used 
to pacify the Sino-Vietnamese water borders and Vietnamese waters. As for the 
                                                                                                                                               
社会科学院历史研究所, Gu dai zhong yue guan xi shi zi liao xuan bian 古代中越关系史资料选编 
[The compilation on the ancient Sino-Vietnamese relations] (Bei jing zhong guo she hui ke xue chu ban 
she北京: 中国社会科学出版社, 1982), p. 567. 
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overland borders, the establishment of fortresses in crucial passes and transportation 
knots, the curbing and investigation of suspicious persons along the borders and the 
organisation of merchants or people to establish border towns or villages were the main 
methods used by Vietnam to control the overland borders as tightly as possible. It was 
the expansion of the power of the central government to the periphery that lay behind 
the intensified national security measures.   
The expansion is reflected in two aspects. One was to consolidate central power in 
the whole kingdom by lessening local powers. Actions such as the annihilation of 
rebellions and pirates, bandits, etc. using indigenous forces and the strengthening of 
frontier defence by all means were taken with the purpose of concentrating the court’s 
power.  
The other aspect was the emergence of political and diplomatic tensions in 
Sino-Vietnamese relations in border areas. Vietnamese territory advanced northwards 
via negotiation and compromise under China’s frontier policy and the normative 
tributary system. The Huế court’s reinforced jurisdictions on peripheral regions in the 
frontiers sparked alarm in the Qing even though it continued to maintain normal 
Sino-Vietnamese tributary relations. The presence of the Nguyễn court in northern 
Vietnam, especially in Sino-Vietnamese border regions, was the result of the expansion 
of central power to the periphery.  
The consolidation of frontier defence, which utilised local forces in frontier conflicts, 
was a sign of Vietnam’s challenge to China’s territorial claims and its attempts to assert 
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its status as a regional power in overland Southeast Asia and later to expand its 

























Source from Đại Nam Nhất Thống Dư Đồ大南一统舆图[The atlas of Đại Nam]. Viện 








Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
By the nineteenth century, Sino-Vietnamese relations had experienced an impressive 
variety of forms. Grounded in different strategies of administration and diplomacy, the 
distinction between the two countries was manifested in their respective concern for 
Sino-Vietnamese relations. China’s world order fuelled the effort to realise the 
cosmology rooted in the Ritual of Zhou, including the ritual responsibilities of 
neighbouring kingdoms. However, for Vietnam, how to survive in the shadow of its 
northern giant, China, how to sustain itself, and how to promote stable development 
were the principal and essential strategy concerns since Vietnam’s territorial separation 
from China and its establishment of individual administrative domains around the tenth 
century. Correspondingly, Sino-Vietnamese relations were indispensably marked on 
both sides by the focus on amalgamation by concession and negotiation until the earlier 
part of the nineteenth century.  
With economic and population growth, a new round of Chinese commercial 
expansion in Southeast Asia emerged in the late eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth 
century. Coupled with Nguyễn’s uniting of northern and southern Vietnam, Vietnam 
played a significant role in the commercial contacts between China and Southeast Asia. 
The fine-tuning of traditional Sino-Vietnamese relations and a stable administration in 
the northern regions as a primary part of Vietnam were indispensable ingredients of the 
trade boom with the Chinese in northern Vietnam in 1802. The tribute trade together 
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with the tributary system was revived from 1802. The Sino-Vietnamese trade of all sorts 
pertaining to tributary regulations, and commercial communications facilitated tributary 
responsibilities such as rescuing wrecked crews, repatriation and extradition of people, 
and even direct missions to Guangdong on official business. All these were signs of the 
recovery and promotion of government-to-government commercial contacts between 
China and Vietnam. By the nineteenth century, the Nguyễn government played an 
active role in commercial contacts at the government level.  
In accordance with active governmental commercial contact, authorised private 
trade was ebullient in northern Vietnam. Private trade included overland trade across the 
Sino-Vietnamese frontier, trade further south in Vietnam, and Sino-Vietnamese 
maritime regions, in the Gulf of Tonkin and further south. Itinerant petty merchants or 
enterprises, and plying junks were dynamic commercial elements in Vietnam’s northern 
land and sea frontiers. The cross-border or ocean-going trade with the Chinese moving 
back and forth between China and northern Vietnam acted as an external component of 
this integrated trade system between northern Vietnam, central Vietnam, and even 
southern Vietnam. Concurrently, the vitality of Sino-Vietnamese commercial 
communications in northern Vietnam introduced a new impetus to the Nguyễn 
kingdom.  
The surreptitious commercial network formed by unauthorised traders developed 
alongside the blossoming of the Huế Court’s authorised trade. Assorted smuggling 
traders who benefited from this bustling Asian commerce became the economic 
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pioneers who constructed new opportunities or facilities in some regions not easily 
reached by legitimate trade networks. Large-scale Chinese migration and intermittent 
bans on maritime trade resulted in the flourishing of smuggling activities. These 
smugglers were usually pirates, fishermen, or merchants who engaged in unauthorised 
deals by fraudulent means such as avoiding tax and so on. They became active 
commercial elements as well as forces that shared in the profits with Vietnam’s central 
government in the waters of south-eastern China and northern Vietnam. Concurrently, 
by the middle of the nineteenth century, bandits, secret society members and rebels 
were engaged in smuggling in northern Vietnam. However, the flourishing of 
commercial trends, such as the overwhelming success of opium in China and Southeast 
Asia, the outflow of precious metals, and illegal human movement, had changed by the 
1830s. It was in this historical context that Vietnam's identity evolved in the eyes of 
China and Southeast Asia. This process was punctuated by intermittent wrangling and 
conflicts, and even wars.  
The challenges the Nguyễn faced in the process of developing one polity included 
how to confront unprecedented frontier commercial success and security problems with 
China, and how to achieve a status that had evolved under the traditional framework of 
Sino-Vietnamese relations. Internally, it had to establish and differentiate itself as a new 
dynasty from the south, unlike the former traditional regime that had maintained a 
northern stronghold.  
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Huế Vietnam, originating in the south, facilitated the emergence of a national 
identity that evolved with some new dynamic elements. This meant that Huế had to 
adopt and adapt, and even improve the previous traditional framework of the 
Sino-Vietnamese tributary relationship so as to handle the previous unprecedented 
problems before Nguyễn Phúc Ánh established the Nguyễn Dynasty in Huế in 1802. 
Grounded in the practice and experience of coexisting with China, and sustaining the 
unbalanced relationship with China over several hundred years, Huế chose the more 
pragmatic and flexible way of endeavouring to obtain more chances such as commerce 
in inter-governmental contacts with China. It is worth noting that this did not mean the 
same thing for both sides: for China, Vietnam’s deference was the sign of a ritual 
responsibility; while Vietnam saw the submission or subordination as a means to an 
end.  
As mentioned in Chapter One, the Nguyễn actively promoted the tributary 
Sino-Vietnamese relationship in order to accomplish the dynasty’s legitimacy in 
Vietnam and reorganise commercial communications at the governmental level. The 
subtext behind the active tributary practice was not only sincere servitude but also 
commercial demand. The era that exerted the most Chinese influence in Nguyễn 
Vietnam, cultural or otherwise, was not the most submissive period. The most aberrant 
events occurred in the ‘most Chinese’ period under Emperor Minh Mạng, such as 
Vietnam’s criticism of the Opium War in China, the extradition and repatriation of 
criminals, and even the payment of tribute by sea and so on. The criticism of the Opium 
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War in China can be attributed to the blocking of the regular Sino-Vietnamese trade 
routes. The purpose of changing the route for extraditing and repatriating criminals was 
to create better opportunities for Sino-Vietnamese official trade. 
These ‘exceptions’ were due to two factors. On one hand, the Nguyễn endeavoured 
to reshape the traditional Sino-Vietnamese relationship by enhancing Vietnamese 
influence in China’s tributary system. A more stable diplomatic Sino-Vietnamese 
relationship would offer greater trade opportunities for Vietnam due to Qing’s frontier 
concerns shifting from the south to middle Asia. On the other hand, the challenge was to 
find new trade opportunities from the traditional Sino-Vietnamese relationship to satisfy 
increasing trade demands. Apart from these exceptions fostered by the Nguyễn, Như 
Đông Công Vụ (going to Guangdong for official business) became a regular activity. 
Như Đông Công Vụ was not explicitly mentioned in Vietnam’s major historical records 
in Vietnam before the Nguyễn Dynasty was founded. However, it appears frequently in 
the records of the Nguyễn Dynasty. Như Đông Công Vụ definitely included trade in 
Guangzhou, even though its other purposes or detailed activities were not clearly 
recorded in Nguyễn dynastic records. These events and activities demonstrated that 
commercial elements in traditional relationships were not neglected in the nineteenth 
century. 
During the nineteenth century, in terms of Sino-Vietnamese relations, the Nguyễn 
reign in Vietnam not only obtained the acknowledgment of China, but also more 
commercial opportunities under China’s tributary system, which was evolving into the 
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treaty system. Furthermore, Vietnam contributed to the enlargement of 
Sino-Vietnamese contacts by using tributary obligations as commercial opportunities, 
since Qing China did not allow direct trade. This paved the way for the transformation 
from tribute trade to maritime trade and even openly foreign trade, and from a tributary 
system to a system of equal inter-state relations with the outside world in the colonial 
era. 
In addition, the friendship in the tributary system helped to consolidate Vietnam’s 
legitimacy in China’s eyes. Sino-Vietnamese cooperation in exterminating bandits or 
pirates, routing rebels, extraditing criminals, and rescuing shipwrecks and the like 
helped to defend militarily and diplomatically the legitimacy of Vietnam’s throne as an 
autonomous state. As for commercial communications, Vietnam obtained more from 
tribute trade. From the perspective of the Nguyễn, it contributed to the facilitation of 
normal trade between southeast China and northern Vietnam. 
In accordance with diplomatic reform during the reshaping of Vietnam’s identity, 
Huế also endeavoured to reorganise certain domestic elements. Nguyễn regulated 
authorised trade. Furthermore, the Huế court grasped the most effective tool, the 
Chinese community in Vietnam, and succeeded in integrating domestic commercial 
resources. Chinese travelling merchants amassed wealth, and exploited more 
commercial opportunities in northern Vietnam. 
The growing power of the state in Vietnam created both geographical and political 
changes in Sino-Vietnamese relations, resulting in pressure on the previous local power 
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groups on the northern frontiers . Coupled with this increasing pressure, smuggling, as 
defined by the government of Huế, was rampant, particularly on the northern border. 
Explicit mentions in the Nguyễn official archives demonstrated the solidifying of 
governance and the growth of commercial resources at the frontier during Vietnam’s 
national emergence. Hand in hand with Chinese commercial developments in Southeast 
Asia, trade trends shifted in Asia and were followed by the introduction of trade with 
the West. Forbidden item policies were a sign that the Nguyễn court attempted to 
maintain and continue its dominant position in domestic commercial resources, and 
solve its economic problems, such as the shortage of silver and other items, which 
emerged from the rapid commercial changes in Asia. As for forbidden items, they were 
not contraband in the strict sense. National demand determined when or to what degree 
certain goods became a forbidden item. In general, some goods were forbidden either 
for export or import. Some goods were used to exchange other vital merchandise from 
foreign merchants. Others could neither be imported nor exported. Also, some goods 
were not always forbidden goods in certain periods, but were labelled as such in other 
periods. They also evolved in accordance with Huế’s commercial policy and demands.  
With regards to Nguyễn’s economic responses to the outside world, Chinese traders 
played an important role in the illegal trade contacts between Vietnam, China and even 
other regions in Asia for the smuggling of crucial goods such as opium, copper and rice 
into or out of Vietnam. In this respect, Chinese merchants became the vital bridge in 
trade that connected Vietnam and China, and even regions in Southeast Asia. Moreover, 
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Chinese smugglers were a driving force behind the opium deals that engulfed Vietnam 
and shifts in trade trends as well as the outflow and dearth of precious metals, especially 
Vietnam’s silver and copper. Concurrently, as far as the Nguyễn government was 
concerned, the Chinese merchants also became a kind of tool to accomplish its political 
and economic goal of exchanging other important items such as military resources or 
copper and to solve domestic commercial problems using the contraband policy. Be it 
the Chinese merchants or the contraband policy, both completed the profit 
monopolisation of the Nguyễn rulers, and enhanced their expansion of power to some 
degree. However, the Huế court was incapable of resolving problems that were a result 
of global commercial expansion. Therefore, the ‘forbidden item policy’ neither 
mitigated the impact that the Eurasian commercial exchanges exerted on Vietnam, nor 
did it provide the Huế Court with a normative way to respond to the world outside 
Vietnam.  
Security was consistently intertwined with commercial development in Vietnam. 
Security defence on the northern border interacted with commercial activities in 
Vietnam. Huế was adept in utilising local forces to defend the frontier. The local forces, 
comprising people such as local fishermen, sojourning Chinese and the like, were the 
defence force for the government on the northern frontier. However, Vietnam’s 
expansion on the frontier unavoidably created conflicts under the regulations stipulated 
by the traditional Sino-Vietnamese relationship. The Điêu Doãn An incident is an 
example of this. Here, we borrow the term ‘Sino-Vietnamese asymmetry’ from Brantly 
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Womack’s work. 1
                                                 
1 Brantly Womack, China and Vietnam : the politics of asymmetry (Imprint Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006). 
 Huế indeed applied ‘Sino-Vietnamese asymmetry’ to serve a 
purpose, that of enhancing its strength. Qing China’s concerns about its internal 
problems and the inner Asian frontier problem created this opportunity. Vietnam not 
only seized the opportunity to expand under the Sino-Vietnamese ‘politics of 
asymmetry,’ but also changed Nguyễn’s frontier ideas on how to review and expand the 
southern frontier. Vietnam marched into Cambodia and pushed the frontier line further 
south during the Minh Mạng era. This event made the best footnote even though the 
march into Cambodia was temporary and Vietnam withdrew its troops in Thiệu Trị. 
In earlier periods of the Nguyễn dynasty, the evolution of the identity of Huế 
Vietnam culminated in the high point of Vietnamese history. It not only gained far more 
commercial profit than would have been possible in the traditional Sino-Vietnamese 
relationship, but also succeeded in integrating domestic commercial resources and 
achieved both a planned and actualised frontier, before the arrival of the French 










1: Như Đông Công Vụ (Going to Guangdong for official business) in the Nguyễn 
Dynasty   
Time  Place  Officials  Vessels  Remarks  Reference  
1755 From 
Guangdong  




nh Biên I, 
Vol. 1, p.10 







nh Biên I 
Vol. 4, p.14 
1796 China  Chu Văn 
Yến朱文燕  
and others  




nh Biên I 
Vol. 8, p.21 






got the news 
which Le 
emperor died 
and go back  
ĐNTL Chí
nh Biên I 
Vol. 10, 
p.10 
1803 China  Lê Quang 
Định黎光
定 
 Back from 
China 
ĐNTL Chí
nh Biên I 
Vol. 22， 
p.25 
1805    Send the book 
to China 
ĐNTL Chí
nh Biên I 
Vol. 26， 
p.22 




nh Biên I 
Vol. 27， 
p.6 










coppers to buy 
cargos  
ĐNTL Chí
nh Biên I 
Vol. 28， 
p.11 





nh Biên I 
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ships bailiffs go 
back China by 
Vietnamese 
commercial 
ships   
Vol. 34, 
p. 2 




 Took 20,000 
liang silver to 
buy cargos  
ĐNTL Chí
nh Biên I 
Vol. 40， 
p.14 
1810 China  Nguyễn 
Hữu Thận
阮有慎  
 Come back 
from China  
ĐNTL Chí
nh Biên I 
Vol. 40， 
p.20 




nh Biên I 
Vol. 44， 
p.1 







nh Biên I 
Vol. 45, p.6 




  Be 
commissioned 
to take 10,000 




nh Biên I 
Vol. 48, 
p.19 





nh Biên II 
Vol. 2, p.3 













nh Biên II 
Vol. 3, p.10 
1823 Guangdong  Trần Đức 
Suất陈德
帅，and Trần 
 For official 
business  
ĐNTL Chí





















nh Biên II 
Vol. 16, p.1 








nh Biên II 
Vol. 
46,p.17 
1831 Yunnan  By land  Purchase the 




nh Biên II 
Vol. 73, p.5 













nh Biên II 
Vol. 
81,p.14 
1836 Guangdong Lý Văn 
Phức李文
馥  
 Return  ĐNTL Chí
nh Biên II 
Vol. 
167,p.3 










nh Biên II 
Vol. 
181,p.20 



















Qin ding da 
qing hui 













nh Biên II, 
Vol. 170, 
p.24 








 for official 
business 
ĐNTL Chí
nh Biên II 
Vol. 202, 
p.24 






 Return ĐNTL Chí
nh Biên II 
Vol. 214, 
p.3 
1844 Guangdong  Trương Hảo 
Hợp张好合 
 
 Return ĐNTL Chí
nh Biên III 
Vol. 37, 
p.13 




凤 junks  
Return ĐNTL 
Chính Biên 
III Vol. 45, 
p.12 
1846 Guangdong Ngô Kim 
Thanh吴金
声 and other 
five officials  







nh Biên III 
Vol. 58, p.1 














nh Biên III 
Vol. 64, 
p.12 
















ships   









goods )  
ĐNTL Chí
nh Biên IV 
Vol. 14, 
p.40 
1863 Guangdong  Trần Như 
Sơn陈如山 
 For official 
business  
ĐNTL Chí
nh Biên IV 
Vol. 28, 
p.33 






Return  ĐNTL Chí
nh Biên IV 
Vol. 30,p. 5 
 
*:Yun nan sheng li shi yan jiu suo云南历史研究所. ‘Qing shi lu’yue nan mian dian tai 
guo lao wo shi liao zhai chao,《清实录》越南缅甸泰国老挝史料摘抄[The collection of 
materials related to Vietnam, Laos, Thailand and Burma in the veritable records of Qing 
dynasty]. Yun nan ren min chu ban she云南人民出版社,1985. 
 
 
Source from Source from 清实录 qing shi lu，钦定大清汇典事例 qin ding da qing 




2: Extraditing and repatriating criminals  
 
































ên I, Vol. 
13, p.1 
1802  Zhang Yalu 
张亚禄 and 





China   Qinzhou  ĐNTL, 
Chính Bi
ên I, Vol. 
18, p.5 






other five  
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China  Tống Phúc 
Lương宋
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Qinzhou  ĐNTL, 
Chính Bi









China   Qinzhou  ĐNTL, 
Chính Bi
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四 and Su 
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1845 Cao Bằng 





in China  







1845 Vạn Ninh 
in Vietnam  
Huang 
Jinxiu黄进















1848 Quảng Yên 










































  Sent back 
to Qinzhou 













*: Yun nan sheng li shi yan jiu suo云南历史研究所. ‘Qing shi lu’yue nan mian dian tai 
guo lao wo shi liao zhai chao,《清实录》越南缅甸泰国老挝史料摘抄[The collection of 
materials related to Vietnam, Laos, Thailand and Burma in the veritable records of Qing 
dynasty]. Yun nan ren min chu ban she云南人民出版社,1985. 
 
Source from 清实录 qing shi lu，钦定大清汇典事例 qin ding da qing hui dian shi li，
Đại Nam Thực Lục, Khâm Định Đại Nam Hội Điển Sự Lệ. 
 
 
3: rescuing Chinese shipwrecks  
 
Time  Place  Wrecks name  Wrecks 
Original 
place  




1796 Guangdong in 
China  
Vietnamese 
who sold rice  











1798 Guangdong in 
China 












1801  Zhao Dashi 赵
大仕 
















and fifty five 
Vietnamese  












1804 Quảng Trị and 
Bình Định   




China   Sent back 














 Sent back 













1806 Vietnam  Chinese 
fishermen  




























1807 Vietnam Siamese 
envoys on the 
way to pay 
tribute to China 




















Fujian province  






































1814 Phú An Xu Ningan,许
宁安 Chinese 














1815 Phú An, 
Vietnam  
Xu Ningan 许











1815 Vietnam  Siamese 
envoys’ ship on 
the way to pay 
tribute to China  











and other  
fifty 
Vietnamese   













1816 Hainan , 
China 
Soldiers around 
ten Vietnamese  













Họa. Vol. 52， 
p.1 
1817 Vietnam  Siamese 
envoys’ ship to 
pay tribute to 
China 





1817 Japan  Vietnamese 
officials  
Officials 








sent back  






1817 Phú An, 
Vietnam 
Chinese  Official 
ships  from 
Fujian  




, Reel 3 
1818 Phú An, 
Vietnam 
Weapons of Xu 
Ning’an 许宁
安 and Li 
Zhenshi，李振
示 

































文禄 and other 
twenty 










, Reel 6 






1821 Vietnam  Yu Xingfa 于 Fishermen Lê Văn Rescued Châu 
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兴发 and other 
fifteen Chinese  















, Reel 9 
1822 China Vietnamese 
refugee  

































1822 Vietnam  Siamese 
refugee ships  





1822 Khôi Bích 
seaport, Thanh 












1822 Khôi Bích 
seaport, Thanh 
Hóa, Vietnam   
One Chinese 
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1834 Khôi Bích 
seaport, Thanh 



















































































































































1843 Quảng Nam , 
Vietnam  
Chinese around 









1843 Biện Sơn 
waters, Thanh 








































1844 Khôi Bích 
seaport, Thanh 
Hóa, Vietnam   
Seven Chinese 
























1844 Khôi Bích 
seaport, Thanh 
Hóa, Vietnam   
seven wrecked 












1845 Tonkin waters 
in Vietnam 












1847 China  Ryukyu and 
Vietnamese  






































Chinese  Chinese 
ships from 
Guangdong  





1848 China Vietnamese 
wrecked ships 





















of copper  
Vol. 4, 
p.42 




Vietnamese  Ship from 
Bình Thuận 








1849 Thuận An , 
Vietnam  
Wu Huilin 吴































































1851 China  Vietnamese 
wrecked ships 




















































































1855 Thuận An , 
Vietnam  
Chinese 
official ship  
Intend to go 
to 
Qiongzhou  





1855 Thi Nại, 
Vietnam  
Chinese 
official ship  
For official 
business  
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eight Chinese  





1856 Đại Chiêm 
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1858 Quảng Trị, 
Vietnam  
Chinese 
merchants   





1863? Bình Định, 
Vietnam  
Western 
merchants   


























*: Yun nan sheng li shi yan jiu suo云南历史研究所. ‘Qing shi lu’yue nan mian dian tai 
guo lao wo shi liao zhai chao,《清实录》越南缅甸泰国老挝史料摘抄[The collection of 
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materials related to Vietnam, Laos, Thailand and Burma in the veritable records of Qing 
dynasty]. Yun nan ren min chu ban she云南人民出版社,1985. 
 
 
Source from Đại Nam Thực Lục, Khâm Định Đại Nam Hội Điển Sự Lệ , Nguyễn Triều 
Châu Bản, qin ding da qing hui dian shi li钦定大清汇典事例 and qing shi lu zhai 
chao. 
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Source from Phan Thúc Trực潘叔直. Quốc Sử Di Biên国史遗编 [A transmitted 
compilation of the dynasty’s history]. Xiang gang zhong wen da xue wen hua yan jiu 
suo香港中文大学新亚硏究所.Hong Kong New Asia Institute, 1965. Trương Đăng 
Quế张登桂. Đại Nam Thực Lục大南实录[Primary compilation of the Veritable 







5: Weighted provincial distribution of floods in different dynasty(Only provinces 
having recorded floods are mentioned Note: N=Number WP=Weighted percentage) 
Yuan Dynasty 
PROVINCE N WP 
TOTAL  57 9.75 
SOUTH    
KIANG SI 16 2.86 
HUNAN 13 1.96 
FUKIAN  9 2.02 
KWANGTUNG 7 1.15 
KWANGSI 8 1.31 
YUNNAN 4 4.5 
 
Ming Dynasty 
PROVINCE N WP 
TOTAL  182 21.71 
SOUTH    
 309 
KIANG SI 30 3.83 
HUNAN 27 2.91 
FUKIAN  27 4.34 
KWANGTUNG 29 3.41 
KWANGSI 29 3.40 
YUNNAN 30 42.40 
 
Qing Dynasty 
PROVINCE N WP 
TOTAL  145 12.93 
SOUTH    
KIANG SI 52 4.93 
HUNAN 3 0.24 
FUKIAN  0  
KWANGTUNG 50 4.37 
KWANGSI 30 2.61 
YUNNAN 6 0.36 
 
 
Weighted provincial distribution of droughts in different dynasty 
(Only provinces having recorded droughts are mentioned  
Note: N=Number WP=Weighted percentage) 
Yuan Dynasty 
PROVINCE N WP 
TOTAL  34 10.75 
SOUTH    
KIANG SI 5 1.86 
 310 
HUNAN 9 1.97 
FUKIAN  3 1.41 
KWANGTUNG 6 2.06 
KWANGSI 8 2.72 
YUNNAN 3 0.70 
KWEICHOW 0  
 
Ming Dynasty 
PROVINCE N WP 
TOTAL  115 25.23 
SOUTH    
KIANG SI 20 4.65 
HUNAN 23 4.51 
FUKIAN  27 7.89 
KWANGTUNG 8 1.71 
KWANGSI 11 2.35 
YUNNAN 23 3.34 
KWEICHOW 3 0.78 
 
Qing Dynasty 
PROVINCE N WP 
TOTAL  88 31.13 
SOUTH    
KIANG SI 18 1.69 
HUNAN 2 15.88 
 311 
FUKIAN  0  
KWANGTUNG 44 3.82 
KWANGSI 15 9.07 
YUNNAN 6 0.35 
KWEICHOW 3 0.32 
 
Resource from: Yao Shan-Yu: The Geographical Distribution of Floods and Droughts 
in Chinese History, 206B.C.-A.D.1911 in The Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol.2, 
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